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The War of the Ilemi Appendix *

by Uri Almagor

INTRODUCTION

Our knowledge of the history of the area to the west and northwest of Lake Rudolf goes back little more than a century, and for most of this time the dominant tribe in the region has been the Turkana, who are considerably more numerous than any of their neighbours. (1) There was, however, a period in the 1920's and 1930's when Turkana hegemony was replaced by that of a much smaller tribe, the Dassanetch (also known as the Merile, Galuba, or Reshiat). In this paper I want to explore the question of how the Dassanetch achieved that position.

The three tribes mainly dealt with in this paper are the Turkana, the Dassanetch and the Nyangatom (Dongiro, Bume).

The Turkana number around one hundred thousand souls and inhabit an area in Kenya lying west and northwest of Lake Rudolf and extending some three hundred miles from north to south, and about one hundred miles from east to west. The whole area is arid and rainfall is not enough to permit agriculture. The Turkana subsist mainly on pastoralism. Turkana nomadism is based on movements between dry season and rainy season pastures. Population and livestock density is low and herds are spread over almost the whole area. The core of Turkana social structure is the independent small kinship group which is generally split and distributed between different grazing areas. Turkana settlements usually consist of a temporary cluster of homesteads. The tribe has no chiefs or central political institutions. Though they have an age-set system it does not play a particularly important part in their lives. The Turkana were studied by P.H. Gulliver in the early 1950's, and he has published a number of books and articles relating to them. (2)

The Dassanetch are a small tribe numbering around 15,000 and inhabiting the area north of Lake Rudolf along and on both sides of the Omo River in Ethiopia. Dassanetchland covers only about 850 sq. miles within which the Dassanetch practice stock husbandry and cultivate grain. Agriculture is made possible by the annual inundation of the Omo River and is practiced along the river and near its delta.

Dassanetch settlements are densely concentrated near the cultivated areas and each settlement contains households which independently follow a transhumant pattern of herding and cultivation. The

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Dassanetch are divided into clans but generally speaking ties based on kinship are weak. Clans have no territory of their own, shared ritual, leadership or any political organization. The central political institution of the Dassanetch is their age-group system, which affects almost every aspect of its members' lives. The Dassanetch have been investigated by the author of this paper, who spent the years 1968-1970 among them. (3)

The small tribe of Nyangotom numbers 5,000 and occupies the area north of the Dassanetch between the Omo and Kibish Rivers. The Nyangotom too subsist on a mixed economy of agriculture and pastoralism. They cultivate the alluvial flats of the rivers but their pastures extend to the Sudan - west and north of Kibish. Very little is known of their social organization, but an anthropological study was initiated in 1971 by Serge Tornay (The University of Paris).

The paper that follows is divided into three parts. The first one deals with the political history of the area, largely from the point of view of the ruling powers (British, Ethiopian and Italian), in the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of World War II. The second part analyses the reasons for Dassanetch military success in this period, and the last part deals with events since World War II.

Part of the information on which this paper is based was derived directly from the Dassanetch in the course of field-work; and part of it derives from published sources and from unpublished intelligence files. Wherever a datum is derived from written sources, I have indicated this in a footnote. If not source reference is given, this means that the datum was collected in the field.

II

In 1888, as a result of the exploration of Count Teleki and Von Hohnel, the existence of Lake Rudolf was first made known to the western world. There followed ten years of rivalry between England and Ethiopia over control of the area north and northwest of the lake. It culminated in 1898, when Ethiopian troops conquered and permanently annexed the area. (4) It was however only by the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement of 1907 that the border line in this area between British and Ethiopian territories was finally defined. (This is the international border line indicated on the map.) No police posts were established to protect the border, let alone any administration or control over the local pastoral tribes.

The absence of effective government in the area was exploited by outsiders of many nationalities, but above all Ethiopians, who established themselves in the small town of Maji, about 100 miles to the north of Lake Rudolf. From this base hunters and traders operated not only in Ethiopian, but also in British territory, and from here raids were launched on the various tribes in order to loot cattle, ivory and slaves. Maji was also the place where tribesmen could - at a price - always acquire arms. (5) As a result, inter-tribal war was intensified and widespread. A state of the utmost insecurity prevailed throughout the area.

This anarchic situation was repulsive to the British. Furthermore they were afraid that the Ethiopians - who viewed the 1907 treaty as a purely temporary arrangement - would gain de facto control of large areas of nominally British territory. (6) For these reasons Uganda, Kenya and Sudan in 1918 launched a joint military expedition known as the Labor Patrol. It aimed at punishing the Turkana, Dassanetch and Nyangotom for their disorderly conduct, and at expelling the Ethiopians from British West Africa. Both these objectives were achieved; but the British did not take advantage of their military success in order to establish a regular administration in the area. Instead, the immediate result of the expedition was, in Barber's words "a retreat by both sides from Northern Turkana. They withdrew because they both doubted their immediate strength against the potential strength of their opponents". (7) By that time there were no elephants left in this area and the ivory trade had almost ceased. (8)

During the period immediately following the Patrol, both the Turkana and the Dassanetch were heavily armed, free of effective control and in effect, left largely to themselves. This whole area north of the Kenya-Sudan border contains vital pastureland and water sources. The combined result of these two facts was a series of serious tribal clashes over access to grazing and water. Friction among the Turkana, Toposa, Dassanetch and Nyangotom was so common that at the beginning of the 20's the area was still being described as being "lawless, disturbed, hostile, violent and dangerous!"

The region in which tribal conflicts were most severe was the one known as the Ilemi Appendix (see map). This was the dry season grazing ground of the Dassanetch, Nyangotom and Turkana. From 1919 onwards the Dassanetch and Nyangotom were in alliance, and a series of small-scale clashes between them and the Turkana culminated in 1924 in a severe defeat of the Turkana, who were forced to abandon parts of the Appendix and move well south for British protection. (9)

Because of these clashes it became necessary to define the customary pastureland of the Turkana. The main body of the Turkana lived in a region which was originally part of Uganda, but which was transferred to Kenya in 1926. However, an important part of their grazing ground was actually in the Sudan. In order to avoid further inter-tribal conflicts, Sudan and Kenya agreed in 1926 that an area of Southern Sudan be reserved exclusively for the Turkana to graze. This is part of the area known as the Ilemi Triangle which has as its northern boundary the so-called Red Line, and as its southern limit the Kenya-Sudan border. (10)

In the same year, 1926, another measure was taken with the same purpose in mind: the military expedition called the Merile Patrol, whose purpose it was to punish the Dassanetch and Nyangotom for their raids on the Turkana in the Ilemi Triangle. The Merile Patrol achieved very little since during the following years the Dassanetch mounted such massive raids that the Turkana lost 64 dead in 1927, 215 in 1928, and 135 in 1929. Furthermore, much Turkana stock was lost. (11)

Effective action against Dassanetch raiders was inhibited by the complex political situation, involving three countries. To secure protection of the Turkana, who were living in Kenya, a firmer administrative control should have been imposed in the Appendix. The whole of the Appendix, however, is in Sudanese territory. Ethiopia, in turn, had claims on the Appendix and held that the Appendix issue was only temporarily settled (12) and that final borders should be negotiated. The inability of Ethiopia to control or disarm the Dassanetch and Nyangotom brought Kenyan demands and pressure on the Sudan to extend its administrative control to the Triangle and to take action against raiders operating in its territory.

After a Sudanese military expedition had surveyed the Ilemi Triangle, and had reported on the difficulties of the terrain, the Government of the Sudan concluded in 1931 that it was unable to extend the administration of the Eastern District into the Triangle. They therefore granted permission to the Kenyan authorities to take action against raiders and to establish police posts for defending the Red Line.

But at this point another issue arose; Kenya argued that the Red Line was unsatisfactory since it excluded water points and grazing which were "essential to the existence of the Turkana ... but ... more in the nature of a luxury to the Merile (i.e. Dassanetch)" (13) For this reason, they proposed in 1934 a new northern boundary for the area of grazing reserved to the Turkana. This proposal was accepted in 1937, and the new boundary became known as the Blue Line.

In actuality it was not until 1942 that Kenya took advantage of the permission it had to establish police posts in Sudanese territory. The reason for this delay was that the 30's were by and large peaceful years for the area (except 1933, when 57 Turkana were killed by Dassanetch raiders). The reasons for this slackening of hostilities are not known.

In 1937, an Italian force of about 1000 troops occupied the Lower Omo Valley. (The Italian army even entered the Ilemi Appendix and established a number of posts. They remained there for over a year, at the end of which time British diplomatic efforts brought about their withdrawal.) In order to subdue the hostile tribes in southwest Ethiopia, the Italians decided to arm the Dassanetch and gain their cooperation. For this purpose, and also as protection against British invasion from west of Lake Rudolf, they gave the Dassanetch 1000 modern rifles and a large quantity of ammunition. (14) In addition some of the young Dassanetch were enlisted by the Italians in their irregular forces, and were trained in modern guerrilla warfare.

At the end of the thirties almost the full fighting power of the Dassanetch, estimated at 3000 men, was armed with rifles. (15) The consequences were not long in coming. In 1939 the Dassanetch struck the Turkana with renewed vigour and nearly 300 Turkana were killed. (16) As a punitive measure, the Kenyan authorities despatched a column of the King's African Rifles, which killed 24 Dassanetch and confiscated several hundred head of livestock. In the meantime Italy made a diplomatic effort

to acquire the Ilemi Appendix, basing its claims on the Ethiopian argument that by establishing the Red Line as the limit of Turkana grazing ground, the British had ceded to Ethiopia the area lying between the Red Line and the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary. (17)

During 1940-41 the Dassanetch and Nyangatom continued to raid the Turkana extensively and engaged in several clashes with British patrols. At the end of 1940, and the beginning of 1941, massive military action was taken by the British army against the Dassanetch. The Italian army was forced to retreat and the Dassanetch fought to hold back the advancing British (who were assisted by 5000 Turkana irregulars). After Dassanetch settlements and camps had been bombed from the air, and the Dassanetch had been decisively defeated in battle, the Lower Omo was occupied (September 1941).

The British authorities realised that, once in control of the country, the best solution to the Merile problem was to disarm them. But the Dassanetch refused to give up their arms. In response, the British forbade the Dassanetch access to their pastures on the west bank of the Omo River. A military blockade was established to prevent tribesmen or stock from crossing to the west bank. The plan intended to allow a certain number of stock into a limited area of pasture on the west bank in return for each rifle handed over. (18) The Dassanetch refused to hand in any arms and the plan to disarm them failed. Since the British army left the Lower Omo region in December 1941, on the advice of the medical authorities who stated that the delta was too unhealthy for the troops, the blockade was lifted. (19)

Since the Dassanetch were still armed and had not been brought under control, the British authorities felt that they represented as great a threat to the Turkana as they had two years previously. Towards the end of 1942, Kenyan police posts were at last established in the area (at Liwan, Kaiemothia, Kokuro, Lokomarinyang and Kibish), and the Appendix was regularly patrolled by Kenyan troops.

The British decided, however, that their original notion of maintaining a border line between Dassanetch and Turkana was a mistaken one. The Red line had not been a success, and the policy of replacing it by the Blue Line and the Ethiopian-Sudanese boundary was never put into practice. There were several reasons for the failure of the Red Line. It was not a natural boundary, (20) it was never properly demarcated, and it ignored the interests and rights of the Dassanetch and Nyangatom. The Blue Line plus the Ethiopian-Sudan boundary would have suffered from similar defects.

The Kenyan authorities therefore changed their policy. The area of grazing reserved to the Turkana was once again to be limited by the Red Line. The Ilemi Appendix, the Dassanetch grazing ground which the Kenyans intended to transfer to the Turkana, was now declared out of bounds to both tribes. It was turned into a kind of "no-man's land", with the purpose of preventing any possible clash between the tribes. (21) British

officials informed the Dassanetch elders of the new eastern border and warned them that any tribesman found beyond the border was liable to be shot and his livestock to be confiscated. The Dassanetch rejected the new constraint and asserted their right to return to the Appendix.

In 1943, when the Ethiopian army returned to the Lower Omo, their government protested forcibly to the British about the occupation of the Ilemi Appendix and the establishment of military posts by the Kenyan authorities. They demanded that the 1907 treaty be respected. (This treaty, it will be recalled, gave the nomadic tribes near the border free access to pasture and wells on both sides of the International border.)

Britain denied the Ethiopian claims and refused to allow the Dassanetch access to the Appendix. The British argued that Ethiopia did not effectively control the Dassanetch, and that the Dassanetch were responsible for the large number of raids on the Turkana, in which hundreds were killed and much stock looted. The Kenyans further maintained that the Turkana were closely administered and virtually disarmed, while the Dassanetch were "completely uncontrolled" and had a considerable number of rifles. (22)

As the British had the largest forces in the area, their point of view won the day, and since that time the Dassanetch have been excluded from the Appendix.

III

In the 19th century the Turkana reached the limits of their expansion, and a reasonable degree of pastoral co-existence was achieved in the area. There existed, in the words of a later observer, "a nicely balanced community of small tribes around the north of Lake Rudolf and along the Omo River". (23) Disputes and clashes over pasture, water and livestock are more or less an inherent feature of inter-tribal pastoral relations, but such clashes did little to permanently change the status quo and seldom, if ever, forced tribes to evacuate areas customarily grazed, or to alter their patterns of movement. Petty gains and losses over pastures and access to wells were usually temporary and mutual, and were largely dependent on the fluctuating power relations among the tribes. Even in the relations between the powerful Turkana and a small tribe like the Dassanetch, the amount of livestock looted and the number of casualties on both sides were low.

What were the objectives of the warfare at that time? The Dassanetch were hemmed in on both sides by numerically far superior tribes - the Turkana in the west and the Borana Galla in the east. Both these tribes would have liked to expand their territory at the expense of the Dassanetch, and the overall aim of Dassanetch warfare was to prevent them from doing so.

The strategy used by the Dassanetch to achieve this was to send small raiding parties into enemy territory. Their own country was so small that effective defense always involved fighting on enemy territory.

A typical Dassanetch raiding party consisted of 10 to 15 men in their twenties. These were men who had known each other intimately from early childhood. They had all been born within the space of a year or two of each other, and constituted a separate group within the age-group system. This meant that they acted as a group not only in warfare, but in many other circumstances. The ties between them were immensely strong, and they continued to constitute a coherent group for the rest of their lives. It is noteworthy that they regarded themselves as equals - they had no leader.

Raids were never planned in advance. There were three kinds of circumstances which characteristically gave rise to them. Sometimes in the course of a ceremony involving dancing the participants would begin expressing hostility to their enemies. When this reached a certain pitch they would decide to go on a raid, and leave within a matter of hours. Similarly, an age-group of the kind we have mentioned might be sitting in the shade or round the fire talking, and then, when the subject of war was introduced, become excited and decide to raid. Here again they would leave almost immediately. Lastly, the raid might take place in revenge for some specific hostile act by their enemies - e.g. preventing a herdsman from watering his cattle at a certain place, or killing someone. Once again, the age-group would decide to leave almost at the moment.

The elders were more reflective than the young, and would sometimes try to hold back a raiding party on the grounds that on the whole it would do more harm than good; but their power was limited, and they rarely succeeded.

The raiding party would not normally have a definite objective. They would set out on foot, with spears and shields, sometimes with and sometimes without food supplies, hoping to come across an isolated enemy camp or small settlement. Having found one, the group would divide into three sections. One entered the enclosure and captured cattle, another attacked the inhabitants of the camp and tried to kidnap girls, while the third did not actually participate in the attack, but waited to ambush anyone who might arrive to help the victims or to act as a reserve in case of unexpected fierce resistance.

The attackers' aim was to kill all the inhabitants, except for the young girls, whom they took home with them together with the cattle.

It must be emphasized that cooperation between raiding parties was totally absent: each group carried out its raids independently, and there were no tribal long-term campaigns.

There were many incentives which encouraged an individual to participate in a raid. One of these related to the booty. Whoever seized cattle or girls retained control of them until he arrived home. The Dassanetch rule was that he then had to part with them. He could give them to whoever he wanted, and thereby created powerful bonds of obligation. Cattle were normally given to age-mates. Individuals in an

age-group were rotated among the three sections, so that in the long run their chance of spoils and honours of war were essentially equal.

Another incentive, and no less important, was the honour and the super-natural gains that accrued to someone who killed an enemy. Whenever a Dassanetch felled an enemy he smeared the enemy's blood all over his own body, and this was believed to bring him and his cattle fertility. If it was the first that the Dassanetch had killed, then, when he got home a ceremony took place at which his chest was scarred and he received a new and honorific name. (24)

Every raid strengthened the relationships among the age-mates (i.e. the members of an age-group). This was not only because they underwent common fighting experiences, but also a raid created institutionalized ties among them. Three kinds of bonds were established as an outcome of raids. First, the bond of 'killing partners' (meso): when a Dassanetch kills an enemy he asks an age-mate to certify the killing by spearing or shooting the dead man once again. This act joins the partners in an unbreakable tie, the emotional tie of 'best friends'. Second, the powerful formalized bond created whenever a Dassanetch saves the life of an age-mate. Third, the bond already mentioned, which was created by a gift of stock.

This complex and cross-cutting network of social and emotional ties created a high degree of solidarity and cooperation in a group which already had a remarkable esprit de corps.

* * *

The traditional balance of power in the area was upset in the early years of the century by the introduction of firearms. The Dassanetch are first mentioned as raiding with rifles in 1913, (25) and in the years that followed their numerous attacks on other tribes rapidly gained them a fearsome reputation.

Thorp presents some of the sayings of tribesmen about the Dassanetch. For example, a Rendile once said to Thorp that "the Geluba are more dangerous than Shifta (bands of robbers), because no one ever sees the Geluba". (26) Thorp confirms this by saying that that was "one of the reasons why other tribes fear them (the Dassanetch) so greatly. A raiding party will suddenly strike out of the blue and be gone almost before anyone has realized what has happened." (27) British officers participating in the military expeditions against the Dassanetch spread stories about the outstanding prowess and fanatic behaviour of the Dassanetch in battle. The report of the commander in charge of the 1932 expedition said that "the Dassanetch appear to be of considerable bravery and possessing natural intelligence for fighting, their knowledge of extended order and of taking cover was excellent, and had not the smoke of their rifles given away their position the Patrol might have experienced considerably greater difficulty in dealing with the situation." (28) An officer of the 4th King's African Rifles who took part in the 1939 operation against the Dassanetch told Thorp "that on one occasion some of their (the Dassanetch) riflemen continued to fire

until killed with the bayonet." (29) Thorp added that in cases of unexpected clashes, especially with the British forces, the raiders would put up a stout defence, fighting to the last man when pressed. Dassanetch warriors came to be known as utterly fearless, advancing in the open even against machine-guns. (30)

Now there is no reason to believe that the military prowess of the Dassanetch suddenly increased at the beginning of the 20th century. The explanation of their sudden rise to military might must lie elsewhere. The British view was that it was connected with their acquisition of firearms, and in this we concur. However, we believe that the British intelligence officers did not understand exactly why firearms made the Dassanetch more powerful. The British view was simply that they had more good weapons than did their neighbours, and that they were not held in check by the Ethiopians. The Turkana, they pointed out in contrast, were partially disarmed, and were under British control. (31)

But this is only a partial and unsatisfactory explanation. The Turkana, in spite of their partial disarmament, still possessed relatively large quantities of rifles. (32) Furthermore, they were never under such rigorous control as to prevent them from raiding other tribes. In 1962, almost 30 years after the Turkana had come under British administration, control of their country was still immensely difficult. (33)

There must therefore be other factors which explain the clear military superiority that the Dassanetch gained. What seems to have occurred is that firearms allowed the Dassanetch to kill far larger numbers of Turkana than ever before. In the old days a raiding party could only attack a small camp or settlement; now the same party could wipe out a very much larger one, because surprise was such an important feature of Dassanetch tactics - they often penetrated deep into Turkana territory, and appeared in completely unexpected places - the fact that the defenders also possessed firearms did not give them any corresponding advantage.

Why were the Turkana not able to employ the same tactics against the Dassanetch? The answer evidently lies in the different settlement patterns of the two tribes. As we have mentioned, Dassanetch land, in contrast to the Turkana country, was densely settled. Different groups of people were often no more than a few hundred yards apart, and could easily help each other in case of attack. Thus, in order for an attack to be successful it had to be carried out by a very large body of men - something of the order of 3000 rifles. The Turkana had the necessary numbers, but they simply lacked the ability to organize men on anything like this scale.

A point of some general interest emerges from this analysis. It has generally been argued in relation to other parts of Africa that the introduction of firearms had little effect on the local balance of

power. (34) Here, at least, things were otherwise. The introduction of firearms to the pastoral tribes of this area gave dramatic, effective and decisive military advantage.

IV

The loss of their western pastures in 1942 had severe ecological consequences for the Dassanetch. Even before the cordon sanitair was established around their country, their pastures lands were small, and since they possessed a relatively large number of cattle and small stock, pressure on their grazing land was considerable. Since the end of World War II, this pressure has mounted, gradually causing the overgrazing of some pastures. The pressure is, in a sense, mitigated by the regular inundations of the Omo River; each year the river floods the flats of Dassanetchland, providing cattle with excellent pasture. (35) Though the problem of overgrazing was considerable, between 1942 and 1962, no serious clashes took place in the Ilemi Appendix. It is true that at the end of the forties the Dassanetch made several attempts to regain their former pastures, but the area seems to have calmed down and the Dassanetch appear to have come to terms with the new situation.

During the sixties, however, a renewal of serious clashes between the Dassanetch and Kenyan police patrols occurred. The new hostilities, I would suggest, derive from further pressures on their limited pasture, brought about by the rise of Lake Rudolf since the end of 1961. Butzer who studied the geomorphology of the Lower Omo states: "The overall effect of the 1962-65 transgression has been to submerge almost 400 square kilometers of the Delta Fringe, with the Lake shore advancing northward an average distance of 12 kilometers." (36) Elsewhere he concludes that "the Lake level was higher in late 1962 than it had been for some 30 years." (37)

The increase in overgrazing, and the rapid submergence of some of their best pastures in the delta area produced more and more pressure on the restricted area of pasture land. This pressure reached the point where the very pastoral character of the tribe was in jeopardy - a fact which even the Dassanetch became aware of. I suspect that the renewed clashes with Kenyan patrols during the sixties were directly related to these mounting pressures and represented another attempt to regain their traditional grazing grounds. The attempt, however was unsuccessful.

The increased efficiency of Kenyan police patrols in the Ilemi Appendix and firmer control of the Dassanetch by the Ethiopian authorities, made the Dassanetch realize that they could not by themselves regain their lost western pastures. The establishment of the cordon sanitair, and of police posts around their country had brought their military superiority to an end.

At present the Dassanetch complain that they had been betrayed and humiliated by everyone except the Italians. They resent the Turkana who, throughout the last century, managed to extend their pastureland at the expense of the Dassanetch, and are bitter at the fact that

in spite of their victories over the Turkana they were forced into a very restricted homeland. They hate the British, who deprived them of their western pastures. They are hostile to the Nyangatom, with whom they had cooperated in joint raids but whom they saw return to their grazing area north of the Appendix, because they were considered more amenable. They are also antagonistic towards the Kenyans, who forbade their return to the Appendix, and towards the Ethiopians, who were unable to regain for them access to their former grazing grounds. They remember the short Italian occupation as a time of glory, during which their military supremacy over the Turkana reached its peak.

The Dassanetch have now been disarmed by the Ethiopian authorities and this together with the close control imposed upon them, deprives them of any aggressive strength. The continued exclusion of the Dassanetch from their western pastures therefore seems unjustified.

FOOT NOTES

1. See P.H. Gulliver - The Family Herds, 1955, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London; and J. Barber - Imperial Frontier, 1968, East African Publishing House, Nairobi.
2. See P.H. Gulliver - op.cit. The Second Impression (1966) contains good bibliography on the Turkana.
3. For further information see U. Almagor - "The Social Organization of the Dassanetch of the Lower Omo". Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. The University of Manchester, 1971; "Tribal Sections, Territory and Myth - Dassanetch Responses to Variable Ecological Conditions", Asian and African Studies, 1972, 8:185-206; and "Name Oxen and Ox-Names among the Dassanetch of Southwest Ethiopia", Paideuma, 1972, 18:79-96.
4. For more details see G. Sellassie - Chronique du regne de Menelik II, 1930-31, M. de Coppet, II, Paris, p. 471; M. Perham - The Government of Ethiopia, 1947, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, p. 295; and J.R.L. MacDonald - "Journeys to the North of Uganda", The Geographical Journal, 1899, Vol. XIV, pp. 129-148.
5. Barber, op. cit.: 103
6. Ibid
7. Barber, op.cit.: 185-6. See also R.O. Collins, "The Turkana Patrol of 1918", Uganda Journal, 1961, Vol. 25, pp. 16-33.
8. EA 2364, Turpin-PC Eastern Province, 28 June, 1919, quoted in Barber, op.cit.: 106. See also R.W. Beachey - The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century", Journal of African History, 1967, Vol.8, pp. 269-290.
9. See R.G. Turnbull - Turkana Frontier Affairs, Admin. Memo., Lodwar 1944.
10. Turnbull, op. cit.
11. Ibid
12. Barber, op.cit., 112-114

13. Turnbull, op.cit., 45
14. See 25 Bde. "I" Summary No. 11 (Political Records File No. 14/W/1939/2) of captured Italian documents.
15. See Political Branch letter No. 40/110 of 11.11.1941 to 'Chief Secretariat.
16. Turkana District Intelligence Report for July 1939.
17. Turnbull, op.cit., 28-49.
18. See S.P.O.'s letter No. Lok/1/Vd III/6 to Political Branch of 6.11.1941.
19. See D.C. Turkana's No. LOK/1/Vol. III/9 of 26.11.1941.
20. It is interesting to note that in some parts of the Red Line the grazing boundary is defined by expressions such as "a prominent cedar tree", "a cairn on a grassy bluff", or "a distinctive and blazed brown olive tree in the midst of forest" etc. See Turnbull, op.cit., p. 48.
21. Turnbull, op.cit.: 33
22. See Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to H.B.M.'s Minister at Addis Ababa, No. 1473/29 of 10.12.1944 and British reply A.XAF. 3/6/10 of 24.4.1944.
23. J.R.R. Thorp - A Short History of the Gelubba Border East of Lake Rudolf 1888-1942, 1942, Administrative Notes. Marsabit, p. 22. See also P.H. Gulliver - A Preliminary Survey of the Turkana, 1963, University of Cape Town - Communication from the School of African Studies, p. 154, and also his The Family Herds, op.cit., p.5; L. Von Holmel - "The Lake Rudolf Region: Its Discovery and Subsequent Exploration, 1888-1909", Journal of African Society, 1938, Vol. 37, 222-225.
24. For further details on Dassanetch names see U. Almagor - "Name Oxen and Ox-Names", op.cit.
25. Thorp, op.cit.: 17
26. Ibid.: 14
27. Ibid.: 14-15. See also Harrington's Notes on Gelubba Raids, A.D.C. Maikona, 1917. Administrative Records.
28. Ibid.: 13
29. Ibid.: ibid.
30. Ibid.: 13
31. Ibid.; Turnbull, op.cit.
32. In spite of several attempts to disarm the Turkana in the past, they possessed a large number of rifles in 1962, and were able to strongly resist Kenyan police patrols. See "Kenya Border Operation to Disarm Tribesmen", The Times, 5 March, 1962.
33. Ibid.

34. See G. White - "Firearms in Africa - An Introduction"; H.J. Fisher and U. Rowland - "Firearms in Central Sudan"; S. Marks and A. Atmore - "Firearms in Southern Africa - A Survey"; and R. Gray - "Portuguese Musketeers on the Zambia", in Journal of African History, 1971, Vol. XII, pp. 173-184, 215-239, 517-530, 531-533.
35. For further details on grazing patterns and the effects of over-grazing see U. Almagor - "The Social Organization of the Dassanetch", op. cit.
36. K.W. Butzer - Recent History of an Ethiopian Delta. The University of Chicago. Research Paper No. 136, 1971, p. 124.
37. Ibid., pp. 122-124.

