

AGENDA-SETTING REPORT FOR THE BORDERLANDS WORKING GROUP



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Cover Photo: Security and border arrangements in the contested borderland between Somaliland and Puntland at Lasanod (Laascaanood), Somaliland after Puntland forces took over control of the town in 2004. ©Markus Hoehne

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ACRONYMS

AEFJN	Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network	ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands	JESH	Jijiga Export Slaughter House
ASM	Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining	LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor
AU	African Union	LSLA	Large Scale Land Acquisitions
AUBP	African Union Border Programme	MP	Member of Parliament
AVR	Armed Violence Reduction	NPR	National Police Reserves
BWG	Borderlands Working Group	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
CBSG	Cross Border Security Governance	OUA	Organisation of African Unity
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism	OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
CCP	Country Programming Paper	ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	PIA	Priority Intervention Area
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework	PLP	Pastoralist Livelihood Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	REC	Regional Economic Community
DRC/DDG	Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining Group	RDPP	Regional Drought Preparedness Programme
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts	RISPA	Regional Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism
DRR/M	Disaster Risk Reduction/Management	RPLRP	Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	RPP	Regional Programming Paper
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	RVI	Rift Valley Institute
ERCA	Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority	SADC	South African Development Community
EU	European Union	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
GHoA	Greater Horn of Africa	SPLA/M/IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement/In Opposition
HoA	Horn of Africa	SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
ICBT	Informal Cross-Border Trade	UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
IDDRSI	IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative	UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development		
IOM	International Organisation for Migration		

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The borderlands of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHOA) are largely zones of recurrent human security crises. This is due to an interplay of their socio-ecological systems, political and economic developments, and the impact of humanitarian and military interventions. Border management is largely inefficient in that it does not provide basic physical security, forcing borderland communities to arm themselves to be able to fend off attacks. Simultaneously, a century of colonial and post-colonial aid and development policies has resulted in consequent chronic food insecurity, high unemployment rates, extreme precariousness of livelihoods, and increasing dependency on all kinds of (mainly international) aid. Yet, borders and borderlands are also spaces of opportunities in the form of vibrant cross border economies, productive and resilient socio-ecological systems, knowledge on how to make efficient and sustainable use of renewable resources, and sophisticated conflict management and equitable resource sharing systems. The purpose of this report is to provide the Borderlands Working Group (BWG) with a review of pertinent literature on key issues affecting borders and the borderlands of GHOA. The BWG is a collaboration between ten agencies working in border regions of East Africa. The BWG aims to influence discourse, policy, and practice on border security and management in East Africa from a community-centred approach. The main borderlands covered in the report are: Ethiopia-South Sudan; Elemi Triangle/Ateker Cluster borders in Kenya-Uganda-Ethiopia-South Sudan; and Somali Borderlands in Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia.

While the general interest in and readiness to cooperate across sectors is encouraging, it remains to be established how exactly this cooperation should take place, which issues require priority, and which gaps in knowledge and understanding need to be filled. Therefore, the report also lays out a set of recommendations on how knowledge about borders/borderlands can inform policy and practice.

We begin by giving an overview of the characteristics and key issues of the three border regions covered in the report, including geography, livelihoods and security; pertinent historical and ethnographic background; important developments, such as emerging economies, large-scale development schemes and demographic trends; dynamics of social, political and armed conflicts; as well as the effects of national and regional policies, governance, and development practices on the lives of borderlanders. Following the regional overviews, we examine key thematic areas across the different borderlands to present comparative discussions. The key findings of the study are as follows:

Ecology, Economy, and Livelihoods: On the majority of the borderlands, mobile pastoralism is the most viable livelihood, given the arid/semi-arid and unpredictable climatic conditions. The ecology also influence access to critical resources for pastoral production – water and pasture – which, in turn, affects livestock trade (central to the economy) and intercommunity dynamics. Pastoralism is critically dependent on mobility, which may be disrupted due to political disputes over and military presence around borders. Recently, many communities have adopted alternative livelihoods, such as artisanal mining, wage work, and contraband, both as a result of rising poverty as well as to buffer risks such as drought, disease, and raiding. The emergence of urban centres has led to new economic opportunities as well as rising inequality. Poorer pastoralists resort to low income generating activities, whereas wealthier households are able to take advantage of the commercialized livestock trade.

Social Organisation, Political Context, and Governance: The majority of borderland communities covered in the report are organized politically on ‘decentralized’ principles of social organisation such as gerontocracy, the generation or age-set systems, or clan/lineage. Hierarchical governance structures play important roles in community decision making processes and in regulating access to resources such as pasture and water. Communities also follow patrilineal descent system, patrilocal settlement pattern, and polygynous marriage systems. Although women do not have the same political power as men, they make important contributions to the economy and food security of borderlands. In addition, communities rely extensively on social networks, both within and across clan or ethnic identity as well as across borders. These networks allow for exchange, trade, and, critically, assistance during or after shocks to the livelihood base. Centralized rules and regulations of state-based authority, therefore, are antithetical to participatory governance structures. Moreover, borderland communities tend to be peripheral to state

interests and to lack influence in decision making vis-à-vis law and governance.

Peace, Conflict, and Security: Conflict in the borderlands comprises competition over natural resources, livestock raiding (including for commercial purposes), political disputes over boundaries, spill-over effects of political instability within countries, and terrorism. A range of environmental, political and historical factors influence conflict dynamics. The proliferation and circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) exacerbates the situation. Although countries have enacted measures to control the use and flow of SALW, these have not been entirely successful due to certain obstacles such as: lack of coherent national and cross-border strategies, high rate of militarization of civilian populations (e.g. in Somalia and South Sudan), and recurring food insecurity in border regions. Although marginalized, borderlands witness a heavy presence of security apparatuses, including military and intelligence. Formal security provisioning, where present, is largely inefficient, and the relation between formal security actors and the communities remains conflictive due to hard-handed approaches. In some areas, this breeds violent extremism. The complementary capacities of traditional institutions, governments, experts and NGOs are not yet in synergy although some promising examples do exist.

Stakeholders and Policies: This section presents an overview of relevant and critical regional stakeholders. These include national governments, the African Union and other regional bodies, private sector, and multilateral organisations such as the European Union and the World Bank. Concurrently, we also discuss principal national and regional policies relevant to the borderlands. In so doing we highlight the importance of local governments in border management, the current dissonance between national and continental/regional policies, and the initiatives that BWG could focus on in order to enhance community participation in programming and policy making.

Recommendations: Based on the extensive review, the study provides a list of research and practice recommendations in order to assist in setting the BWG's research and advocacy agenda on key thematic issues and under-researched borders and borderlands in the GHoA. Our recommendations highlight the need for knowledge on questions of central importance for the lives and livelihoods of borderlanders, including borderland security and social stability, and the sustainable and equitable development of borderland resources, cross-border economies, and regional socio-ecological systems. Our findings suggest that the unique capacities of the borderlanders – vis-à-vis resource use, conflict management, and decision making – remain largely ignored and unused in formal governance and development practice. The relations between borderlanders and their governments, security providers, experts, and development practitioners could be more harmonious and productive. The key to achieving this synergy would be to find efficient ways of harnessing the complementary expertise and capacities of local communities, professionals, government institutions, non-governmental organisations, and researchers. We discuss how this could be achieved and the contributions BWG could make in this regard.

INTRODUCTION

GREATER HORN OF AFRICA BORDERLANDS AND THE BORDERLANDS WORKING GROUP

The borders and borderlands of the Greater Horn of Africa (GHOA) are political constructs born out of strategic compromises by colonial and post-colonial governments whose primary aim was to influence population and economic trajectories within specific geographic boundaries (Baud and Van Schendel 1997; Manda, et al. 2014). The seemingly precise lines that divide the current states of the region – Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia (and its autonomous regions), South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda¹ – can be conceptualized at once as constraints as well as opportunities for people living around them. Cross-border communities, economies, kinship and friendship networks defy political projects of demarcation and control. This is reinforced by the high degrees of economic and cultural autonomy of many borderland communities.

With exceptions, GHOA borderlands are largely comprised of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs), which are characterized by dry, hot and highly unstable climate, water scarcity, and erratic and low biomass production. The economy, socio-political organisation and lifestyles of borderlanders have evolved over millennia as adaptations to the harsh environment. Economically, many borderland communities have sophisticated livelihood strategies, combining mobile livestock herding with agriculture and foraging. Socially, they commonly organise their affairs and activities in far more egalitarian ways within their own traditional governance systems. As (agro) pastoralists, borderland communities rely extensively on cross-border mobility, resource sharing and informal trade. Consequently, the communities' understanding of and practices around borders can sometimes, if not often, be in opposition to the ambitions of national governments whose prime concerns are about security and sovereignty.

While colonial governments in the region had accepted the legitimacy of traditional access rights of borderland communities to cross-border resources, postcolonial governments shifted to more hard-handed approaches – involving military forces – to “rein in the waywardness of pastoral existence” (Khadiagala 2010). Over time, as a result of declining state authority on several borderlands, new issues emerged that led to the intensification of security and military interventions. Chief among these issues are intercommunity conflicts, proliferation of weapons, illegal trade, the new scramble for high-value natural resources, refugee and migration flows, extremism, and smuggling of arms, humans and drugs (Manda, et al. 2014; Okumu 2010). In addition, borders are also common triggers of conflict and even war in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHOA).

Since these terms have critical bearing on the discussion that follows, it is necessary to define *borders*, *borderlands*, and *boundaries* at the outset. Whereas *border* refers to territorial divisions based on state formation and international law (commonly used as the line that separates two countries), *borderlands* signifies the areas of social, economic, and political interactions around the *borders* on both sides (Baud and Van Schendel 1997; Feyissa and Hoehne 2010). *Boundary*, on the other hand, is used both in discussions of borders (between and within countries) as well as in discussions of social, cultural and behavioural divisions, often as a line that should not be crossed at will (Baud and Van Schendel, 1997; see also Newman and Paasi, 1998). Unlike borders, which are commonly understood as political demarcations, borderlands are contested spaces of cross-border networks, cooperation, and conflict. This analytical distinction between borderlands and borders becomes critical when attempting to separate state and regional elite aspirations of borderland jurisdiction, control and cross-border dynamics from borderland communities' understandings and experiences of these areas.

Another important term we use in the report is *borderlanders*, which refers to individuals living around the borders. Without viewing borderland communities as an undifferentiated mass, we nevertheless recognize that in the context of the Greater Horn of Africa, they share profound similarities. In addition to an oftentimes shared ecosystem and resulting livelihood strategies, similarities among borderland

¹ Whereas various terms may be used to describe this region (e.g. East, Eastern or Northeast Africa), we refer to it as Greater Horn of Africa (GHOA) for the report. When we mention “the borderlands” in the report, unless specified, we refer to the borderlands/borders of the countries identified (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda).

communities include a particular form of political subjectivity. These communities are generally marginalized due to their political and ‘cultural’ distance from national centres. This distance is further reinforced by their geographic location typically far away from state capitals. Despite this marginalization, borderlands are frequently of great political and economic interest to governments. As inhabitants of spaces of geopolitical sensitivities, borderland communities are invariably greatly influenced by decisions made in national centres. Therefore, whereas we recognize and highlight the different historical, political and economic trajectories as specific to the border area, we also aim to heighten the agency of borderland communities by using a common term.

Although widely known for their constraints and marginalization, borders are also sites of economic, political, and other opportunities (Feyissa and Hoehne 2008). Borderlands play an important economic role, as evidenced by booming cross-border trades in livestock, agricultural produce and items such as *khat* (Mahmoud 2010). The recent discoveries of high-value natural resources, particularly oil and gold have, at once, led to a rapid increase in interest and investment in the region as well as resource grabbing and ownership disputes. Despite the opportunities, corruption, inadequate security arrangements, human trafficking and the proliferation of firearms increase the volatility of border areas (Slijper 2016). As this volatility is regionally and locally specific, developing efficient solutions requires systematic and comprehensive information.

This report, thus, attempts to present a comprehensive understanding of the historical and current situation in the borderlands of GHoA. It provides baseline information on the communities living in the borderlands and discusses key issues such as livelihoods, resource sharing, conflict, security, trade, socio-political organisation and governance. The report takes a people or community-centred approach, which privileges the perspectives and experiences of borderlanders. The report also discusses key regional and national policies regarding borders and borderlands. In so doing, the report outlines ways that different policymakers can include community-sensitive approaches in future policy and programming.

The consultancy team includes experts on key border hotspots such as: the Somali borderlands (Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia), *Ateker* borders and *Elemi Triangle* (Kenya-Ethiopia-South-Sudan-Uganda), and Ethiopia-South Sudan borders. The consultancy team has reviewed and synthesized literature on these borderlands to: a) provide detailed analyses and comparative discussions on the main issues affecting borders/borderlands; b) identify the most significant gaps in knowledge; and c) offer solutions and opportunities for research-based policy enhancement. The team also interviewed regional stakeholders to acquire perspectives on the issues affecting border security and management. Based on the extensive review and interviews, the report provides a list of research and practice recommendations to assist in setting the Borderlands Working Group’s (BWG) research and advocacy agenda.

Established in April 2017, the BWG is a collaboration between ten agencies² that aims to influence discourse, policy and practice on border security and management in GHoA through a community-centred approach. The Group believes that for border policy and development practices to be effective and sustainable, they need to be built with the active participation of local communities. The needs, interests and knowledge of local communities must be at the centre of efforts to achieve secure and prosperous border areas. The BWG exists to influence policy and practice on borderlands through evidence-based propositions that a community-centred approach to border management is feasible, sustainable and mutually beneficial.

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) – which has commissioned this report - is the current coordinator of the BWG. DDG is a unit within the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) specialising in Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) and Humanitarian Mine Action. With regard to borderlands, the focus of DDG’s work

² By February 2018, members included Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining Group, Norwegian Refugee Council; PACT; Institute for Security Studies; Rift Valley Institute; Small Arms Survey; PAX Christi; Life and Peace Institute; Handicap International; and Conciliation Resources; has observer status. Membership is open to more INGOs as well as CSOs working in border areas, who share the BWG’s goals and principles.

in the region is on AVR, including community-driven approaches to improving public security provision and conflict management, analysis and sensitivity. Among others, conflict analysis and GIS mapping are used to promote informed inclusive stakeholder dialogue with the view of collectively identifying and addressing conflict and security concerns. DDG has a growing portfolio focused on promoting community sensitive border security and management in the borderland areas of north, east and west Africa (Danish Demining Group 2016).

METHODOLOGY, APPROACH AND AUTHORS

For the foundational report, the consultancy team aimed for a methodology that allowed for the integration of different aspects of borderlands into a systematic analysis framework. In that regard, the report considers various currents of research, methodological foci, theoretical and empirical topics, as well as important interrelations and synergies between them. We review relevant scholarship on borderland communities and the issues affecting the borderlands, such as conflict and security, resource management, informal and formal cross-border trade, and accompanying development and policy interventions. These issues are explored both thematically and geographically. The approaches include socio-ecological systems, political ecology, political economy, regional and local history, ethnography and social anthropology. The report, thus, makes extensive use of comparative analysis and theoretical-methodological triangulation.

The desk review included research and analysis of various types of documents, including monographs, peer reviewed journal articles, books and reports. From the main sources we identified the most salient topics for inclusion in the report as well as gaps in knowledge, all the while focusing on a community-centred approach to borders and borderlands. Further, we explore and discuss ways in which these gaps can be filled to appropriately inform border(land) policies and practice on key problems and opportunities regarding conflict management, livelihoods resilience, sustainable development and resource management among others. The study aims to inform a multi-stakeholder process to collaboratively develop, test and implement community-driven security provision, local governance, resource use systems and tools to build community-centred interventions.


The desk review was supplemented by Key Informant Interviews (KII) using semi-structured questionnaires and focus group discussions with stakeholders in Nairobi, Lodwar, and Addis Ababa in November 2017. Interviewees included community representatives, regional experts, conflict analysts, government representatives, border security advisors, and staff of United Nations agencies and international and national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working in the borderlands. KII were also conducted in the Somali Region, Ethiopia, using a research guide. KII focused on, among others: a) the impact of national, international, regional and local politics on border security and management, b) key actors and interests involved in the borderlands, c) dynamics, risks and opportunities in the region, and d) alternative solutions, strategies and models for central problems in borderland security, livelihoods and development. Interviewees included community elders, researchers, security officers and representatives from the government and NGOs. KII were conducted with the objective of understanding and documenting current situation of the borderlands, as well as ongoing programmes in the border regions under study.

We also use primary data collected from the Somali Region in July 2017 for a different research project which focused on economic activities, livelihoods, trade and governance. Data was collected from the Trade and Investment Bureau, diaspora investors in the region, and the Jijiga Branch of the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA). The detailed and freely available data from the International Trade Centre complemented the data acquired from Jijiga's ERCA branch. We use this data in our discussion on cross-border trade in the Ethiopia-Somali borderlands.

The consultancy team comprises three lead researchers, and six regional experts (see Annex II). The team has conducted and published on several decades of in-depth research on the borderlands of Ethiopia, South Sudan, Somalia (including autonomous regions), Kenya, and Uganda. Our collective areas of expertise include anthropological and historical studies, pastoralism, conflict dynamics and management, ethnic identity, governance, migration and emerging economies among others, all within the context of borders and borderlands. The consultancy team maintains active connections in the academic and development worlds and are, therefore, knowledgeable about the existing debates and literature, as well as latest publications in their respective geographic and thematic areas of expertise.

REGIONAL OVERVIEWS

SOMALI BORDERLANDS AND MOYALE



ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA BORDERS

From a total of approximately 5,925 kilometres (km) of border that Ethiopia shares with its neighbours, one third (1,600 km) and the longest stretch is that along Somalia (CIA n.d.). This distance accounts for the entire border to the east, except the 349 km border with Djibouti. The Ethiopia-Somalia borderland is made up of Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland, and south-central Somalia. It extends from Djibouti to Kenya. The area within the border of Ethiopia is the Somali Regional State. Various Somali clans and sub-clans straddle this long border, contributing both to cooperation as well as conflict between the two countries.

In the past, the region was known for internal instability and fragile security conditions. Insurgent armed groups, such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and others, operated within the Ethiopia-Somalia borderlands. Between 2007 and 2017, however, Ethiopia's Somali region is enjoying a rare period of relative peace and stability. On the Somali side of the border, however, conflict is still ongoing. The Hiiraan and Gedo regions, in particular, are sites of counter-terrorism operations of the Ethiopian military, which has been fighting Al-Shabaab since 2007 albeit with interruptions. Fighting between various Somali armed groups and harsh external counter-terrorism campaigns have led to massive displacement and civilian casualties in recent years.

GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

The Somali borderlands are largely arid and semiarid where the average rainfall (560 mm) is much lower than in the Jubba river valley. The western rangelands on the Kenya-Somalia border receive the lowest rainfall (Little, et al. 2001a). The vast majority of individuals living in the arid and semiarid borderlands practice mobile pastoralism. In Somalia, agriculture is feasible mainly along the only two permanent rivers crossing southern Somalia, the Shabelle and the Jubba, both coming from Ethiopia. Agriculture is also possible in the Somali Region of Ethiopia, in the areas adjacent to the Oromia highlands, which receive higher rainfall and are cooler such as the Jijiga plains, and the riverine areas of Shebelle and Liban Zones.

The dominance of pastoralism translates to a very sparse population density in these borderlands, as this form of livelihood needs large land areas for mobility and cannot sustain a high population per unit of land. The population density in Ethiopia's Somali region, for instance, is only 13 individuals per sq. km.³ A similarly low population density is also visible across the border in Somaliland, Puntland and south-central Somalia, except in towns and riverine farming areas.⁴ Similarly, the Somali Region's population density is 15 persons per sq. km. (Central Statistical Agency 2008). By contrast, and despite the hardship and suffering since 1991, the population of Somalia has tripled since the 1970s, from around 3.6 million to around 12 million in 2017 (Madsen 2011).⁴ Moreover, many Somalis live in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia located in the border areas, in places such as the Dadaab camp in Garissa, Kenya. Additionally, it is estimated that around 1 million Somalis are part of the diaspora (e.g., in Europe, North America, Asia and the Arab Peninsula).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

History had the Somalis divided among different colonial powers. In addition to Somalia (and its autonomous regions), Somali-inhabited territories are now found in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. During colonial times, the current *de jure* state of Somalia itself was under the British (present day *de facto* state of Somaliland) and Italy (today's autonomous region of Puntland and southern Somalia). In an attempt to counter France (which controlled Djibouti), Britain encouraged the Italians to 'take' southern Somalia. After its victory over Italian troops at Adwa in 1896, Ethiopia expanded its borders into Somali territory and agreed on new boundaries with the French and the British. This made Ethiopia a colonial power on par with the Europeans regarding the Somalis. Italy kept an interest in watching over Ethiopia, seeking

³ Unpublished data from Somali Region's Finance and Economic Cooperation Bureau, July 2017.

⁴ Exact statistics not available

to undo the defeat at the hands of Emperor Menelik. The French and the British had their geo-strategic interests in controlling the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb; the British additionally supplied their troops in Aden with Somali livestock for meat production (Kendie 2007). The Ethiopia-British-Somaliland border was demarcated on the ground in 1932-1934 with the erection of concrete posts. Although Ethiopia and Italy agreed on the boundary, no written agreement was signed. This was used as a pretext to invade Ethiopia, first by Italy itself when in 1934 it invaded Ethiopia and controlled Wal-Wal, claiming un-demarcated borderlands, and later by post-independence leaders of Somalia. Up until today, the status of this part of the Ethiopia-Somali border is, legally speaking, undetermined (Bahru 2001).

State-society relations in the Somali borderlands were and remain mainly predatory. As a rule, state officials viewed, and continue to view, Somali (and other) pastoralists as unproductive, and Ethiopian (and Kenyan) governments suspected them of siding with their ethnic-folk across the border. Somali irredentism, i.e. pan-Somali nationalism (the claim to unite all Somalis in the Horn under one government within one nation state), triggered wars between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1960s and 1970s, and between Kenya and Somalia in the 1960s. Similarly, the Somalis in Ethiopia viewed the Ethiopian state as 'alien' - Christian and imposed on them. As such, relations remain tense and violence has affected the Ethiopia-Somalia borderlands since the late 19th century (Hagmann 2014).

In the mid-1970s, confrontations peaked and the government in Mogadishu ordered its army to invade eastern Ethiopia and support the Western Somali Liberation Front. In the so called "Ogaden War" (1977-78), Somali forces at first ascended until Harar, before being confronted by Ethiopian forces aided by the USSR and other socialist allies like Cuba. The Somali army was defeated in February 1978. In the wake of the defeat, more than half a million Somalis fled to Somalia in fear of reprisals (Markakis 2011).

Throughout the 1980s, President Siad Barre used the so-called Ogaden refugees, many of whom belonged to the Darood clan-family, as paramilitary forces. They were given weapons and the 'green light' to curb the rebellion of other clans (mainly Isaaq and Majeerteen) against his government. The rebel movements, Somali National Movement (SNM) and Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), had been founded by disgruntled Somali military officers around 1981, and had been hosted and partly equipped by Ethiopia. After initial losses, the ranks of the rebels swelled with volunteers. The Somali regime's atrocities against civilians in northern Somalia pushed many locals from their homes and made them refugees in Ethiopia and drove many into the arms of guerrillas (Compagnon 1990; Compagnon 1992). In 1991, with the toppling of the Somali government, state institutions collapsed. In contrast to this unfolding mayhem (particularly between 1991 to 1994), Ethiopia's Somali territories seemed much safer. Many Somalis fled there, as well as to Kenya. In Ethiopia, they settled mainly in Jijiga and surrounding areas.

Despite its promise, the federal restructuring of the Ethiopian state and the establishment of a Somali region did not resolve the troubled underlying state-society relation. Political turmoil and insecurity produced by large-scale human rights violations on the Ethiopian side as well as violence used by Somali rebels (mainly ONLF) continued to be hallmarks of the region after 1994 (Hagmann 2005). Rapid turnover of administrations, the activities of the ONLF, the establishment of the *Liyu* Police (a regional paramilitary force) that made its name as a particularly ruthless force staffed with Somalis operating against Somalis and, in Somalia, the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and later Al-Shabaab negatively affected stability, development and peace in the region. Security considerations outweighed socio-economic and welfare considerations to the detriment of the Somalis for most of the post-1991 period (Hagmann 2014).

LIVELIHOODS AND SECURITY⁵

Livelihoods in the Ethiopia-Somalia borderlands centre on livestock production and trade (Mahmoud 2010). Livestock is critical to the informal cross-border trade, besides being the main export product to the Arab Peninsula. Trade of other items (food, clothes, electronics, etc) also occurs in urban centres

⁵ Includes information from KII conducted in November 2017 under this project.

and on the Somali coast. Somali traders import items from the Arab Peninsula and Asia. Ethiopia exports mainly *khat* to northern Somalia. *Khat* is a mild stimulant consumed regularly by many Somali men, which produces considerable economic gain for Ethiopia and tax income for regional Somali authorities. There is also a contraband trade along the borders, particularly Ethiopia-Somaliland and to a lesser extent Moyale, aided by porous borders and weak state authority (Hailemeskel, et al. 2016).

According to key informants, insecurity on the Ethiopian side of the borderlands in recent years is mainly due to the fighting between Ethiopian government forces, including regional special forces, like the recently created *Liyu* Police, and Somali insurgents, most prominently the ONLF. In the view of some informants, the *Liyu* police, whose establishment is initiated and supported by the Somali elders, led to improvements in security and relative peace in Ethiopia's Somali region. Although the peace talks between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government that began in 2012 had not yet produced any results, a new round of talks commenced in 2018 (Maruf 2018). Most informants agree that in past years the Ethiopian state has fostered development in its Somali region, with for instance massive investments in infrastructure and regional universities in the capital Jijiga and in Kebri Dahar town. This was part of a peacebuilding strategy that aimed to isolate the ONLF from the regional Somali population.

The education and the health sector as well as the formal economy in Somalia have suffered tremendously due to the protracted period of conflict. The functioning of services depends on local conflict dynamics of warring. Discussions with key informants revealed that since 2000, with the enormous help of the diaspora and some NGOs, certain services (hospitals, schools, universities, orphanages) have been established in urban centres across Somalia. They are all private and attendance/services cost money. In Somaliland and Puntland, where autonomous regional governments have been established in the 1990s and guarantee basic security, civilians enjoy some peace and development.

From 2013 onwards, the relative stability in the Ethiopian Somali region allowed for the resumption of oil exploration and other capital-intensive development projects. China Poly Group plans to start exporting natural gas from the Ogaden basin by mid-2019 as it continues to explore near the Somali border. According to Ethiopian government sources, shipments from the Calub and Hilala fields will be exported along a 700-kilometre pipeline to a port complex in neighbouring Djibouti. This emerging extractive sector along the Somalia border is going to greatly affect local livelihoods if it does not consider human security.

KEY ISSUES ALONG THE ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA BORDER⁶

Implications of Localization and Trans-nationalisation

With the collapse of the central state in Somalia and state reforms in Ethiopia, Somalis fell back into village and lineage structures, and are more concerned today with locality than they were until the mid-20th century (Hoehne 2016; Menkhaus 1998). The globalization of Somalis, besides leading to massive diasporic investment in basic services and remittances, has also led to differences in lifestyles between 'homeland' communities and diaspora Somalis. These differences can sometimes turn into misunderstandings and conflict. Increasing localization and privatization, combined with trans-nationalization, have also influenced the economy (Little 2003). Many Somalis no longer live self-sufficiently as pastoral nomads. Rural as well as urban Somalis have increasingly become dependent on financial remittances from relatives abroad and on humanitarian aid (particularly in southern Somalia) (see also Gundel 2002). Additionally, urbanization in parts of Somalia (Mogadishu, Bosaso, Hargeisa) means that demand for milk, meat and other food stuffs is growing dramatically. Simultaneously, less people actually work in food-production (as pastoralists or agro-pastoralists), and grazing areas are decreasing. Land has become valuable, particularly in and around urban settlements leading to an increasing number of land conflicts which, in turn, alongside growing privatization have negatively affected pastoralist access to grazing areas.

⁶ This section is based on primary data collected as part of the fieldwork for this project in November 2017, as well as another project in July 2017 (interviews as well as unpublished data from the Somali region of Ethiopia).

Commercialisation of Livestock Trade, Informal Exports and Social Stratification

Despite state collapse, recurring conflicts and ecological crises, the livestock economy persists in the Somali borderlands and contributes significantly to the economy thus demonstrating its strength and importance. This is not to say that conflict has had no effect on the production system. Blocking of seasonal grazing areas are detrimental to herds. Moreover, trade and state support to formal trade (such as veterinary services and other infrastructure) are lacking. In addition, the arid and semi-arid lowlands are seeing more frequent and severe droughts in recent decades. Coupled with ongoing conflict, this has led to ongoing risk of or actual famine, particularly in Al-Shabaab areas. In 2017, 40% of Somalia's population, particularly in the conflict-ridden south, remained acutely food insecure (FAO 2017).

Regional power structures also impinge negatively on the pastoral economy. Ethiopia has been strengthening border controls since the ascent of militant Islamist groups such as UIC and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Kenya is also fortifying its border with Somalia. These measures interfere with the free movement of animals, people and goods that over much of the 20th century aided the Somali economy. Additionally, within Somalia, new administrative borders are created in the context of federalism. These borders have been officially introduced in the Somali political set-up with the new constitution. Somalia is turning into a more sedentary society. This means that internal (inter-communal, federal) and external (between Somalia and neighbouring states) borders are much more important than they were before 1991.

The informal cross border trade (ICBT) in livestock makes significant contributions to the economy of the Somali Borderlands (see *Informal Economies*). According to experts working for the government and NGOs, the Ethiopian government, aiming to limit the trade within the territorial bounds of the country, is engaged in various institutional and infrastructure building endeavours. Markets are being built across the different *Weredas*, while a quarantine centre is being completed near Jijiga. A large abattoir, Jijiga Export Slaughter House (JESH), was established by the Somali diaspora with support from the USAID and became operational in 2016. These schemes will benefit wealthier pastoralists or secondary traders, as such households buy larger stocks (200-500 heads at a time).

The difference in reasons and timing for engaging in livestock trade, and the extent of engagement leads to differences in benefits reaped by poorer and wealthier households. This is leading to an increasing wealth differentiation trend in pastoral areas. While the proportion of the poor/destitute (measured in ownership of livestock) and the extent of poverty is increasing (Aklilu and Catley 2010a; Aklilu and Catley 2010b; Bassa and Woldeamanuel 2015), the rich are becoming richer (in smaller proportion). Aklilu and Catley (2010a) note an annual increase of 2.5% in the number of wealthy pastoralists, with a counter increase of 4.1% in the number of poor households. Thus, in effect, commercialisation is leading to the transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich.

Complex Political Economy

The Ethiopian side of the borderlands is guided by a complex political economy. One major factor of this complexity is its strategic location along the export/import route. A key informant from the Ethiopian Trade and Industry Bureau emphasized that the region is "Ethiopia's throat:" whatever comes in or goes out passes through Somali territories on the way to the port of Djibouti, which handles more than 90 % of the country's international trade. Combined with the proximity of Berbera port from Jijiga, this has created conducive conditions for the flourishing of a contraband trade. Although state officials stress that this trade is a drain on the country's potential revenue, small-scale cross-border traders stress that it is higher level regional and federal civilian as well as security officials who reap the benefits of the trade (Abdiwasa 2015).⁷ Moreover, informants from Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority's (ERCA) Jijiga Branch and the region's Trade Bureau asserted that the seizure of contraband leading to a 'reward' of 25-30% of the good's value is problematic as well. The available data from Jijiga Branch of ERCA indicates that

⁷ This was also found during fieldwork in Jijiga, Interviews: Jijiga Trade Bureau, July 2017.

seizing capacity has increased through the years, but the role of the *Liyu* police is increasing as well, at the expense of federal authorities (Abdiwasa 2015). This implies that money is being channelled to the regional security apparatus, which, it is feared, will not be disbursed in a transparent and accountable manner.


Given Jijiga's proximity to the *Khat* producing Hararghe highlands and the pervasive use of the stimulant leaf (and preference to Hararghe *Khat*, compared to Kenyan *Mira*), there is a lucrative trade along the Harar-Jijiga-Toga Wajale-Hargeisa route. *Khat* emerged as one of the leading foreign currency-generating agricultural commodities in Ethiopia, generating upwards of 200 million USD per year (Hailemeskel et al., 2014; see Table 3 in Annex I). A company owned by an entrepreneurial woman called Suhura emerged to have a significant share of the export trade in the 1990s, which many claim came with patrimonial links with high ranking government officials. Her market share and business network, however, appear to be under attack by the current leadership of the region and supporters of the region's president in the Ethiopian military. This contestation, some argue, is among the root causes of the recent killings in Aweday in September 2017, a central *Khat* trading centre in Oromia, which precipitated the large-scale conflict and evictions of Oromo from Somali region and vice versa (Jeffrey 2017). Although we cannot confirm these rumours and informants were reluctant to discuss the conflict, the pronouncements by former Ethiopian Prime Minister (PM) Hailemariam Dessalegn linking the conflict to the "rush to monopolize *Khat* trade" lends credence to it. The PM also linked the conflict to "contraband trade" (Abera 2017).

In contrast to Ethiopia's western borderlands with Sudan and South Sudan (Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz) and the lower Omo valley, there is little mega-government intervention in the Somali region. This might be due to the primacy of security considerations, which has postponed actual (state) investments. There is, however, an indigenous 'onion boom' in Kelafo, Shebelle Valley, with harvests reaching all the way to Addis Ababa during the rainy season (Korf, et al. 2015). There are a few other reported cases of commercial farming (on relatively smaller land area) in Sitti Zone. Exploration of fossil fuel and natural gas continues, with the possibility of actual exploitation of the resources beginning soon. This is evidenced by the construction of an asphalt road linking Jijiga to Godey (which is close to Shelabo where the reserves are), and the establishment of a state-owned enterprise to engage in such activities (the Ethiopian Petroleum and Natural Gas Development Enterprise).⁸ What that has in store for the area, including its social stability and potential conflict is hard to predict. The government also attempted a villagization scheme in the Somali region. However, compared to Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, a smaller proportion of the population was targeted (~ 8 %).⁹

⁸ See the following link to access the Council of Ministers Regulation establishing this Corporation <https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/regulation-no-264-2012-ethiopian-petroleum-and-natural-gas.pdf>.

⁹ Half a million Somalis were planned to be villagized (Human Rights Watch, 2012: 19), about 8 % of Ethiopia's Somali population.

ETHIOPIA-KENYA BORDERLANDS (MOYALE AND MANDERA TRIANGLE)



GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

An Ethiopia-Kenya border region with a relatively vibrant economy and better infrastructure (than other Somali borderlands) is Moyale, a name shared by towns on both sides of a check-point and districts on both sides of the border. There is an enormous flow of people and goods in this borderland region. On the Ethiopian side, a tarmac road connects Moyale to Addis Ababa (~776 km) since the 1970s and upgrading is currently underway (FSNWG 2010). On the Kenyan side, the road to Nairobi (~ 595 km) via Isiolo was in very poor condition until recently. A new asphalt road is now almost completed. The ambitious Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project, launched by Kenya in 2012, will connect Ethiopia and Kenya through Moyale, but remains slow in its implementation (Abdi 2018).

East of the Moyale borderlands, the Ethiopia-Kenya border meets the Gedo region of southern Somalia, the Dollo Ado district of Ethiopia, and Mandera district of Kenya. This forms the Dollo Ado-Gedo-Mandera Triangle (also known as 'Mandera Triangle'). Unlike much of the ASAL Ethiopia-Kenya borderlands, the confluence of the Dawa and Ganale Rivers that forms the Juba River in Somalia makes this area a productive farmland. Of the three adjacent districts, Mandera has better physical and social infrastructure attracting migrants from both Gedo and Dollo Ado (Gedi 2005). Gedo has been seriously affected by the longstanding conflict in Somalia, leading to an influx of refugees to Dollo Ado. In 2014 Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to construct a hydro dam (on River Dawa in Mandera County, Kenya) and a bridge linking Kenya and Ethiopia. These are meant to promote cross-border movement across the river. River Dawa flows from Ethiopia and enters Somalia to become the Jubba. It forms part of the border between Kenya-Ethiopia and Somalia – Ethiopia. To date, however, construction of the dam has not yet begun.

Demographically, the Ethiopia-Kenya borderlands east of Lake Turkana are mainly inhabited by groups belonging to Oromo and Somali. The three major groups are: Borana, Gabra and Garri. The Borana are predominantly cattle pastoralists who live in the Oromia National Regional State in Ethiopia, and Marsabit and Isiolo Counties in Kenya. Notwithstanding their long history of interaction with the Somali, the overwhelming majority of the Borana remained mono lingual, speaking only Afaan Oromo. Except for the Isiolo Borana, who were Islamized in the 1930s and 40s, the Borana have until recently resisted Islamization in favour of their traditional beliefs.

The Garri, a bilingual group speaking both Afaan Oromo and Somali, live in Ethiopia's Dawa Zone, Kenya's Mandera County, and Somalia's Gedo Region. Besides standard Somali, the Garri speak two dialects: the dialect of the Rahanweyn clan, of southern Somalia, and Garri Kofar, a dialect spoken mainly in Kenya. This further demonstrates their geographical stretch in all the three countries (Adugna 2010; Markakis 2011). This linguistic diversity, coupled with their mixed Oromo-Somali cultural markers, give Garri the advantage of switching between ethnic groups and countries (Adugna 2009; Schlee 1994).

Ethnic identity is equally fluid among the Gabra communities. Based on their location, Gabra people are divided into Gabra Miigo of southern Ethiopia and Gabra Malbe of northern Kenya. The two groups, although geographically divided, maintain kinship and other cooperative relationships. With a long history of nomadic life and cultural adaptation, the Gabra are endowed with notable cultural markers that help them fit into both Oromo and Somali ethnic groups. Currently, the Gabra are divided between the Oromo and Somali identities. In other words, some Gabra claim, actually the majority, Oromo identity, while some others claim Somali identity. Some elite switch between the two based on political and economic opportunities (Adugna 2009). Lastly, Burji migrants from Ethiopia's agricultural highlights also live in these borderlands (Mohamoud 2010).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Ethiopia-Kenya borderlanders found themselves at the geographical and political margins of the post-colonial states. Whereas low intensity conflict has always been present on these borders, it has had a significant, negative impact on cross-border population movement and trade in the post-colonial period and in recent years. Regional geopolitical wars have further exacerbated the situation in the borderlands:

for instance, the whole area from Dollo Ado to Moyale on the Ethiopian side was a battleground during the 'Ogaden War' of the 1970s and Shifita War in the 1960s (Aguilar 1996; Tareke 1991).

The collapse of Siad Barre's government signalled the cessation of inter-state conflicts; however communal conflicts increased in magnitude and intensity. The federalisation of Ethiopia along ethno-linguistic lines in the 1990s drastically changed the form of conflict in the borderlands of Ethiopia and Kenya. The traditional inter-community competition between pastoralists over scarce resources has been reformulated into claims and counter-claims of territories, including urban spaces, between the Oromia and Somali National Regional States (Adugna 2009; Basi 1997). Moyale has become an extreme example of these new dynamics. It witnesses deadly conflicts between Borana, Garri and Gabra on both sides of the border (Adugna 2011; Molla 2015).

The diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya is the most amicable throughout post-colonial period compared to their relations with other neighbours, especially Somalia. The colonial borders are also not contested between these two states (the Elemi triangle is an exception, see map on page 24). However, due to longstanding inter-communal conflicts and the presence of insurgents that primarily target Ethiopia, the Ethiopia-Kenya borderlands have remained as securitized as most other GHOA borderlands throughout the post-colonial period.

LIVELIHOODS AND SECURITY

Pastoralism is the dominant livelihood system in the Ethiopia-Kenya borderlands. The two dominant pastoral groups, the Oromo and Somali, used to specialize in cattle and camel respectively. Today, while the sociocultural values attached to cattle and camel persist, Oromo and Somali herd both types of livestock. Since the 1970s, cultivation has increased in importance as well (Ayalew 2016). However, recurrent droughts have affected opportunistic farming. Only in the Dawa-Genale River basin (and Juba area in Southern Somalia) do many people rely on agriculture (Gedi 2005).

Other feasible income-generating activities such as wage labour, formal trade, and smuggling/trafficking of goods and animals is also practiced. Towns and markets are opening up in the borderlands with opportunities for income generation. A large number of borderlanders are engaged in business, especially livestock. Vibrant camel and cattle markets are on the rise from which herders, traders, brokers and other market actors stand to gain (DfID 2010). The markets at Mandera and Moyale are supplied by the Somali and Oromia regions of Ethiopia, north-eastern Kenya and the Lower Juba in Somalia (Pavanello 2009).

Security challenges in the Ethiopia-Kenya borderlands emanate from interrelated sociocultural, environmental, and political factors. The most serious problem is inter-community conflicts (see map on page 16). The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) insurgency and the Ethiopian Government's counter-insurgency in Moyale, and Al-Shabaab terrorism in Mandera are also critical sources of insecurity. Formed in 1973 to fight for the Oromo people's right to self-determination, the OLF has been an influential political force in Ethiopia, even without having a strong military presence on the ground. Since 1992, the OLF military wing has been relatively active in Southern Ethiopia with occasional attacks on Ethiopian military bases. This has provoked Ethiopian military incursions into Kenya on a number of occasions. The Ethiopian government accuses the Kenyan Borana of hosting OLF fighters. Military crackdown by the Ethiopian government and factional politics has greatly weakened OLF's capability to sustain an insurgency (Adugna 2010; Mail and Guardian Africa 2015).

Since November 2014 Al-Shabaab has successfully crossed the porous Somalia-Kenya border and undertaken terrorist operations in Mandera and Garissa counties. Attacks include the killing of non-Muslim passengers on a public bus (Otsialo and Hajir 2014), shortly followed by an attack on non-Muslim quarry workers (Mutiga 2014). Even more deadly was the attack on Garissa University that resulted in the massacre of 148 students and wounded 69 more in April 2015. As Al-Shabaab remains a security challenge in the Mandera area and the borderlands as a whole.

KEY ISSUES ALONG THE ETHIOPIA-KENYA BORDER

Conflict (Moyale)

Conflict along the Ethiopian-Kenyan border in Moyale stems from many factors. Changes in boundaries and politico-administrative units on both sides of the border have played a central role in the exacerbation of conflict. This is because administrative units and boundaries not only determine access to critical pastoral resources, they are also crucial for access to employment opportunities. For instance, the Ethiopian Moyale district and town have been contested between Oromia and Somali Regional States. Since 1994, both regional states have established their competing administrations, including a mayor, police force, customs office and revenue authority among others, in the same town. As a result, the town has been affected by protracted conflict and this has had a spill over effect on the Kenyan side as well. In 2009, Garri and Borana fought a deadly war that led to many deaths and even greater displacement. The conflict was instigated by a dispute over the territory where a borehole was supposed to be drilled, which was contested between the two regional states. Subsequent violent conflicts in 2012 and in 2017 have resulted in deaths and mass displacement (IRIN 2012), and also call attention to the changing nature of conflict.

The territorialisation of pastoral areas has disrupted longstanding pastoral livelihood strategies and affected cooperative resource regimes. The ritualized mutual interdependence and long-lived, socio-politically harmonious relationships between the Gabra and the Borana were transformed into competitive and conflictual, as well as into an ecologically incompatible way of life. As a consequence, the majority of Gabra were forced to give up pastoralism in favour of a destitute peri-urban life in Moyale. Territorial contestation, compounded by demographic growth, severe drought and recurrent conflicts, has forced many to drop out of pastoralism and settle down in big settlements. Similar to Southern Oromia, in the Somali Region, pastoralists' increasing identification with a given territory in the last two decades was primarily motivated by their 'eagerness to achieve political recognition through land occupancy' (Hagmann 2007).

On the Kenyan side, Marsabit County (including Moyale) was relatively peaceful in the 1990s. Manifestations of inter-group competition and territorial contestations started with the emergence of Kenya's multi-party system in 1992. In the 2000s, sporadic conflicts started in the County mainly in Moyale and North Horr between the Borana and Gabra (Hussein 2006). It was, allegedly, a spill over effect of developments in Ethiopia. Since 2011, the frequency of conflict and the number of lives lost increased, reaching its peak in 2012 and 2013 (Adugna 2015). The last and the most violent conflict took place in December 2013 when all of Kenyan-Moyale became a battleground as Gabra fought Borana, and Garri joined in support of Gabra (Gardner 2017). The magnitude of the conflict and the intensity of animosity between the groups have significantly increased over the years, which has, in turn, affected the free movement of people and their livelihoods. Interestingly, developments on the Kenyan side are similar to those in Ethiopia without having similar politico-administrative systems and constitutional provisions at the national level (Schlee 2011).

Clan Conflict (Mandera Triangle)

Inter-communal conflicts, herder-farmer disputes and threats from Al-Shabaab are the key issues in the Dollo Ado-Gedo-Mandera Triangle. The main reasons for the conflicts in the Mandera Triangle and the Moyale-Marsabit cluster (discussed above) are similar in that they are about territorial control, both of pastoral territories and of towns and major trade routes. However, unlike the ethnic conflict of Moyale (between Oromo and Somali), the conflict in the Mandera Triangle is between different Somali clans.

Conflicts are usually triggered by factors such as territorial claims, demands of political representation and establishment of their own district, as well as competition over pastoral resources. Some examples are the conflict between the Marrehan and Degodia clans and between the Degodia and Garri (Abdurahman 2011). Secondly, there are clan members who live as minorities within the provinces 'owned' by a different

majority clan. Here, the cases of conflict between the majority Ogaden and minority clan Shekaash, and between the Degodia and Garimaro are some examples (Gedi 2005; Hagmann 2007). The Gedo region witnesses protracted conflict between the Garri and Marrehan where the two control rangelands and the border town of El Waqi. Similar conflicts also occurred between the Garri and Murule in 2004 in Mandera, and Garri-Degodia in 2013 in Mandera and Wajir (Menkhaus 2015).


A different type of conflict, between farmers and herders, occurs in the fertile Dawa and Genale River basins and the lower Juba basin. In Dollo Ado, this conflict is between Degodia, a pastoralist clan, and Garimaro, a minority group practicing riverside agriculture. The conflict is primarily over scarce fertile farming land. The two groups used to complement each other as the Degodia exchanged livestock for cereals from the Garimaro. However, recently, recurrent drought alongside demographic increase, has forced many Degodia to drop out of pastoralism and take up farming in the Dawa and Genale riverside, thus initiating competition and conflict with the Garimaro (Gedi 2005).

Besides the complex political economy in Ethiopia, cross-border networks and broader Somali politics complicate the conflicts on both sides of the border. For instance, the conflict between the Degodia and Marrehan mainly caused by territorial claims, has been complicated by their support for opposite groups in the Somalia conflict (Abdurahman 2011). The Degodia sympathize with the Hawiye while the Marrehan support the Darood. This general insecurity and spill-over effect from Somalia, later compounded by terrorist threats from Al-Shabaab, has made the Mandera triangle a conflict hotspot.

Migration and Human Trafficking

Migration and human trafficking have also become key concerns in the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia borders due to the combined effects of climate change, conflict, poverty, and other crises (see McAuliffe and Laczko 2013). Several migratory routes are used by migrants and smugglers; these include existent trade routes in Horn of Africa, which traverses the border town of Moyale through Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique, as far as South Africa and beyond (Long and Crisp 2011). Other routes include the Northern Africa Route (through North Africa to Europe) and the Gulf of Aden route (from the Horn to Yemen and further) (IOM 2015). Along the Ethiopia-Kenya border, migrants and smugglers use private motorbike operators in Ethiopian Moyale who transport people across the border into Kenyan Moyale. Smugglers keep migrants in safe houses until their numbers are high enough to fill pick-up cars or trucks. En route to Nairobi, migrants are forced to travel on trucks, in gas tankers or double decker vehicles used for carrying livestock (Ayalew 2016). Similar migrant smuggling also occurs along the Ethiopia-Somaliland/Puntland borders, where Somali pastoralists are involved in the smuggling operation (see Ayalew 2016). The International Organisation for Migration (among other organisations) works with East and Horn of Africa countries to address migration and trafficking through such measures as border management, developing standard operating procedures on detecting human trafficking and tracking the smuggling of people and goods across borders (IOM 2015).

ATEKER BORDERLANDS AND THE ELEMI TRIANGLE



GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

The Ateker region stretches from Lake Turkana in the east to Uganda's Karamoja Region in the west, and from South Sudan's Boma plateau and Ethiopia's South Omo Zone in the north to the Kenyan highlands in the south. The dominant borderland communities, part of the Ateker (or Karamoja) cluster of Nilotic languages, include Turkana, Karamojong (see map on page 21), Jiye, Toposa, and Nyangatom. Other major communities of the wider region include Dasanach (Kenya-Ethiopia), Didinga (South Sudan), Tepeth and Pokot (Kenya-Uganda). These latter communities have often heavily borrowed from the repertoire of institutions, cultural practices, and even language from the Ateker communities. "Ateker (or Karamoja) Cluster / Region" has, therefore, become a widely used term, especially through the many cross-border initiatives and programmes that NGOs and government institutions have started over the last decades.

Most of this region, especially Turkana and Karamoja, has seen a remarkable number of such programmes, not least because the combined effects of population growth, problematic development policies, and recurrent drought have generated an environment of persistent social crisis (Eulenberger, et al. 2017). The major communities are all traditionally, and in their vast majority to this day, mobile (agro-) pastoralists. The region inhabited by the Ateker communities and their neighbours forms a complex landscape of ecological zones with different degrees of aridity. The borderlands afford a mosaic of grasslands, thorn shrub savannah, forests and other habitats, as well as mountains, river basins and the world's largest desert lake, Lake Turkana. Their several shared similarities include sociocultural institutions and ecological conditions, as well as rapid population growth. Bearing in mind the problems with calculating population growth in pastoralist areas (see *Ecology, Economy and Livelihoods*), several Ateker borderlands show increased human population numbers (e.g. Humanitarian Policy Group 2010; REGLAP 2012). The declining human to livestock ratio – as a result of increased human and decreased animal population growths – is a major obstacle in the region's present and future well-being (Humanitarian Policy Group 2010; Sandford 2006)

LIVELIHOODS AND SECURITY

The central and most viable livelihood in the Ateker Borderlands is agro-pastoralism. While most of Turkana is too dry for cultivation to play a significant role, periodic rainfall and floods are used throughout the region to plant sorghum, the most suitable crop for this climate. Similarly, sorghum was an important crop for communities of the Omo Valley. Both the socio-political institutions of the region's communities and the patterns of conflict and cooperation between them are shaped by the requirements of the pastoralist economy and its vital need to access water and pasture in adaptation to rapidly changing and unpredictable environmental conditions (McCabe 1987). More recently, various factors such as droughts, population growth, aid interventions and the expansion of formal and capitalist economies have led to an increase in other types of livelihoods. These include wage labour (mainly in Kenya and Uganda), fishing (at the shores of lake Turkana), commercial charcoal or fuelwood and local alcohol production (especially by women), as well as petty trade.

Pastoralism has come under pressure from colonial and post-colonial government policies, reduced mobility, land dispossession, forced settlement, ecological changes, and misinformed development interventions. The discovery of profitable oil deposits in Southern Turkana has caused some disruption through elite competition and fears of pollution (Lind 2017). Recent mining activities in Karamoja (Mosebo 2017) have a mixed record of providing some locals with much-needed income but also affecting livelihoods through pollution, and land- and water grabbing (Mosebo 2017). The most alarming developments are large-scale transformation schemes targeting the Lower Omo Valley such as the Gibe III dam and associated commercial agriculture. These developments threaten to not only destroy productive and resilient socio-ecological systems that rely on access to the river and the surrounding forests and flood plains, but also Lake Turkana and the millions of people who depend on it (Avery 2013; Carr 2017b).

Besides its cultural diversity, the Ateker borderlands have commanded decades of scholarly attention on issues of intercommunity conflict (e.g. Dyson-Hudson 1966; Lamphear 1976; McCabe 2004; Tornay 1979 among others).¹⁰ The region has also been a challenge for formal security providers. Formal security provision in the borderlands includes the army, non-state entities, private security actors, as well as traditional authority structures (Mkutu 2017; Simonse 2011). Among the issues with formal security provisioning, a critical few are the use of hard-handed and violent approaches (e.g. by the Ugandan army during disarmament in Karamoja); security actors' role in fueling conflict (e.g. the case of National Police Reserves in Kenya who have been accused of corruption and proliferation of SALW); and the co-option of, rather than partnership with, traditional authority (see *Social and Political Organisation*; see also *Peace, Conflict and Security*). Plausible claims have been made that efficient conflict management requires better involvement of local communities with formal security structures (e.g. Eaton 2010). The reality of border security and management in the Ateker region is still far from the ideal, even though many borderlanders, government officials and civil society organisations struggle for improvements.


HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The early history of the Ateker peoples is a matter of scholarly dispute. However, it is generally agreed that they originate from the Kote-Mogos hills at the western feet of the escarpment between Kenya and Uganda. Existing groups trace their origins to common ancestors and give largely complementary accounts on how they either split over internal conflicts and/or migrations often due to population growth and ecological pressures or assimilated with other populations (Lamphear 1976). The Turkana were especially efficient in this process and managed to expand the reach of their political-cultural community in approximately three centuries from a small area between the Jie part of the escarpment and Mount Loima to most of the vast area they inhabit today (Lamphear 1992; Lokuruka and Lokuruka 2006).

The start of the colonial era in the 19th century brought with it many outsiders. These included hunters, traders, and other outsiders from the Ethiopian highlands and the Swahili and Somali coasts who came in search of ivory. As competition between them increased and indigenous communities became more conscious of their existing resources, glass beads and decorative copper wire (until then used as attractive barter) lost importance. Instead, local communities became increasingly interested in firearms. This is also the time, at the turn of the 20th century, when the problem of the Eleme Triangle emerged (Mburu 2003).

¹⁰ There is extensive historical and anthropological literature on Ateker communities and their cooperative and conflictual relationships. This report considers only some of the major issues affecting these borderlands.

THE BORDERLANDS OF THE ELEMI TRIANGLE¹¹



Ethnic groups in and around the Elemi Triangle

¹¹ The information in this section, unless otherwise indicated, is based on Immo Eulenberger's fieldwork in the Elemi Triangle since 2009. The information will be part of the following forthcoming publication: Eulenberger, Immo. Elemi Triangle: Risks and opportunities of a contested pastoralist frontier region between South Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia. Omo-Turkana Research Network (OTuRN) and Lands of the Future Research Network (LOF)/ PAX and Rift Valley Institute

GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

The Elemi Triangle (also spelled Ilemi) is a disputed area between Kenya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. It covers an area of 10,000 – 14,000 square kilometres (sq. km.). (Mburu 2007) and has important water points and dry season grazing resources in flood plains and mountain ranges. It is one of the few remaining zones with significant wildlife in the region. While the Turkana, Dasanach, Nyangatom, Suri and (to a lesser degree) Toposa used the area for herding, hunting and –in the case of Nyangatom and Suri– cultivation and permanent settlement, only Turkana are permanent residents of Elemi today (see map on page 24). Over 90% of these communities are pastoralists whose productivity depends vitally on their ability to access water and pasture resources across boundaries, yet their mobility is impaired by mutual hostility and restrictive border policies. While emerging irrigation opportunities of the adjoining Omo valley could boost cross-border livestock production and generate revenue from livestock sales, current developments threaten to damage the productive capacity of a much larger region, including the Elemi.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, CONFLICT AND KEY ISSUES

The dispute over Elemi is mainly one between Kenya and South Sudan, although Ethiopia is reported to have revived claims that had long been assumed abandoned (see for e.g. Carr 2017b). The dispute is rooted both in colonial boundary making and in contests between the region's communities. While it was British policy to avoid separating communities through administrative boundaries, in many instances, pragmatic reasons led to negligence towards this principle. The most seriously disputed borderline of the Triangle, the one once separating the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from the Uganda Protectorate, was drawn two consecutive times without reliable knowledge of the political geography of the area, i.e. which community could be considered 'the rightful owner' of which part of the territory. As Britain still fought to crush a Turkana resistance army that operated from in and around the Triangle where it could access rifles and ammunition from Ethiopia, it sent the Kelly-Tufnell expedition to survey the area between the Nile and the Omo to rectify the Sudan-Uganda boundary of 1902 along 'tribal boundaries'. However, reaching the Turkana-Toposa frontier, and thus areas in close proximity to the Turkana resistance army, it turned north to the Boma Plateau and drew a straight line along 4°37' N as provisional new boundary to have "the grazing grounds of the Turkana ... included in Uganda" (Collins, 2005: 7).¹² When the Turkana of the region were brought under administration with the establishment of the post at Lokitaung in 1928, it became clear that the straight line left much of these customary grazing grounds on the 'Sudanese' side. However, all consecutive attempts to amend the line to match the original intention and allocate the pastures to which the Turkana had the most plausible claim to British East Africa (after the transfer of Uganda's 'Rudolph Province' to Kenya in 1926) failed due to contradictions between the interests of the powers involved, especially the sensitivities of the government of Egypt that shared sovereignty with Britain in the Sudan Condominium.

Incompatible Territorialities

In addition to these historical contingencies, there is a greater issue of which community can be considered 'rightful owners' of the Triangle. This is a critical question given the different conceptions of territoriality between indigenous communities and Western notions, where the latter's includes ideas of clear-cut boundedness and exclusive sovereignty. While there are certain areas that are generally considered 'to belong to' a certain part of a community, for e.g. settlement and cultivation sites and pasture or forage resources of special importance for certain territorial sub-section of Turkana or Nyangatom, there are large areas where access and usage rights are more broadly defined. Some of these areas are shared only among different factions of the same ethnic community, while many areas are shared between ethnic groups. The adjoining communities used them jointly or alternatingly when they were on peaceful terms. By contrast, there have also been raiding wars over access when peace broke down. To define a

¹² Information collected from KII for this study

national boundary that accommodates all traditional rights over such areas is, thus, at odds with the idea of access rights and cross-border mobility based on the principle of exclusivity. In the Elemi Triangle, although the British and the post-colonial Kenyan government pursued policies based on hard borders in order to increase security, this approach has not shown success in decreasing insecurity of the area.

Wars, Guns and Exclusion

Modern assault rifles from Uganda came into the area with the ouster of Ugandan president Idi Amin, the repeated looting of the Moroto armoury between 1979 and 1986 and the friendly relations between Turkana and Matheniko (Mirzeler and Young 2000). As a result, the northern Turkana sections managed to crush the Dasanach in a joint raid on their camp at Kaengomonyang (Liwani) in 1983, which marked the end of their martial superiority and –together with a continuation of British lock-out policies by the Government of Kenya – large-scale cross-border migrations. The second Sudanese Civil War that started in the same year converted the Toposa and Nyangatom into major military powers. Playing both sides, they managed to acquire such vast number of guns (e.g. 57,000 from Khartoum between 1990-92 alone) that practically all males of fighting age came to own at least one (Simonse 2000). ‘Intoxicated’ by this new power, they started dealing heavy blows to rival neighbours. The Nyangatom, hard pressed in the 1970s, defeated all their neighbours in South Omo and displaced jointly with the Toposa the Suri from 60% of their lands (Abbink 2009; Tornay 2009). In 1987, an attack by 3,000 Toposa and Nyangatom armed with assault rifles, machine guns, mortars and grenades on Turkana in the central Triangle ended the peace that had prevailed between them since the 1950s. The few additional policemen and KPR provided by the Kenyan government were overrun by another raiding party the following year, killing 18 officers and shooting down a police helicopter. In response, the government sent thousands of special forces in Buffalo air carriers that scattered not only the raiders but also bombed and burned Nyangatom villages, both in the Elemi and the Ethiopian side of the Kibish border, which was repeated in 1989.

These events mark the beginning of the displacement of the Nyangatom from their Elemi lands. Simultaneously, the Moi government started establishing government institutions in the Triangle and displaying the disputed area south of the Red Line as Kenyan land on official maps. It also facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid to re-settled Turkana who had lost their herds to a devastating drought in the old economic and demographic heartland of the Nyangatom in the northern Triangle around (west-bank) Kibish. Similar to the Dasanach community, who lost their vast Elemi pastures to similar efforts by the government, the Turkana community refuses to accept the ‘takeover’ of the western half of their homelands to this day.

Key Issues in the Elemi Triangle

Today, at least 90% of the population inhabiting the Elemi Triangle, permanently or during seasonal migrations, are Turkana pastoralists who understand themselves as citizens of Kenya. The remaining are formally educated Turkana and labour migrants from other parts of Kenya. Of the other ethnic groups that used to live or periodically frequent the Elemi area, only the Nyangatom continue to access its pastures with some regularity, especially in the Kibish plains and the northern fringes. Together with incidents of theft and raid, one of the main reasons behind conflict in the Elemi is that Nyangatom have to depend on the lenience of local Turkana and Kenyan security forces to use what was once their homeland. They are often joined by their Toposa allies from South Sudan who also launch raids into the Triangle from the north and north-west. Recently, several thousand Toposa associated with South Sudanese opposition factions have put up camp near Kangaten, the headquarters of Ethiopia’s Nyangatom woreda. Dasanach occasionally launch attacks on Turkana and their stock in the south-eastern part but joint patrols of Ethiopian and Kenyan police have improved the situation recently.¹³

The legal status of the Triangle remains unclear and contested. An initiative of the African Union to

¹³ Information collected from KII for this study

address all pending boundary issues between member states triggered an initiative by South Sudan in 2015 to claim the Elemi. This was also possibly done to please the leadership of the Toposa community and signal 'nationalism' while anti-Government (of South Sudan) rebels started operating from Toposa and Nyangatom areas in the north of the Triangle. Rebel activity has rendered much of the areas along the adjoining borderlands of Elemi and Ethiopia inaccessible for government personnel. As the Government of South Sudan depends greatly on oil for its revenues, the discovery of lucrative oil deposits not far from the Triangle in Kenya and reports on similar deposits in the Elemi might have provided additional incentives to claim Elemi. However, exploration has not revealed any significant deposits thus far. Ethiopia had renounced its claims after World War II yet joined South Sudan in 2015 in reviving them and is reportedly eyeing the Triangle as resettling ground for the indigenous communities whose land it seized for 'investors' in South Omo and Bench Maji.

THE UGANDA-KENYA BORDERLANDS

GEOGRAPHY, DEMOGRAPHY AND LIVELIHOODS

The border between the Republics of Uganda and Kenya stretches over 800 kms (see map on page 28). At its northern edge, 450 kms of this border separates Kenya's Turkana County from Karamoja, a sub-region of northern Uganda of 27,200 sq. km. and a population of around 1 million people. The majority of Karamoja's inhabitants belong to the Ateker Cluster. They include the communities of Matheniko, Bokora, Pian, Jie, and Dodoth. Other (non-Ateker Cluster) communities who call Karamoja home include Tepeth, Pokot, Labwor, Nyakwai, Ik and Mening¹⁴. With the exception of Tepeth, all non-Ateker Cluster communities speak different languages. Ateker communities as well as Pokot are agro-pastoralists, whereas other communities have historically engaged in agriculture, beekeeping, and foraging.

Most of Karamoja is used by pastoralists in accordance with their intimate knowledge of local vegetation, seasonal changes and the complex needs of their livestock that need to be met through sophisticated migration patterns across ecological zones (Dyson-Hudson 1966). Complementary rain-fed agriculture concentrates around the traditional permanent settlements and the westernmost green belt where soil conditions and rainfall are more suitable. Whereas subsistence activities are the mainstay of life in Karamoja, due to the unreliability of weather and periodic livestock diseases, a large proportion of the population has turned to alternative livelihoods such as mining, casual labour and brewing. Employment and labour options are, however, limited (Iyer and Mosebo 2017).

Across the border in Turkana County, at 67,000 sq. km. the largest in Kenya, live Turkana pastoralists who are primarily livestock herders. In comparison to neighbouring Karamoja, Turkana County has generally less rainfall and higher temperatures. The region has been classified as one of the most arid in eastern Africa and rainfall estimates around Lodwar range from 500 millimetres (mm) in wet periods to 50 mm in dry periods (Schilling, et al. 2014). While a few Turkana sections engage in riverine agriculture or fishing, most rely traditionally, almost exclusively, on their livestock (Broch-Due 1986; Carr 2017c; McCabe 1987).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, CONFLICT AND KEY ISSUES

As with other borderland pastoralist communities in the GHoA, communities along the Uganda-Kenya borders, were caught in cycles of raids and counter raids until approximately a decade ago (Gray, et al. 2003; Stites, et al. 2007) [however, see below for information on renewed raiding]. Colonial expansion brought with it borders and territorial administration which impeded the movement of pastoralists and their herds. Besides restricting movement, the British also cordoned off large grazing areas for wildlife conservation and water development projects, leading to increased competition among groups (Akabwai and Ateyo 2007, see also Rugadya et al 2010). Colonial rule was able to suppress intercommunity raiding to a large degree through disarmament and securing borders and establishing a military garrison (Barber 1968). However, along with developments leading independent Uganda into three decades of civil war, livestock raids became a matter of routine again in the 1970s. This was in large part due to the sudden flow of assault rifles from the wars and shadow economies of the region. In particular, the ouster of Idi Amin in 1979 afforded a chance for Jie and Matheniko to arm themselves by looting armouries (Mirzeler and Young 2000). This also generated sudden power imbalances and unprecedented levels of insecurity.

Although a brutal disarmament campaign by the Ugandan Army managed to suppress large-scale raids, it devastated the local pastoralist economy and had a lasting negative influence on the social, political and economic life (Knighton 2003; Stites, et al. 2007). Despite these heavy-handed approaches by the state, resource conflict continues to dominate the discourse on the Karamoja–Turkana borderlands. The establishment of intercommunity peace in the first decade of this century was followed by a scramble for minerals, including gold, limestone and marble, especially since 2007, which brought in its wake extensive land dispossession (Rugadya, et al. 2010).

¹⁴ For the reader's benefit, we use the umbrella term Karamojong for all communities living in Karamoja (including non-Ateker speaking groups).

In Turkana, violent conflicts with neighbouring pastoralist groups, particularly Pokot, Toposa, Nyangatom and Dasanach, continue to pose serious threats to the lives and livelihoods of borderlanders (Mulugeta 2016; Österle and Bollig 2003). In contrast to the Karamojong, Turkana and Pokot have not been disarmed after independence and resulting changes in relative advantage have led to periodic escalations in raiding since the 1960s (Bollig 1990; Österle and Bollig 2003). Although resource sharing and cooperative ties with Turkana and Pokot pastoralists have kept the Karamojong remarkably safe from cross-border attacks in recent years, inter-community conflict and the rise of commercialised livestock theft continue to plague Karamoja (Eaton 2010; Hendrickson, et al. 1998; Lind 2018).

KEY ISSUES ALONG THE UGANDA-KENYA BORDER

Recent years of peace and renewed conflict

Despite disarmament in Karamoja and numerous cross-border peacebuilding activities with Turkana, armed conflict has recently flared up again between Turkana and Dodoth (from August 2017) and, Turkana and Jie pastoralists (from December 2017; intensified in early 2018). These recent conflicts are characterized by increased livestock theft, raids (which had stopped for several years), killings and abductions. It became evident that Dodoth and Jie had kept or reacquired assault rifles, enabling them to mount numerous raids against Turkana, including around the Kobebe dam area in central Karamoja where the communities of the region had convened to share resources and build amicable relations (Eulenberger, et al. 2017). Notably, the Uganda-Kenya borderlands near Moroto District have remained relatively immune to escalation of conflict. This is thanks to the long-term peace between Matheniko (the majority group living in Moroto District) and Turkana that started with the Lokirama Peace Accords of 1973. Although livestock thefts occur periodically, inter-community dialogue that builds on strong relations between pastoralist community leaders, supported by CSOs and facilitated by government institutions to facilitate recovery of stolen animals and compensation have been able to prevent escalation. Cross-border trade and labour migration by Turkana and Matheniko to each other's areas also contributes to peaceful integration, and the communities enjoy a general collaboration that is uncommon in the northern corridors (see also Iyer and Mosebo, 2017). Even relations between these two and the neighbouring Tepeth agro-pastoralists of the Mount Moroto, which had been very hostile until a few years ago, have remained relatively stable, with only a few recent, isolated incidents.

To the south, Turkana County borders West Pokot and Baringo Counties, home to Pokot pastoralists who enjoy a fearsome reputation among their neighbours. Turkana-Pokot raiding has been ongoing since pre-colonial times and since witnessed repeated shifts in advantage due to differential access to SALW (Bollig 1990). Today, Pokot-Turkana conflict in the form of theft and livestock raiding is concentrated in three corridors along the boundary between Loima and North Pokot sub-counties: Loiya and Kotaruk in Loima bordering Lopuke in Pokot North, and Lobei in Loima bordering Marakala in Pokot North (UN Trust Fund for Human Security 2014). Studies report resource pressure and climatic factors and for areas further south, recent oil finds in Turkana as conflict drivers (Schilling, et al. 2015).

Extractives and Conflict

The discovery and extraction of oil in Turkana South and East led to the employment of pastoralist security providers of the National Police Reserve (NPR)¹⁵ to protect facilities and convoys of enterprises engaged in the emerging oil business (Schilling, et al. 2015). While this was efficient from the latter's perspective, the NPR, despite being known to be the most efficient and reliable forces under government control, are not salaried. They have come under heavy criticism due to corruption, their role in the further proliferation of weapons, and their involvement in crime (Simonse 2011). Although the number of NPR in the area is very limited, their legal status, their connections with regular forces, their access to ammunition and their fighting power had been an important pillar of the security structures protecting Turkana from Pokot

¹⁵ Formerly the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR)

attacks. The Pokot have been accused for decades of targeting Turkana kraals along the Turkana-West Pokot-Baringo county boundaries in order to enable their community to occupy vacated areas. Pokot politicians have also been implicated in such 'geo-political raiding' against most of their neighbours since the Moi era. Consequently, there was a notable increase in attacks after the oil find, which only ceased when western and northern Turkana combined with other locals to mount the largest counter-attack in recent history. The attack in May 2015, which crushed Pokot forces and led to the deaths of over hundred men and women, has come to be known as the Nadomé massacre (Mabatuk 2015). Politicians from all sides subsequently rallied a peace caravan. However, the weak presence and ineffectiveness of the police in the area and the drain of NPRs towards the oil fields and transport corridors have left the Turkana along the Turkwel river vulnerable to Pokot attacks.

Extractive activities within Karamoja, especially on its borderlands, has also fuelled conflict between communities, investors, miscellaneous land 'owners' and district administrations over land and resource ownership and use (Saferworld 2017). Land grabbing and dispossession, especially of customarily owned land, and disputes over administrative boundaries are exacerbated by the discovery and extraction of minerals, and, in turn, exacerbates intercommunity conflicts (Kabongo, et al. 2014; Otim and Mugisa 2014).

ETHIOPIA-SOUTH SUDAN/SUDAN BORDERLANDS



The 803-km long Ethiopia – (South) Sudanese border was demarcated between Imperial Ethiopia and colonial Britain in 1902. Currently, it touches four regional states on the Ethiopian side and five regional states on the South Sudanese side of the border. On the Ethiopian side, the regional states that border South Sudan are: Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz; Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR). On the South Sudanese side of the border, five states border Ethiopia: Eastern Nile, Latjor, Eastern Bieh, Boma and Namorunyang. Prior to the October 2016 administrative restructuring of South Sudan that created 28 States¹⁶, the border areas on the South Sudanese side used to belong to the three States of Upper Nile, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria. The discussion on the Ethiopia-South Sudanese border focuses on the Gambella region. The smaller border area between Southern Ethiopia and South Sudan is covered in other sections as part of the Greater Eleme Triangle (see map on page 21).

GAMBELLA-SOUTH SUDAN BORDERLANDS

GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

Located in western Ethiopia about 780 km from Addis Ababa, Gambella covers 34,063 square km, and consists of eleven *weredas*. Three features stand out in defining Gambella, not only as a physical space but also as a socio-political unit. First, Gambella is one of the hottest lowlands in the country, with an average temperature of 37 degrees Celsius at an altitude of only 500 meters above sea level in contrast to the neighbouring highland regions, which rise as high as 3,000 metres. Second, unlike other lowland regions in Ethiopia, Gambella is endowed with abundant and fertile land and water resources where the Baro-Akobo-Sobat river basin is found, a major tributary to the White Nile. Its water sources and ecology also differentiate it from other borderlands discussed above, which are primarily ASALs. Third, Gambella is a peripheral region, situated along Ethiopia's long international border with South Sudan. These features explain in part Gambella's economic and geopolitical significance as well as its political sensitivity.

Five main groups of people live in this border area: the Nuer; the Anuak; the Murle; the Opo and the Komo. The last two (Opo and Komo) have large settlements in the Benishangul Gumuz region. Except for the Murle (who live in Boma State of South Sudan) all other communities have cross-border settlements. The Nuer are the largest group of people on both sides of the border. Of the various Nuer groups only two are represented in the border areas: the Lou and the Jikany. The Lou Nuer live in (former) Jonglei state, but they are engaged in extensive cattle raiding and child abductions across the border in Gambella. The Jikany Nuer constitute about 50 % of Gambella's 307,000 people and are the majority in Eastern Bieh and Latjor States of South Sudan. Lastly, the Anuak constitute the second largest group of people in the Gambella region (21%). In South Sudan the Anuak predominantly live in Pochalla and Akobo Counties of present-day Boma State. The Murle are the third largest group exclusively living in Boma state, although they are actively engaged in cross border cattle raiding and child abduction practices. Linguistically, Nuer and Anuak speak languages belonging to the Nilo-Saharan language family. Murle speak the East Sudanic Murle language and belong to Surmic-speaking groups who span across Southwest Ethiopia (Bender 1977).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Gambella was incorporated into the Ethiopian state at the end of the nineteenth century. The 803 km-long Ethiopia- South Sudanese border was set by the Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Agreement of 1902 (Bahru 1987). This agreement also gave the British an important economic concession to establish a commercial enclave in Gambella town on the Baro River. The British claimed sovereignty over the western half of the town, while the eastern half remained under Ethiopian sovereignty. Gambella remained an

¹⁶ These were subsequently restructured to 32 States in 2017 (Sudan Tribune 2017).

economic hub of the country, serving as an important station in Ethiopia's international trade via the Sudan for the first three decades of the twentieth century (ibid). According to the terms of the concession, the enclave was transferred to the Ethiopian government upon the independence of the Sudan in 1956. The security situation in southern Sudan in the 1960s and 1970s undermined the viability of the trade route passing through Gambella. The town lost its economic significance as trade in the former enclave declined because of competition with the eastern railway route through Djibouti, and trade finally ceased because of the civil wars in the Sudan.

LIVELIHOODS AND SECURITY

The Nuer are mobile pastoralists who also engage in small-scale farming and fishing. The Murle range from relying exclusively on mobile pastoralism to agro-pastoralism (Murle-Pibor) to solely cultivation (Murle-Boma plateau), also combined with fishing. The Anuak are predominantly farmers except in Jor wereda where they combine farming with small scale livestock herding. Many Nilotic and Surmic communities are pastoralists, but the significance of livestock varies from one group to another. One of the most noticeable features of Anuak economy vis-à-vis neighbouring communities is an emphasis on farming and gardening adapted to local ecology, especially riverine maize and sorghum cultivation, where livestock forms – together with fishing and alluvial gold mining- are an important complementary livelihood but not central. Most of the Anuak villages are found along rivers. It is for this reason that the Anuak are often called 'River Nilotes' (Perner 1997).

Despite its natural resources, Gambella is one of Ethiopia's poorest regions in terms of infrastructure and social services; it has, however, attracted successive Ethiopian governments for investments in irrigated commercial agriculture. Because of its location along the border with South Sudan, Gambella is also susceptible to wider geopolitical processes. In fact, political instability and conflicts in Gambella are intimately related to the civil wars in southern/South Sudan.

KEY ISSUES ALONG THE GAMBELLA-SOUTH SUDAN BORDERS

Inter-Ethnic Tensions and Conflicts

Inter-ethnic conflict is a major feature of life on both sides of the border, of which the protracted Anuak and Nuer conflict stands out. Much of the conflict is connected to the issue of marginality, border crossing practices, and the impact of South Sudanese civil wars. The roots of the Anuak-Nuer conflict go back to the 19th century when the Nuer embarked on their historic expansion to the east. Nuer expansion was achieved at the expense of their neighbours, including the Anuak, who lost not only territory but also people. Nuer territorial expansion is also related to cultural expansion, thanks to their system of assimilation. The extensive territorial loss and the continual process of assimilation have generated the Anuak discourse of ethnic extinction. Anuak memory of loss has informed their relations with the Nuer (Feyissa 2011).

Nuer expansion also concerns access to water and pasture. During the dry season, Nuer still migrate to the rivers of Gambella, most of which lie within traditional Anuak territories. With an identity discourse and practice rooted to territory, the Anuak have perceived Nuer resource-driven territorial expansion as 'ethnic conspiracy' (Feyissa 2011). Anuak ethnic sensibility has been further pressed by the rapid changes in the region's demography. Up until the early 1980s, the Anuak constituted an ethnic majority. The massive influx of South Sudanese refugees starting in the 1960s and accelerating in the 80s converted the Nuer into a *de facto* majority while the Derg government resettled thousands of drought-affected highlanders to Gambella. As the host-refugee boundary is very blurry, the Anuak-Nuer conflict in Gambella often involves the refugee camps.

Power struggles between Anuak and Nuer elite in the newly established Gambella Regional State under federal Ethiopia has further compounded ethnic tension. Ethiopia's ethnic federalism is very much contested particularly in multi-ethnic regional states, generating the question of "who owns Gambella?"

The Anuak elites have advanced a historical argument for political entitlement presenting themselves as the indigenous people of Gambella. The Nuer have advanced a demographic argument for political entitlement claiming the status of an ethnic majority. These conflicting bases of political entitlement and their variable political fortunes have been a major driver of Gambella's political instability and conflict.

Competition over natural resources

Competition over scarce natural resources is a major driver of conflict along the Ethiopia-South Sudanese border, particularly between the Nuer and the Murle and among the various Nuer clans. At the heart of this lies the uneven distribution of critical pastoral resources. The homelands of the Lou Nuer in Jonglei/Bieh States in South Sudan do not contain sufficient wetlands to support their comparatively large herds and population. Consequently, they must migrate annually in multiple directions, passing through and into the territories of neighbouring groups on a semi-annual basis. Other communities view Lou Nuer migrations as "land grabbing". Some Lou migrate during the dry-season northwards across the Jonglei state border into Jikany (principally the Akobo area inhabited by Gaajok Nuer). Nuer territories extend along the southern bank of the Sobat river, eastwards to Khor Nyanding, south-eastwards into contested Anuak territories along the Pibor River and, sometimes, across the Ethiopian border as far as the Gilo River (Hutchinson 2012). Owing to almost continual insecurity along their southern borders with the Murle, the Lou have retreated from a large swath of land immediately to their south that were formerly used for both wet and dry-season settlements. As a result, they, in turn, have gradually encroached deeper into Anuak lands south of Akobo since at least the mid-1970s. Many former Anuak residents have been squeezed out of this area entirely, retreating across the river into Ethiopia (Hutchinson 2012).

While many outsiders perceive inter-ethnic divides as a main source of conflict in the region, throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s some of the heaviest fighting in the region was between Nuer groups. Resource competition among Nuer clans is most intense between the Luo and Jikany. Jikany Nuer live on both sides of the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. The violence between the Lou and Jikany Nuer began in 1993 at a seasonal pool called Dual Dap over fishing rights between two families, but quickly spread to include all Lou and Jikany.

Former South Sudan vice-president and current leader of the main armed opposition group the Sudan People's Liberation Army–In Opposition (SPLA–IO) Riak Machar attempted to negotiate a peace agreement in Ulang but fighting resumed only months later. The intensity of the conflict between the two clans fluctuated greatly from 1993 until 2010. The relationship between the Jikany and Lou Nuer has been relatively peaceful since 2010. Allegedly instrumentalised by Dinka Bor, the escalating conflict between the Lou Nuer and the Murle between 2009 and 2013 further shifted security priorities and a few Jikany youth even cooperated with the Lou in their attacks against the Murle. However, cattle rustling continued to be carried out with impunity by youth from both communities (Hutchinson, *ibid*). To reduce tensions and promote unity and military cooperation in the current warfare, Lou and Jikany chiefs held talks in Gambella in the beginning of 2014 to settle many cattle thefts. Despite this, there have been tensions between Lou and Jikany Nuer in the Ethiopian refugee camps. If the current standoff between the government's SPLA which since July 2016 includes the SPLA-IO faction led by -Taban Deng, and SPLA-IO Machar continues, there is the possibility that the civil war might affect inter-group relations including the latent Lou-Jikany conflict. Akobo town acted as the primary economic driver for the area under IO's Machar. Its proximity to the Ethiopian border makes the town a conduit for SPLA-IO political and military elites moving to and from meetings outside of South Sudan.

Proliferation of SALW

One of the key issues at the South Sudan-Ethiopia borderland areas is the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Currently, South Sudan has one of the most armed populations of any state in the world (Doki and Ahmad 2014). The proliferation of arms has directly contributed to the violence and instability that have plagued the country for years. This is intricately linked to the country's violent history,

which continues to this day. Both the Sudanese Government and the Southern rebel groups received weapons and ammunition from foreign powers using the country as a proxy in this larger conflict (Broga 2016). These weapons frequently changed hands and were often appropriated by civilians. In the past, the Sudanese government has also armed and supported forces fighting the SPLA, providing guns and ammunition to civilians. General insecurity has also increased civilian armament, particularly among pastoralist communities who often travel through porous borders to neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda to obtain arms and ammunition for cattle raiding and self-defence.

At independence in 2011, it is believed that 3.2 million weapons were circulating in South Sudan, two-thirds of which were thought to be in the hands of civilians (Lapegna 2015). There is also a widespread circulation of SALW on the Ethiopian side of the border. The Derg had one of the largest and fully armed military in the continent. After the demise of the Derg in 1991, there were a great number of unaccounted arms floating in the country. According to Yohannes (2016), 12 percent of those 500,000 SALW have made their way illegally into the ownership of various individuals. Nowhere else than in Jonglei state is the devastating impact of the proliferation of SALW most visible, particularly between the Lou Nuer and Murle. Between 2009 and 2013 thousands of people were killed in raids and revenge attacks carried out by both sides (Small Arms Survey 2012).

Proliferation of SALW is directly linked to the progressive abandonment of former ethical restraints on regional patterns of warfare and raiding. Traditionally, whether Nuer or Murle or other pastoral communities in the border areas would not intentionally kill women or children during inter-communal confrontations. Similarly, as noted by Hutchinson (2012: 29), “acts of intra-ethnic homicide were governed by an even stricter set of ethical codes aimed at ensuring the immediate identification of the slayer and the payment of bloodwealth cattle compensation to the family of the deceased. The purposeful slaying of a child, woman or elderly person was universally perceived not only as cowardly and reprehensible but, more importantly, as a direct affront against God as the ultimate guardian of human morality”. Hutchinson (2000) further attributed the shift in the traditional ethics of warfare that put a caveat on excessive violence particularly within an ethnic group to the proliferation of SALW. Unlike spears, guns created a situation where bullets could not be traced, and homicide became “increasingly depersonalized” (ibid: 30).

Cognizant of the debilitating effects of SALW, both the governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan have sought to control it through a series of disarmament interventions and legal frameworks, particularly Ethiopia, which has greater administrative capacity for border security management. However, most of the disarmament interventions proved to be ineffectual and counter-productive. Based on the authorization of disarmament in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the government of South Sudan and the SPLA have conducted multiple civilian disarmament campaigns in Jonglei, targeting different communities to different degrees, often leading to further violence and animosity (Garfield 2007; Young 2010). Communities usually refuse to surrender arms because of the fear that their unilateral disarmament would make them vulnerable to attacks by their neighbours (ICG 2009).

The Ethiopian government has carried out a more effective disarmament in the Gambella region. The rationale for disarmament is clear enough since Ethiopia has adapted the Bamako Protocol since April 2003, which commits the government to disarm civilians and non-state actors (Eyob 2016). That some rebel groups operate in the border areas is an additional factor for disarming civilians carrying SALW. The Ethiopian government has also drafted an ‘arms trafficking’ proclamation that focuses on legalizing/licensing arms. However, the differential and uncoordinated disarmament by the two governments has created a security vacuum, particularly on the Ethiopian side of the border, further encouraging larger scale cross-border cattle raiding and child abductions, as the unprecedented April 2016 Murle attack has indicated (Tekle 2016).

Predatory Practices: Commercialization of Cattle Raiding and Child Abduction

Predatory practices such as cattle raiding for commercial purpose and violent child abduction practices

are some of the key issues that impinge on the human security of borderland communities. Indeed, cattle raiding has a long history among pastoralist communities (see Peace, Conflict and Security). Similarly, child abductions were related to assimilationist practices which augment the demographic size of groups, as this is considered an important factor in local power relations, particularly over resources. According to Hutchinson (2012: 23), “entrepreneurial exchanges of children for cattle have also occurred over the years between Murle and Dinka families seeking to rid themselves of ‘incest’ children or those otherwise considered to have been conceived outside ethical norms”. Normally, such children are adopted into their new families as social equals.

Both cattle raiding and child abductions have assumed predatory and violent dimensions in recent years. This shift should be situated within the broader South Sudanese war economy (Thomas 2015). Throughout the civil wars, southern military leaders expected local civilians to bear the costs of feeding and housing their unpaid troops, no matter how difficult the burden. As the war expanded and troop discipline declined, many Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) soldiers took it upon themselves to satisfy their material needs on an individualized, ad-hoc basis. Cattle wealth was monopolized by military officers through forced contributions from locals, and recaptured raided animals that were not returned to civilians (Hutchinson 2012).

Cattle raiding has also increasingly assumed a commercial character. Limited or no education nor job opportunities have made it difficult for youth to secure employment. Their only source of livelihood and in turn, of access to sufficient resources for bridewealth to marry, thus, are cattle raids. As noted by Rolandsen and Breidlid (2013: 54): organized criminal gangs conducting raids for profit form a part of the complex cattle raiding/child abduction dynamics [...] looted cattle are in some cases destined for meat-markets within South Sudan and across the international border. There is, however, limited knowledge of the various actors involved in these raids, including their perceived agenda and status within the community.

Like the traditional cattle raiding, child abduction practices have also become more predatory in the context of escalating violence in border areas. According to Young (2012) there are some reports about some unscrupulous Dinka youths who kidnap Dinka children in the hope of selling them for cattle to Murle, which apparently began when Bor Dinka children born outside accepted relationships were traded to the Murle. This set off a chain reaction in which other tribes were raided for their children, who were then sold to the Murle. Although this is often a reciprocal process, abductions are often blamed entirely on the Murle, feeding greatly into widespread anti-Murle discourses (Laudati 2011).

Transformation Schemes

Gambella is at the centre of land-grabbing controversy, particularly since 2009 following the global food crisis. Gambella’s comparative advantage in land and water resources has made it the focus of the global/national land grabbing phenomena that impinges on the rights of indigenous communities (Gebresenbet 2016). Development through Large-Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs) in Gambella belies a state-remaking project under a dispossessive political economy. It is situated within the broader development agenda pursued by Ethiopia’s ruling party. The political economy of LSLAs tells us that the deals are not occurring in a predominantly economic manner; rather, extra-economic state interventions, i.e., political interventions, clear the way for, facilitate and ensure sustained accumulation. This political intervention is “unlocking” and making the lowland resources accessible and extractable by the state, while a concomitant villagisation project is guaranteeing continued accumulation by disempowering the local population and by making the community legible, governable, and controllable (ibid).

Government-supported and facilitated targeting of low-lying peripheral areas for LSLAs represents a continuation of historical centre–periphery relations (Feyissa 2013). Large scale commercial agriculture in the peripheral regions such as Gambella is contentious in various ways. First, land is made available to investors through the disempowering discourse of *terra nullis*. The preparation phase begins with the “cleansing” and readying of Gambella for the accumulation drive by declaring most of the region

“unused” or “marginally used.” In real terms these lands have been exploited by local communities through extensive production systems such as mobile pastoralism (as among the Nuer) and shifting cultivation (as among the Anuak). At least 42 percent of Gambella’s territory is classified as ‘empty land’ and made available for transfer without any recompense to the local population (Oakland Institute 2011). The federal government has taken these decisions based on the recommendations of its political and technocratic elite from the highlands who come from and are familiar with intensive production systems such as crop production in the highlands. Underpinned by cultural biases, mobile forms of livelihoods are deemed irrational and wasteful, and in need of rationalization actions. Beyond rendering the lowlands “unused,” entrusting and delegating powers to the federal government, and including such areas in the Federal Land Bank hugely depend on the extent of political marginalisation of the ethnic group inhabiting the land. Entrusting the “unused” land to the federal government and leasing such lands to investors has taken place mainly in the Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. A comparison between the eastern borderland regions of Somali and Afar bears this out; these regions, despite their peripherality, seem to have greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the federal government than the western Gambella and Benishangul. This is because Somali and Afar Regions are geopolitically sensitive given their borders with Somalia and Eritrea respectively. As such, the actual disposessions are also expressions of powerlessness. That Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz are the most targeted, and the first areas to be targeted, is an expression of their being the most marginalised in the current federal setup. It is a question of power relations, not a technical rendering.

LSLA is also contested for its link to the sedentarisation/villagisation scheme. This programme is criticised as a scheme to evict people and make way for LSLAs (Human Rights Watch 2012), while the government contends that there is no link between the two, and that it is coincidental that the timing of their implementation overlapped. In addition to the stated objective of reducing costs of service delivery by aggregating the local population in nucleated villages, the villagisation programme aids the LSLAs by disabling the agency of members of the local community by making them legible, governable, and controllable by the state (see Scott 1998). Villagisation has the potential to replace old ways of life with settled ox- plough farming and simultaneously put every household under closer scrutiny of the *kebeles* (the lowest administrative level), structures established below the kebeles (development teams and one-to-five teams), and the police. This increases the state’s ability to surveil and control and reduces the local community’s ability to negatively react to the LSLAs. Land appropriation and the long term environmental effect of the massive clearing of forests for commercial farming has been deeply resented, occasionally erupting into violent conflict. For instance, on April 28, 2012, local grievances were unleashed on Saudi star commercial farm. A group of gunmen, widely held to have been Anuak militants, opened fire at the company’s compound. They killed at least five employees before fleeing. Reprisals followed. According to Human Rights Watch (2012), the military rounded up villagers, beating the men and raping the women.

A decade after the peak of the land leasing and seven years after the planning for villagisation started, there is little success on the ground. Of the total land area leased to investors, less than 12 percent was ploughed (76,000 hectares from the leased 630,000 hectares according to an investigation by the Prime Minister’s Office) (The Ethiopia Observatory 2016). A greater proportion of the land is cleared ostensibly for farming purposes. However, in reality, investors are interested in trade of timber and charcoal from the forest and bush cover of the land they leased, while not making a serious effort to start production. This exposed the local community to a much higher degree of negative consequences of the land alienations than implied by the lower percentage of land cultivated.

Understandably, most of the local community detest the land deals and villagisation schemes. Given their marginality and the difficulty of openly resisting, the main mode of expressing their opposition has been through mundane practices of evasion, foot-dragging, false compliance, ambushes and arson. At the peak of the villagisation and land deals in 2011, insecurity was high in the region. Moreover, many lives have been lost and property destroyed (Keeley, et al. 2014). The government in such cases as well as in cases of stiff resistance to villagisation schemes has relied on the defence forces and federal police.

ECOLOGY, ECONOMY AND LIVELIHOODS

The ecology of the borderlands has had a significant influence on the development of communities' livelihoods and economies, as well as their social and political organisation. As they consist largely of ASALs, with exceptions such as the Gambella Region, the ecological conditions of the borderlands are characterized by unpredictability in resource access. This, in turn, has necessitated the development of differential livelihood strategies, dominated primarily by pastoralism. Mobile pastoralism is the most viable livelihood in the borderlands given that agriculture is mainly rain-fed or dependent on rivers. In addition, although pastoralism is well suited to the dryland conditions found in several borderlands (Chang and Koster 1994), there are also major constraints and risks to pastoral production. To deal with risks in their environment such as drought, livestock disease, and insecurity, borderland communities, particularly those who rely on pastoralism, have developed a range of strategies, including mobility, storage, herd diversification and splitting as well as social exchange (Bollig and Gobel 1997).

Mobility, a key strategy to manage risk, is at the heart of pastoral production in the borderlands. Due to the characteristics of the landscape, herders need to move considerable distances to access patchy, ecologically-valuable resources over expansive rangelands. Not only is mobility critical to water and forage access, and thus animal productivity, it also ensures access to markets and, thus, significant income generation (IIED 2009). Hence, the presence of 'hard' borders and political disputes over borderlands has a direct, detrimental impact on mobility and access to resources, and by consequence, on the livelihoods of many borderland communities. Furthermore, the presence of armies on many borders and military occupation of areas, for e.g. in South Sudan, can also cause great disruption of mobility (Cormack and Young 2010).

Seasonal or perennial rivers in the borderlands also determine subsistence and livelihood strategies. The major rivers in GHoA include the Omo, which flows to the lower Omo valley and Elemi Triangle, Wabi Shebelle and Genale Dawa in southern Somalia, Blue Nile and Tekeze/Atbara in Sudan; Akobo, Gilo, Baro and Alwero to South Sudan. These rivers allow for the practice of flood recession agriculture on their banks when significant rains fall in the highlands and causes flooding in the lowlands. However, ecologies differ along the borderlands. For instance, the western escarpments of Ethiopia's highlands are more humid and the vegetation in the western borderlands is categorized as 'lowland evergreen vegetation'. Comparatively, the eastern and southern borderlands are drier with mainly acacia-dominated vegetation.¹⁷ This enables foraging and shifting cultivation as a possible livelihood strategy in the western borderlands rather than in the eastern and southern. Similarly, in Gambella, abundant water sources allow for the farming of riverine maize and sorghum by Anuak communities. Small scale agriculture along rivers is also practiced in Karamoja and Turkana borderlands.

The transboundary zone between South Omo and Lake Turkana stands out significantly from the other semi-arid GHoA borderlands in its ecological diversity and richness (Carr 2017b). The lowermost Omo river basin affords a mosaic of habitats and vegetation types, including grasslands, wetlands, riverine forests and woodland. Besides flood recession agriculture, the Omo ecology provides pasture for animals and wild plants for foraging (practiced by agro-pastoralist communities as a fall-back option). Lake Turkana, the world's largest desert lake, derives 80-90 percent of its surface water inflow from the Omo River (Avery 2010). Both the Omo River and Lake Turkana are central to livelihood strategies and survival of borderland communities, particularly Nyangatom, Turkana, and Dasanach.

Fishing in Turkana, South Omo and Gambella, is a major ecologically-dependent livelihood strategy alongside agro-pastoralism. Both rivers (e.g. Akobo, Omo) and lakes (Turkana) provide opportunities for fishing. Not only does Lake Turkana provide water (mainly during drought) and shoreline browse for animals, it is also a major source of fish both for subsistence and fishing-related commercial activities (Carr 2017c). Turkana herders from the Kenya-Ethiopia border and near the Elemi Triangle have migrated to the lake and live in camps or settlements. Similar migrations, due to deteriorating herds, land dispossession and state-imposed eviction has led to the intensification of fishing activities among

¹⁷ For details on the vegetation of the region see Ethiopia's 4th Report to the Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (IBC), 2009

the Dasanach community (Carr 2017a). Besides conflict over resources for pastoral production, violent conflict also occurs frequently between Dasanach and Turkana over fishing gear and fish stocks around the Omo Delta and northern Lake Turkana.

Although the ecological conditions of borderlands are well suited to (agro) pastoralism, the constraints to the system are worsening. For one, extreme weather events, especially increasingly frequent droughts have had a significant negative impact on the livelihood base. Anthropogenic climate change exacerbates the fragile ecosystems of the borderlands, thereby influencing resource availability. Some effects of climate change include reduced precipitation, drought, rising temperatures, and frequent flash floods. As recently as December 2017, severe drought conditions and food insecurity were reported for the Horn of Africa, which has not only led to livestock losses and population displacement, but also human disease outbreaks (UN OCHA 2017). Moreover, climate change appears to have a particularly detrimental effect on women (Abebe 2014; Research and Evidence Facility (REF) 2017). Available evidence suggests that women are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than men not only because they are disproportionately poorer but also because their livelihoods depend greatly on natural resources that are threatened by climate change. Moreover, women face social, economic and political barriers that limit their coping capacities.

Resource availability is also affected by the withdrawal of some key resources from the rangelands. Anti-pastoralist government policies greatly affect land access and use, where the most productive patches of land are put to agricultural, conservation or other non-pastoralist use. Several communities in GHOA, including those on the borderlands, have lost land to agriculture, forestry, irrigation and other projects. As a consequence, herd productivity declines, especially during prolonged droughts when valuable patches of grazing land are no longer available (Little and McPeak 2014). Furthermore, the depletion of natural resources and degradation of lands (due to overstocking and reduced mobility) undermines livelihoods, increases vulnerability to disasters and puts human security at risk (Carr 2017b; Catley, et al. 2013a).

Finally, recent 'developments' such as the construction of dams, establishment of commercial private and government farms and commercial fishing spell disaster for the future ecology of the Omo River/Delta and Lake Turkana. Consequently, they also spell disaster for the ecologically-linked livelihoods of communities in the Kenya and Ethiopia borderlands. The impacts of Gibe III Dam on water sources, especially the drop in Lake Turkana's water levels, and consequent effects on the lives and livelihoods of communities have been extensively noted (Avery 2010; Avery 2013). Among the environmental impacts of the Gibe III are destruction of riverine forest and grazing areas, drying of the Omo Delta, loss of watering sources, loss of productive floodplain for agriculture and loss of fish habitats (International Rivers 2013). Furthermore, the Dam's impact will not be restricted only to water sources. Changes to the Lake and Omo Basin will also lead to greater migration of people to the Elemi Triangle, leading to overgrazing, ecological degradation and increased intergroup conflict between borderland communities (Carr 2017b).

ECONOMY AND LIVELIHOODS

A majority of the population of the borderlands consists of mobile (agro-) pastoralists (exception: Gambella, see below). The success of pastoralism depends largely on the availability of and access to temporary vegetation and water for livestock. Although agriculture is practiced in areas of suitable ecology, the output tends to be sub-optimal due to water scarcity or other unfavourable climatic or soil conditions. However, livestock is able to withstand conditions detrimental to cultivation and, thus, provide more security. Notwithstanding the growth in non-pastoral income strategies in the region, livestock trade is the backbone of the economy in the borderlands. Moreover, since non-pastoral activities tend to generate low income (Gebresenbet and Kefale 2012; Iyer and Mosebo 2017) and the options for the wealthy outweigh those for the poor, livestock remain the most productive investment for a great number of people (Little, et al. 2001b).

Apart from the sociocultural and political importance of livestock, particularly cattle and camels, pastoral production also contributes significantly to the economies of countries in the Horn and East of Africa (Hesse and MacGregor 2006). It is estimated that annual exports of livestock and products in the Horn of Africa generate close to 1 billion US\$ (Catley, et al. 2013b). Here, too, mobility plays a critical role in determining producers' access to markets (Aklilu and Catley 2010a). Moreover, cross-border livestock trade creates additional livelihood opportunities for middlemen, butchers, and animal health workers, alongside generating fees and taxes in markets (IIED 2009).

Despite policies by governments and development stakeholders that favour agriculture and marginalise pastoralism (Levine 2010), livestock trade is a matter of routine for the borderland communities across the GHoA. For instance, in the Uganda-Kenya borderlands, trading of animals occurs year-round between Matheniko and Turkana herders. Matheniko herders have access to a vibrant livestock market in Moroto District and respond to market demands through barter exchange with Turkana in specific species and/or through 'trading up', where assets with low growth potential (slaughter bulls) are sold and the proceeds used to buy assets with high growth potential (heifers) (Iyer 2016; Resilience Learning Project 2016). Similar exchanges and trade occur between Tepeth and Pokot pastoralists along the southern border, as well as between Jie, Dodoth and Turkana in the north.

On the borders of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya, livestock trade persists despite prolonged political instability (Mahmoud, et al. 2010). Even with the existence of very few official border crossings, an officially-closed border (Kenya-Somalia) and periodic border closures (Kenya-Ethiopia), human and animal movement as well as livestock marketing continues unabated (Little, et al. 2015; Mahmoud 2010). In fact, a significant portion of Somaliland's/Somalia's formal livestock exports are of Ethiopian origin. Citing other reports, Aklilu and Catley (2010) estimate that 60-80 percent of Somalia's exports are re-exports with origins in the Somali Region of Ethiopia. Similarly, it was estimated that 16 percent of the beef consumed in Nairobi was of South-Central Somali origin (Little and Mahmoud 2005). In Moyale, cross-border trade accounts for 75 percent of the livestock traded (Pavanello 2010). The markets in Mandera and Moyale are supplied by the Somali and Oromia regions in Ethiopia, north-eastern Kenya and the Lower Juba in Somalia (Pavanello 2009). On the other hand, camels purchased from Mandera in north-eastern Kenya and southern Somalia are trekked to Ethiopian Moyale. From there, traders truck them to central Ethiopia from where they export them to the Middle East (see also Pavanello, 2010).

Livestock exports to the Middle East, in particular, contributes significantly to the economy. In the 1990s, exports from the Somali ports of Berbera and Bossaso were valued at US \$ 120 million, with about 80 percent of the traded livestock originating in the Somali Region (Eid 2014). This value of the livestock trade has since increased to above US \$ 400 million in recent years (Ibid.). Besides livestock, the vibrant cross-border trade along the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borders include such items as grains, khat, electronics, sugar, tea and other consumer goods (Behnke 2008).

Livelihood diversification has been a necessary reality for borderland pastoralist communities for several decades, both due to rising poverty as well as a buffer against risks (Hogg 1986; Little 2001). Diversified livelihoods include charcoal and firewood sales, milk sales, construction, small businesses, Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM), wage work and contraband. It is also worth noting that whereas the literature is replete with examples of pastoralist diversification, several variables such as proximity to towns, wealth status and gender play critical roles in the options available to families or individuals (Little, et al. 2001b). For instance, as distance from towns or peri-urban centres increases, so does distance from markets and certain alternative livelihood options such as wage work.¹⁸

Natural resource extraction features as a relatively new development on the borderlands, which on the surface appears as a lucrative option, but has instead increased insecurity. For instance, in northern and central Karamoja, artisanal gold mining is a widely-practiced alternative livelihood, particularly by

¹⁸ Distance from markets here refers specifically to non-pastoral income sources, as mobility over great distances for market access is a reality of the borderlands livestock trade (Aklilu and Catley, 2010).

women (Houdet J., et al. 2014). Periodic successes in gold/dust extraction may result in high incomes for families/individuals, especially in the wet season (Iyer and Mosebo 2017). Despite periodic gains from it, ASM has reportedly led to land grabbing, disregard of community expectations and breach of human rights in Karamoja (Human Rights Watch 2014). Further, the presence of historically antagonistic groups in and around mining areas also poses a conflict risk. For example, Dodoth pastoralists, especially, have reported the threat of attack from Turkana around mining areas. Similarly, in southern Ethiopia, alluvial gold mining by Suri people became a major source of income as part of the response to the famine of the mid-1980s (Abbink 1993). However, the presence of antagonistic groups, in particular Nyangatom and Toposa, in the gold panning areas has made gold a conflict good. It remains, nevertheless, a critical source of cash for Suri (Abbink 2017). On the borderlands of Ethiopia-South Sudan, communities in Boma state (South Sudan), Gambella, Benishangul and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) have also been involved in alluvial gold mining. According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Mining, close to one million artisanal miners produce and export up to nine tonnes of gold per year (Export.gov 2017). Although most of the gold produced by the miners is supplied to the National Bank of Ethiopia, a significant amount is smuggled out of the country to neighbouring countries through borders. In Gambella, ASM has been practiced by the Anuak and neighbouring communities such as the Suri in the Akobo river basin. In 2013, for instance, Gambella State supplied over 1160 kilogrammes of pure gold worth over 50 million USD to the National Bank of Ethiopia (Bekele 2017). In Boma state, the Murle and Kachipo are also known to practice ASM.

The emergence and growth of urban centres and commercial activities have created new economic opportunities but the differentials between social groups convert them into drivers of increasing inequality. While destitute and impoverished pastoralists often resort to commercialized foraging strategies such as the collection and sale of firewood or aloe vera, charcoal burning, poaching, livestock theft, etc., and survive on petty trade, bottom-wage labour, alcohol brewing and other services, wealthier pastoral households are able to take advantage of increasing commercialised livestock trade.

INFORMAL ECONOMIES

Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) in the GHOA carries huge potential to meet national, regional and international demands. However, as most of the trade occurs through unofficial border crossings it has been labelled contraband or illegal. For instance, in the case of the livestock trade, which is a significant contributor to the economies of countries in the region, the distinction between formal and informal cross-border trade is not clear. A primary consideration for governments is that ICBT does not generate public revenue. However, taxes paid at border markets and other markets en route to the terminal market, generally cities, do generate significant revenues at different levels of the chain (Little, et al. 2015). The lack of and inadequacies in services have made the legalization of trade activities in the borderlands difficult, thereby worsening the situation of pastoralists. Herders, however, take advantage of the different economic opportunities and tariffs across borders in informal trade, which lead to significant price increases when commodities cross a particular border. Feyissa and Hoehne (2010) interpret this as an expression of borderlanders' agency to gain economically from the border.

A bustling contraband trade is also visible in the Ethiopia-Somaliland (Somalia) borderlands, and to a lesser extent across the Moyale area.¹⁹ The incoming contraband comprises processed food items and manufactured goods, while the outgoing contraband is mainly agricultural in nature (Hailemeskel, et al. 2016). Based on two-year data from Ethiopia's Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA – 2012/13 and 2013/14), the authors argue that "live animals constitute 35% of this contraband export followed by cereals (20%), pulses (19%), chat (19%) and others (7%)". As such, trade in contraband can be attributed to the relative proximity of the coastline (Berbera port), and the inability/unwillingness of the Somali/Somaliland state to halt this trade. In both export and import contraband trade, Somali pastoralists make use of their intimate knowledge of routes to evade fees while other Ethiopian traders provide the capital for the trade.

¹⁹ Interview key informant, Ethiopia's Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA), Jijiga Branch (July 2017).

Such engagement has been among the few complementary relations between Somali Ethiopians and other Ethiopians during the tense period of the 1980s (Girma 2013). In the Ethiopia-Kenya borderlands, ICBT is a critical source of livelihood for its pastoral inhabitants (Mahmoud, 2010). During peaceful periods, ICBT takes place along the border, with significant quantities of goods flowing in and out with great ease. Not surprisingly, livestock trade dominates both in terms of volume and revenue generated.

The formal trade in *Khat* and livestock makes the greatest contribution to revenue generated at the Jijiga branch of ERCA over the past decade. In recent years, the contribution of vegetables to the formal trade is increasing. This trade however simply uses the pastoral borderlands as a corridor, often without providing any economic benefits to pastoralists directly. It is the informal trade/contraband which benefits the borderlanders. This trade builds on the clan system, both for animal movement as well as information exchange. In the outgoing contraband trade, livestock make the largest contribution, not *Khat*, given the inhibitive nature of the perishability of the latter (Gebresenbet forthcoming). As such, higher prices across the border and lack of market infrastructure on the Ethiopian side coerce Somali pastoralists to trek their livestock across for sale. While *khat* and vegetables are brought in from other parts of the country, the livestock is exclusively from the Somali Region of Ethiopia. A large proportion of the livestock exported at Berbera Port also comes from Ethiopia.

Various attempts have been made by governments to formalize the ICBT in livestock. Ethiopia, in particular, has enacted measures such as import licenses and bank registration in order to both formalize the trade as well as collect revenue (see Little et al, 2015 for details). Other countries, in particular Somalia/Somaliland and Kenya, have been less strict about policing cross-border trade, primarily because of its contribution to the economies. In reality and due to other security concerns, the large import of livestock into Kenya from Somalia, while technically illegal, is not subject to the same control as weapons or drugs.

To deter the contraband trade it is criminalized, and the security apparatus takes the lead in controlling it. Creating a more enabling livestock trade within the country is also lucrative, particularly following the increasing commercialization of live animal trade from the borderlands. This is especially true after Saudi Arabia lifted the ban on livestock imports from HoA due to fear of epizootic Rift Valley Fever (FEWS NET 2010). With the officially-stated aim of enabling cross-border trade, the Ethiopian government is promoting petty cross-border trade by licensing local traders to import/export commodities (included in a predetermined list prepared by the federal government), the total value of which should not be above a predetermined level per month. The delay in revising the necessary legal framework governing this trade and the inability to control 'illegal traders' has made this petty peripheral trade less attractive (Life and Peace Institute 2015).

Estimates from two decades ago show that official statistics do not reflect the actual revenues earned through the ICBT, particularly in livestock, in the Horn of Africa (Coppock 1994). Governments believe that unofficial crossing results in the loss of foreign exchange and national and regional revenues. This instigates them to adopt a punitive stance towards the trade (Pavanello 2009). To the participants and borderlanders, these informal cross-border trades represent a normal market response to cumbersome and time-consuming export regulations, the peripheral location of the pastoral borderland communities and their relations with the centres (Abdiwasa 2015; Adugna 2015; Ayalew 2016). In light of this information, ICBT practices should be encouraged as a means to promote intra-regional trade, meet local demands not met by domestic production and markets and ensure regional food security (IGAD 2012; Little 2006).

DEMOGRAPHY

An assessment of demographic trends in the borderlands is especially important for discussions on livelihoods, economy and human security. The population of GHoA (as a whole) is increasing at a rapid pace (see Figure I). Population projections in pastoralist regions of GHoA, e.g. Turkana County, also point to a rise in population. According to one such projection, the population of Turkana County is expected to rise to 1.4 million in 2017 – a ten-fold increase since 1979 (Turkana County and UN 2015). Recent

population estimates of pastoralist communities in each country, however, are sparse and unreliable (see Table A). Cultural taboos (e.g. not disclosing deaths), failure to fully account for pastoral areas in national censuses, and different definitions of ‘who qualifies as pastoralist’ means it is challenging to gather reliable and accurate data (Humanitarian Policy Group 2010). Census population figures in these areas are also problematic because of the continuous nomadic movements of populations across administrative boundaries and access issues. Given these limitations, it is not possible to focus particularly on population trends in borderlands; instead, the section briefly discusses broad trends in pastoral areas of GHoA in general.




Figure 1: Percentage growth in population in the GHoA (Source: UNEP 2011)

Population growth in pastoralist areas is estimated at 2.5-3.5 percent per year, or in other words projections point at a doubling of population every 25 to 35 years (African Union 2010b). Fertility rates in pastoral areas are far higher than the national average in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (REGLAP 2012). Nevertheless, pastoralist borderlands have generally lower population densities than national centres. For example, the population density in Gambella is only 12 individuals per sq. km. (GPNRS President Office 2013). Unpublished data from Ethiopia’s Somali region puts the region’s population density as only 15 individuals per sq. km. A similarly low population density is also visible across the border in Somaliland, Puntland and south-central Somalia, not including towns and riverine farming areas. Regardless of such low population density, competition over resources persists. In Gambella, for example, there is fierce competition between Anuak and Nuer communities over arable riverine land coveted for its good soil and moisture conditions, which constitutes only 0.5 percent of the region’s land mass (Feyissa 2006; Feyissa 2012). The increasing sedentarisation of pastoralist populations in several GHoA countries, alongside population growth, constrains livestock mobility, increases competition over available grazing land, and in general increases pressure on fragile ecosystems.

Country	Total estimated population	Estimated pastoralist population	Pastoralists percentage of total population
Djibouti	466,900–650,000	93,000–130,000	20%
Eritrea	4.5m	1–1.5m	33%
Ethiopia	70.5m	7–8m	10–12%
Kenya	30m	6m	20%
Somalia	9.6m	6.7m	70%
Sudan	40.2m	n/a	60% (of non-urban areas)

Table A: Pastoralist demography in the Horn of Africa

(Source: USAID, 2005. Horn of Africa – Multi-sectorial interventions in pastoralist communities)

Although the population in pastoral borderland areas has to a large extent remained within pastoralism, long-term analyses indicate that pastoral areas are unable to absorb or sustain a growing human population and that ‘excess’ people move to other forms of livelihoods and life. The push factors in pastoral areas can combine with pull factors from urban centres, which may offer alternative and less risky lifestyles and job opportunities, as well as better education and health services. Among those who remain, many continue with pastoralism because there are few alternative ways of livelihood. However, in areas with relatively higher rainfall and the option of crop production, pastoralists are under pressure from farmers. In the absence of land tenure, they lose their land and way of life (Helland 2015). Those who fall out of pastoralism use various and potentially damaging livelihood strategies, including non-sustainable use of natural resources such as cutting trees for charcoal production and sale; sending daughters to work as house servants in towns, thereby exposing them to risk of abuse; engaging in illegal contraband trade; and criminal activity such as commercial livestock raiding or banditry (African Union 2010b).

SOCIAL ORGANISATION, POLITICAL CONTEXT AND GOVERNANCE

LOCAL FORMS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANISATION

Borderland communities socially and politically organise themselves in various ways. Key among these are ethnic groups, territorial sections, generations and age-sets, patrilineal descent systems, patrilocal settlement patterns and polygynous marriage. Prior to administrative restructuring by the state (both colonial and post-colonial), the communities were generally acephalous - denoting the lack of political leaders and non-hierarchical notions of political organisation. Despite changes to organisation, elders generally continue to retain considerable authority in decision making.

Among Somali communities, organisation along patrilineal descent includes, in order of descending size: clan families; clans; primary lineages; *díya* (compensation)-paying groups, i.e. groups of extended families who pay and receive compensation collectively; and households (Somali: *reer*). Somali customary law, called *heer* (Somali: *xeer*) is, besides *shari'a*, a central non-state body of legal norms and provisions. This body is most effective in rural areas and/or in the absence of effective state authorities in settling disputes. *Heer* is administered by elders, and *shari'a* by sheikhs. Regarding both forms of law, family belonging is important, and usually disputes among Somalis are settled with the aim of re-establishing peaceful relations between members of extended families (restorative justice) (Hoehne 2016).

The importance of clans in Somali communities, both in socio-political organisation and especially in discussions around conflicts, can hardly be overstated (see World Bank 2015 for a review). The relationship of Somali descent groups to territory is complex. In the past, Somalis all over the HoA were mainly attached temporarily to places where periodic resources such as pasture and water were available to sustain their livestock economy. With the encroachment of states into their territory, and particularly with intensified urbanisation in the past few decades, many Somalis became more sedentary. The closer attachment of Somalis to territory, particularly in eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya due to administrative reforms and state control, does, however, not suggest rigidity or inflexibility of clan territories. Despite the existence of clan homelands, the borders were not rigid and changed according to demands of the pastoral production system (Hagmann and Khalif 2005).

Clans also feature as units of socio-political management among other borderland communities such as Gabra and Nuer. The patrilineal clan is a key form of social organisation among the Garri of Moyale (Ethiopia-Kenya), and plays a central role in political alignments and in business, especially in livestock trade within and across borders. Clan membership is a crucial mechanism of mobilization during elections, inter-communal conflicts, to access resources and to manage disasters. With elaborate histories of inter-ethnic/clan assimilations and flexible modes of identifications on multiple levels, other social relations such as bond friendship and religion (mainly Islam) serve as conduits for networks of exchanges and trade beyond the limits of ethnic/clan boundaries (Adugna 2010; Schlee and Shongolo 2012).

The Anuak stand out in regard to their social and political organisation. In comparison to their pastoralist neighbours, cattle are less important in creating and maintaining social relationships. They are also different from their 'stateless' neighbours in having relatively centralized 'village states' (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Lienhardt 2012). There were two kinds of political communities in traditional Anuak society: the *ji-nyiyé* ('peoples of the nobles') and *ji-kwaari* ('peoples of the headmen') (Feyissa 2011). The forceful monetization of Anuak economy and society by the Ethiopian state since the 1970s has greatly undermined the social and economic significance of traditional institutions.

Generation and age-sets are critical units of social and political organisation among the Ateker Cluster communities and most of their neighbours (Kurimoto and Simonse 1998), Boran (Kenya-Ethiopia), Nuer (South Sudan) and Murle (South Sudan). Generation and age-set systems play a critical role in cooperation, conflict social and economic relations, and are critical to understanding succession of power, dynamics of conflict, and processes of governance and authority (Kratli and Swift 2001; Muller-Dempff 2017). Recent studies reveal political and social changes in certain communities, especially regarding the authority of elders. For instance, several authors argue that SALW have changed dynamics within

societies and even families, where sons with rifles have appeared less likely to obey parents, elders and other traditional authorities (Abbink 2009; Carlson et al. 2012), including with regard to raids and the sharing of looted livestock. Other observers, however, argue differently. Akabwai and Ateyo (2007: 28) report: “there are cases in which Matheniko, Pian and Bokora youth can confront their elders and force them to submit, something unheard of in the past. Such is not the case in Jie, Pokot and Tepeth”. Abbink relates such trends to the deep trauma inflicted on Suri society by the dramatic defeat suffered at the hands of better armed Toposa and Nyangatom. Hutchinson (2000) sees deliberate indoctrination by acculturated elites dominating the civil war as key to the changing ethics of warfare among Nuer and Dinka (see also *Peace, Conflict and Security*).

The social assets of pastoralist groups also include the indigenous social support systems (safety nets), which to varying degrees assist poorer members of the community. These systems may target households with relatively few animals or those who have suddenly lost animals due to disease, flooding or other causes. Female-headed households may also be targeted. These local systems are based on loans or gifts of livestock or livestock products and for Muslim pastoralist communities, the giving of alms. Not all pastoralist communities however equally subscribe to a pro-poor social system. For some, pastoralism is a moral and existential universe tying together humans and herds, a self-contained egalitarian system that has historically excluded the poor, rendering them unable to sustain their pastoralist lifestyle and eventually forcing them to abandon it. A case study on the Turkana confirms that, “dislocation of the destitute, both spatially and economically, results in the identity of the poor person being remade into that of an ethnic ‘other’ – a non-Turkana” (Anderson and Broch-Due 1999). The aim is to ensure the community’s survival. The Turkana believe poverty is the result of choices and decisions, and that the prudent will either not fall into poverty or will recover, while the imprudent will drop out.

TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE

The social organisation and resource management systems of borderland communities have enabled the continuity of pastoralist systems for centuries. These institutions and practices developed in different ways in different areas, influenced by the demands of the communities and by the ecological and political environment. Traditional governance structures are critical in the management of land tenures and access rights to grazing lands, as well as in the general management of rangelands (Herrera, et al. 2014). Often, there are specific governance structures for a key resource (such as water) and in some cases, decisions about key resources are made by a central group of community members. If governance structures give responsibility for different resources to different groups of decision-makers, these are expected to work together to prevent over-exploitation (ibid; see also McCabe 1990). This layered pattern of grassroots governance with its strong horizontal and vertical linkages is typical of common property regimes.

There is a common perception among policy-makers that pastoralists do not plan, and particularly not in a long-term manner (Samuel, et al. 2016). However, land use planning is a lifelong practice for pastoralists, as environmental conditions and other factors are constantly changing and pastoralists need to adapt their use of the land accordingly (ibid). As their plans tend to be verbal, sharing them with non-pastoralists is challenging. They also tend to be more short-term and adaptable due to the unpredictability of the environment in which they live.

Traditional governance structures are among the main sources of resilience of borderlands not only from the ecological but also community point of view. As they provide their members with very high levels of influence in decision and rulemaking, as well as enforcement, communities commonly perceive them as a more legitimate and participatory political order than those established by the region’s nation states. Muhereza et al. (2008) suggest that one of the main areas of difference between traditional and formal systems is in relation to the defence of individual rights. A central tenet of the traditional system is the pursuit of social justice, and the recognition that the rights of the collective - e.g. to continued access to a depletable resource - are as important or more so than those of an individual’s. This often boils down to the fact that for a regulation benefitting more than one party to work, all parties must forgo certain

potential benefits. Hence, the rights of an individual are only respected to the extent that they do not negatively affect the legitimate and vital interests of a community, and, thus, comply with established notions (community) of social justice (ibid).

This does not, however, imply that the system always works without biases and hierarchical differentials. In some borderland communities, families associated with strong clans and sub-clans are less vulnerable than are those associated with weaker ones, as the internal “safety net” tends to be more intact. Traditional governance systems often have limited trust in modern public administration systems. Stites et al (2007b: 20), for example, discuss the tensions that often exist between local government ‘leaders’ and elders, due to the former being of a lower status in the community than the latter, while at the same time endowed with more power in the formal sphere. Council leaders are also privileged in dealing with state and other formal institutions, which creates a “fragmented and inefficient system of power”. Similarly, whereas elders continue to have decision-making power and feel that they have authority in Karamoja, women and male youth, in some locations and not universally, question this authority for its rigidity in the face of changing socio-economic conditions (Carlson, et al. 2012). In addition, women and minority groups (and clans) have historically been excluded from important decision-making processes, an issue that is being addressed by development initiatives (Leite 2017).

The traditional governance system has declined because of various reasons. One is the weakening of governance principles such as gerontocracy, where governance systems change as the power of the elders diminishes. For instance, Mirzeler and Young (2000) stress that an increasing number of educated young Karamojong have entered local government service or occupy posts in Kampala, providing important ‘intermediary links.’ This undermines the relevance of elders as traditional authorities. Elders can still influence decisions, particularly in enforcing traditional punishments to preserve peace agreements.

A factor that has also undermined the socio-political factors of resilience in border (pastoralist) areas is the increasing co-option of traditional authorities. As state presence in the borderlands gets stronger, governments have sought to co-opt traditional authorities instead of creating a more sensible partnership that recognizes alternative bases of legitimacy (Feyissa and Kirchmann 2009). This is self-defeating as the very appeal of traditional authorities is that they operate on a different basis of legitimacy. On the other hand, co-option engenders institutional erosion, as traditional authorities would lose their credibility in the eyes of their local constituency, creating an institutional void and weaker local peace-making capacities. In border areas such as Kenya and Somalia, the trend is towards more hybrid forms of governance, one that allows, or at least tolerates, different centres of power in the provision of public goods (Menkhaus 2015a).

Finally, the patriarchal nature of power relations in pastoralist (and borderland) societies has also received great attention in the literature (Hodgson 2000). Although men, in general, have greater economic, social and political power, women play critical roles in borderland (pastoralist) life and economy (Flintan 2008). As previously noted (see *Ecology, Economy and Livelihoods*), women participate actively in cross-border trades (and even smuggling) (Ayalew 2016). Pastoralist women wield subtle forms of power that are often not adequately considered. Understanding pastoral women’s access to and control over livestock - a key financial asset - requires moving beyond the concept of ‘ownership’ to a more complex set of rights and responsibilities, often overlooked by development planners. While in most pastoral communities the final decision to dispose of an animal by sale, gift or slaughter rests with the male head of household, his wives and even his daughters may need to be consulted and can exert a considerable amount of influence over this decision. Disposal rights are therefore complex and are also connected to women’s access rights to the products of any animal. Even customary pastoral inheritance law, which in most pastoral groups passes livestock automatically along the male line, may entitle a widow to keep the livestock given to her as gifts by her husband during their marriage. Development actors should pay attention to and build on women’s ‘informal power’ rather than an approach that focuses only on victimhood (Watson 2010).

POLITICAL CONTEXT - MODES OF INCORPORATION INTO STATE SYSTEMS, FORMS AND DEGREES OF INFLUENCE

Borderland communities vary in their modes of incorporation into the state system. This depends on the historical longevity of their incorporation as well as the socio-cultural and political distance to national centres. In the border region of Gambella, for instance, the two major groups of people vary in their mode of incorporation into the Ethiopian and Sudanese states despite their similarity in their cross-border settlement patterns. The Anuak were incorporated into the Ethiopian state earlier than the Nuer who they consider as “latecomers” or “foreigners”/Sudanese. The Nuer on the other hand are thoroughly incorporated into the Sudanese state system which they leverage in their recognition politics in Gambella (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010). On the other hand, some borderland communities have largely been left to their own devices, including most communities living along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border and in the Elemi borderlands. Others have been subjected to stricter control because of geopolitical sensitivity, as is the case with the Somali populations in eastern Ethiopia and north-eastern Kenya. The Karamoja borderlands in Uganda have seen both brutal state involvement, as exemplified by the disarmament operations, as well as neglect.

In the Ethiopia-Kenya border areas, several Somali clans, and the Borana and Gabra were divided between the Ethiopian and the British empires. But their level of incorporation and the degree of trust they acquired from the respective political centres varied. The Borana were seen as loyal citizens in both countries, while the Somali clans were viewed with suspicion in both countries. The Somali clans were accused of sympathizing with the Republic of Somalia’s irredentist claims (Adugna 2011; Schlee 1989). Indeed, the Somali clans situated in both Ethiopia and Kenya had established many insurgent groups and fought to join the Republic of Somalia. As a result, the Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya triangle was securitized with its full negative effect felt on the livelihoods of the borderland communities (Baxter 1966).

Notwithstanding some differences, all borderland communities occupy a peripheral mode of existence vis-à-vis their respective national centres. They have little or no say on local governance issues and play no meaningful role in decision-making at the national level. Borderland communities however cope with their marginality by national centres, one of which is the practice of de facto alternative citizenship. Porous borders allow pastoralists to pursue traditional patterns of migration crossing many state borders despite the restrictions imposed by national governments. The border is also used as a ‘resource’ to negotiate socio-economic marginality by tapping into the opportunities offered by each border (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010). This is enabled by the cross-border settlement pattern, such as the Somalis settlements in four countries. The Nuer along the Ethiopia-South Sudanese border have practiced alternative citizenship orienting their movement depending on the fluctuating opportunity structure (Feyissa 2013). They have passed as Sudanese when refugee camps were more attractive throughout the 1980s. When the opportunity structure changed in favour of Ethiopia in the 1990s many ‘Sudanese’ Nuer became Ethiopian citizens. However, this is not an opportunity equally accessed by all. The growing securitization of the borders with Somalia because of the Al Shabaab militancy, for instance, has constrained cross border movements.

Political reforms, particularly in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, have significantly reconfigured centre-periphery relations with a direct bearing on the human security of borderland communities. The regime change in Ethiopia in 1991 involved a fundamental restructuring of the Ethiopian state from the historically entrenched Unitarian state with a rigid political centralization into a federation that embraced the ethnic diversity of the nation (Feyissa 2013). In principle, all ethnic groups – small and large, the historically dominant and those in the peripheries – are ‘sovereign’ with equal political and cultural rights (Andreas 2013). Five of the nine regional states (SNNPR, Somali, Afar, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz) are homes for the country’s historic peripheries, which also constitute the country’s borderlands with neighboring countries, respectively with Somalia/Kenya, Eritrea/Djibouti and South Sudan. Although the new federal political order has given a greater voice to the marginalized communities in the peripheries

through the creation of self-governing structures (e.g., regional state, Zones, *Weredas*, etc.), this right has been undermined by many factors.

Much remains to be accomplished when it comes to the autonomy of the regional states, particularly in the peripheries, which have come under the stronger grip of the federal government; a control justified by “a weaker institutional capacity” as well as vulnerability of these regions to geopolitical pressures (Asnake 2013). The lower educational level of borderland communities as compared with the more ‘developed’ regions has also undermined their political voice. The higher political premium put on ethnicity which is reflected in the institutional design of the Ethiopian federation has also, at least inadvertently, generated intense inter-ethnic and inter-clan conflicts which undermine social cohesion at the local and regional levels, as the increasingly tense and confrontational relation between the Somali and the Oromo have shown in recent years (The Economist 2017).

Minority groups, including borderland communities have, thus, come under intense pressure, also in the form of a transformational agenda that imposes a livelihood shift from mobile pastoralism and other mobility-based production practices, to an irrigation-based sedentarisation programme. Ethiopia’s big developmental push in its peripheries, particularly the large scale irrigated commercial agriculture in Gambella and South Omo is a classic example of a top-bottom development approach without consideration of local needs, interests and capabilities (Human Rights Watch 2012). However, Ethiopia’s national development policy has also brought about opportunities to the border areas. Ethiopia has also invested heavily in regional infrastructure. A standard gauge railway built between Ethiopia and Djibouti is expected to further deepen the economic and political ties between the two countries with a direct positive impact on borderland communities. Major infrastructure projects between Ethiopia and Kenya include the LAPSSET and standard road transportation between Ethiopia and the Sudan linking the border towns of Metemma and Gedarif. In February 2017 Ethiopia and South Sudan also agreed to construct two highways (Gambella-Pagak-Palouge and Dima-Raad-Boma-Bor) to boost trade between the two countries (Sisay 2017).

Political reform in Kenya is expressed in the form of a new devolutionary political order. Devolution in Kenya is designed to address decades of political marginalization and underdevelopment of the country’s historic minorities. Conceived at the wake of the 2007 electoral violence and backed by the 2010 new Constitution, devolution in Kenya is hailed as the birth of “the second republic”, one that significantly changed the way power and resources are managed in Kenya (Gachanga 2014). In the previous governments, with executive power largely vested in the central government headquartered in Nairobi, there was “strong feeling of exclusion” (ibid). According to the new devolutionary political order, there are 47 new county governments in charge of overseeing functions such as agriculture, health facilities, sanitation, transport and trade licenses. In turn, these county governments will receive a (15%) share of national revenues and are expected to mobilize revenue from other sources within their counties (Kimenyi 2013).

Devolution has proved to be a turning point for the marginalized in Kenya, most of whom are in the border areas. It has created a sense of identity and self-worth and inspired new hope for a prosperous future. Kenya’s promising devolution has however met with setbacks (ICG 2015). Most clans and counties Kenya’s northeast are in conflict (ibid). Despite constitutional safeguards, minority clans have become vulnerable to the politics of exclusion by the majority clans, with a monopolistic closure on distribution of power and resources within Counties. The 2013 post-election implementation of devolved county government also ushered in violent clan conflict, most acutely in Mandera county, where constituency and county boundary changes were a flash point in the re-eruption of a long-standing feud between the Garre and Degodia (ibid). Security concerns posed by Al-Shabaab is also a complicating factor in the smooth operationalization of devolved government, particularly in the border areas.

Published in 2007, Kenya’s “Vision 2030” national development plan already saw the historically marginalized drylands in the north as the “new frontier” for development. It does not formulate a clear

statement on pastoralism as such, and the term livestock is used without differentiating between pastoralism and livestock husbandry on farms. In the Kenyan ASALs, new lands for cultivation should be prepared by strategically developing more irrigable areas for crops and livestock, and market access to smallholders improved through better marketing (Republic of Kenya 2011). The Mid-Term Plan mentions that special attention will be given to projects improving the livelihoods of the poor in pastoralist communities.

The recent bilateral agreements between Ethiopia and Kenya to enhance cross border cooperation are instructive. Since 2014, the two Governments, in partnership with IGAD and the UN Country Teams, and with support from partners, have embarked on an innovative, integrated programme to bring about sustainable peace and transformative development in the border regions of Marsabit County, Kenya and Borana/Dawa Zones, Ethiopia. On December 2015, former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and President Uhuru Kenyatta sought to address the issue of youth unemployment by signing a deal to create energy, mining and livestock related jobs along their border. Following that, thirty-five local peace committee members, comprised of different ethnic groups, have been continuously working on maintaining peace and committed themselves to peaceful coexistence. The Isiolo-Merille-Marsabit-Moyale road, partially financed by the European Union and African Development Bank, is completed and is expected to have considerable positive impact as it will link Kenya to Ethiopia and promote cross border trade. The two governments also launched in June 2017 a cross border programme known as “The Kenya-Ethiopia Cross Border Programme for Sustainable Peace and Socio-Economic Development” to help foster peace and socio-economic development by unlocking the economic potential of the region. It is a joint UN and governments of Kenya and Ethiopia programme that aims at boosting economic growth, reduce poverty and promote business activities in the Horn of Africa through cross border cooperation.

PEACE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY

TYPES OF CONFLICT, 'DRIVERS' AND FACTORS

Whereas we find conflict everywhere in the world, one of the conspicuous particularities of the GHoA borderlands is the persistence and intensity of armed collective violence. The topic of warfare among pastoralist groups in the GHoA has been extensively discussed in scholarly and other circles (see for e.g. Abbink, 1994; Fukui and Turton, 1979; Krätli and Swift, 2001). In some borderlands, especially in and around the Ateker region, conflicts take place along ethnic lines and follow more conventional intercommunity conflict patterns, albeit with critical changes such as the participation of local elites. Others such as the Somali borderlands, experience conflict that is highly influenced by international, national and local elite politics. The following sections are meant to clarify some of these differences, although definitions of types and 'identification of drivers' need thorough and critical revision. We contend that it may be more fitting to speak of factors that contribute to conflict rather than *cause* them.

SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL ROOTS OF LIVESTOCK RAIDING AND PROCESSES OF CHANGE

The borderlands under discussion are part of a dryland belt that experiences extreme climatic fluctuations, as well as other risks that can lead to periodic disasters and resource scarcity. The mobility of herders is an efficient coping strategy but is impaired by competing interests in pasture and water, the readiness to fight rivals, and concepts of exclusive territorial ownership and control as promoted by states and modern elites. The devastating losses that can befall herders in spite of all efforts can leave few means for survival and rebuilding livelihoods. One important coping strategy is livestock raiding. The extreme uncertainties of pastoralists' non-equilibrium environments convert raids and counter-raids into crucial ways of recuperating livelihoods or increasing resilience in the face of constantly looming and periodically occurring loss, ensure biological, economic and cultural survival, though they simultaneously threaten them (Fukui and Turton 1979; McCabe 2004). Raiding, as an adaptation to harsh socio-ecological conditions, has shaped pastoralist societies, their institutions and behavioural ideals throughout history. Moreover, due to its importance in defence, prosperity and survival, livestock raiding also became an important cultural aspect of masculinity (Fukui and Turton 1979). In many borderlands, participation in raids remain important rites of passage for adolescent boys; for men, they symbolise manhood and social status (Abbink 2007; Stites and Akabwai 2010).

Since the 19th century, the borderlands of GHoA have been exposed to the gradual expansion of global economies and states. The pre-colonial trading and raiding expeditions for ivory, slaves and stock ushered the first entry of modern weaponry, led to an arms race and to escalating inter-community violence (Barber 1962; Grip 2015). British rule and disarmament suppressed inter-community warfare, but elite competition, civil wars and informal laissez-faire rapidly led to its resurgence and to unprecedented numbers of modern firearms in the hands of borderlanders.

Rather than the common assumption that widespread availability of weapons, economic incentives and scarcity results in growing conflict, evidence points to the importance of sudden power imbalances in shifting conflict patterns (Akabwai and Ateyo 2007; Tornay 2009). Conflicts are commonly caused by shifting alliances, differential rates of armament of communities, or a combination of both. Civil wars, especially in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, have given rise to such situations as rival factions both targeted and co-opted borderland communities. As much as these wars were led by elites, politicians and commanders competing for positions in the national political and economic systems, they were often fought along ethnic and community lines at the local level. The impact on the communities was often strong and complex. For example, cattle raiding in South Sudan, especially among Dinka, Nuer and Murle, is heavily influenced by the country's ongoing civil war, including competition between politicians and commanders, breakaway factions of formal armed forces and 'tribal militias' under the command of warlords (Jok and Hutchinson 1999). In the Somali borderlands, on the other hand, infighting is greatly intertwined with political struggles over power at the local or national level. These struggles in the Somali

territories are influenced by numerous external factors, such as access to international aid, extensive diaspora remittances and (formal and informal) trade networks (Bradbury and Healy 2010).

In most of these developments, borders and borderlands are crucial because they provide the entry points for resources of vital importance for the players in the national and local arenas, both as legal and as illegal flows. The attempts of national governments to efficiently control them have been scant and inefficient (with the recent exception of Ethiopia's border with southern Somalia) (REF). Hard border approaches of both colonial and post-colonial governments, especially in the Elemi Triangle (Carr 2012; Collins 2004), have resulted in limited community mobility and cross-cultural interaction, consequently severing important ties and communication channels needed for negotiation and conflict management, resource sharing arrangements and other incentives for cooperation.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Patterns of inter-community conflict in the borderlands have evolved as adaptations to specific environmental and demographic conditions, but their interrelation is the subject of extensive debate. What is clear is that in pre-colonial times, most populations here –and in the whole of Africa – were much smaller and have been growing massively, especially due to the impact of aid and modern healthcare. Population growth is undeniably changing the lives of borderland populations, especially as the amount of available resources per capita decreases. However, this is mainly due to the multiple and interconnected factors that influence individual and collective decisions on both conflict and cooperation.

ECOLOGICAL CHANGES, PERIODIC SCARCITY AND CONFLICT

Ecological changes – increasing frequency and duration of droughts and flooding – have become a prominent theme in conflict. In addition, environmental degradation resulting from population growth, overstocking, sedentarisation, harmful plant species in rangelands and other factors are also linked to intercommunity conflict in the borderlands. Although borderlanders use a range of efficient strategies to deal with their ecologically and politically unpredictable environment, deteriorating climatic conditions increase their vulnerability (Little and McPeak 2014). Studies suggest that climate is becoming more unpredictable in the East and Horn of Africa, and particularly its arid lands are getting drier at an unusually fast pace (Tierney, et al. 2015). Climate change has been linked to adverse effects on livelihoods and increasing risk of conflict (Barnett and Adger 2007; Raleigh and Urdal 2007). This is primarily due to increasing rainfall variability, which has an adverse effect on resource availability (Schilling, et al. 2014).

Although it is widely believed that scarcity leads to conflict, the relationship between these variables is complex (Adano, et al. 2009; van Baalen and Mobjörk 2016). Studies in pastoralist communities in northern Kenya show increase in raiding both during wet years (e.g. in Marsabit, as shown by Witsenburg and Adano 2009), as well as during dry years (as demonstrated by Ember et al. 2012 in Turkana; see also Schilling et al. 2014). Authors argue that wet season conditions – such as “high grass, strong animals, [and] dense bush” (Witsenburg and Adano 2009: 723) make it easier to raid and transport animals, and that during the dry season, herders' primary concern is the wellbeing of their own animals rather than raiding (Eaton 2008). Conversely, it has also been noted that raiding heightens during dry season – e.g. in South Sudan – when short grass allows for faster movement of cattle (Ochan 2007). In northern Kenya, increase in livestock raiding has also been shown in association with the dry season and ensuing resource scarcity (Eriksen and Lind 2009). Therefore, the link between ecological changes, periodic or chronic resource scarcity, and violent conflict deserves future research attention

WEAPONS AND LOCAL SECURITY PROVISION AS FACTORS

Between 100 and 150 million Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are estimated to be in circulation in Africa, primarily in civilian hands (Gramizzi 2014). Although the GHoA has some of the highest concentrations of SALW of the continent (see Table C), the borderlands under discussion are particular

hotspots of SALW proliferation within the region and within each country. Weak governance, expansive and porous borders and ineffective formal security make SALW difficult to control and monitor their movement (Griffiths-Fulton 2002; Mkutu 2007). The circulation of firearms reaches back to the 19th century and was not only a key factor in the integration of borderland communities into the expanding states, it also had strong effects on the relations between communities.

Karamoja, Uganda	15,000 – 200,000
Kenya	530,000 – 680,000
Somaliland	500,000
South Sudan	720,000

Table B: Estimated civilian firearms holdings in selected areas of GHoA, 2014

(Adapted from Wepundi and Lynge 2014; see also LeBrun 2016)

Regionally, different countries have enacted measures to control the use and flow of SALW, including disarmament operations, destruction of illicit weapons and ammunition, stockpile management and awareness campaigns (Gramizzi 2014). Whereas such initiatives can be considered successful to some extent, the unabated entry and use of SALW in the region highlights major obstacles to their implementation such as the lack of national and cross-border strategies, the high rate of militarization of civilian populations (as in South Sudan and Somalia), population displacement and a general insecurity. Consequently, a large number of illicit weapons remain in circulation (Danish Demining Group and Small Arms Survey 2009). Furthermore, disarmament initiatives, such as that by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Karamoja, are said to have resulted in widespread human rights abuses including destruction of lives and livelihoods (Human Rights Watch 2007; Mkutu 2008). A similar joint Kenya-Uganda disarmament operation in 1984, *Operation Nyundo*, resulted in the deaths of both civilians and livestock in the borderlands of Pokot (Kenya) and Karamoja (Kopel, et al. 2008).

Various policy frameworks and initiatives have also been formulated to curb and ultimately eliminate SALW in the region (see also *Stakeholders and Policies*). These include the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004), the African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW (African Union 2011), and IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN, 2003). Some of these initiatives, however, have had limited success due to the lack of commitment from national governments in the region or because of uncoordinated disarmament programmes (Gramizzi 2014). These failures have inadvertently resulted in the increased vulnerability of some communities (Mkutu n.d.). This is particularly the case along the Ethiopia-South Sudanese border areas where the differential disarmament programme and the security vacuum created by the Ethiopian government have made communities on the Ethiopian side of the border vulnerable to cross-border raiding and child abduction, as the April 2016 unprecedented attack by the Murle shows (Gemechu 2016). Along the Turkana-Karamoja border, renewed fighting has been reported since late 2017 despite previous successful resource sharing arrangements.²⁰

COMMERCIALISATION OF LIVESTOCK RAIDING

Conflict is also related to the shift from a more benign, seasonal and redistributive form of raiding to a commercial form on several borderlands (Eaton 2010; Fleisher 2002; Hendrickson, et al. 1996). According to this view, in recent years livestock raiding in pastoralist areas has taken on a more "predatory" form due to the proliferation of small arms and the creation of new markets for raided livestock. The rise in demand for meat in GHoA, as well as in Gulf Countries that import considerable volumes of livestock from the HoA, and the bustling capitalist economy marked by corruption has generated a network of business activities providing avenues for producers as well as thieves (IRIN 2014). While it is certain

²⁰ Source: Minutes of High Level Security Meeting over deteriorating security situation in Kaabong District (29th November 2017, 3rd Division HQ, Moroto). Via Captain Augustine Lokwang.

that this form of economic crime has seriously destabilized a large number of pastoralist economies and societies, especially certain border areas, this process is neither universal nor uniform. Its occurrence, degrees and dynamics have to be considered for every specific region in detail.

The transformation in raiding practices, particularly its commercial motives, have been reported along the Karamoja borderlands and in South Sudan. In the context of South Sudan, studies indicate that shifts in the nature cattle raiding to more commercialized forms among Dinka, Nuer and Murle communities (McCallum and Okech 2013). The rapid sale of raided cattle on unofficial markets also makes thefts more difficult to resolve (Eaton 2010). Moreover, since prices for stolen livestock are usually quite low, this means that commercialized raids tend to impoverish the region from a macro-perspective.

Another aspect of the commercialization of livestock raiding is the emergence of the “traider,” defined as “small-scale livestock traders who rely on close social ties to cattle thieves” (Eaton 2010: 107). These conflict entrepreneurs are usually former raiders themselves, and they fuel conflict by providing raiders with a way to launder stolen cattle. This is done by selling the cattle to the traider immediately after the raid for a deeply discounted price. The trader takes on the risk associated with moving and reselling the stolen cattle in exchange for the opportunity to sell it to buyers outside of Karamoja willing to pay much higher prices. These bands operate across ethnic lines and without regard for the consequences of raids on the local security situation. This has led to increased conflict by making it more difficult for community leaders to exercise control over raiders and stolen livestock.

POLITICAL FACTORS: CONTESTED STATE BORDERS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICTS

The borders of GHoA are the result of colonial policies of the late 19th and early 20th century. Communities were not consulted when their areas were divided. Most colonial boundaries remained unchanged post-independence (Mbembe and Rendall 2000). While this is characteristic for all of Africa, the situation in the GHoA is noteworthy. First, territorial wars around GHoA borders include secessionist wars – such as that of Eritrea with Ethiopia – and annexation wars, as exemplified by the Ethiopia-Somalia wars of 1963 and 1978 over the Ogaden (Mbembe and Rendall 2000). More recently, the unilateral secession of Somaliland from collapsed Somalia in 1991, which has not yet gained international recognition, is continuing conflicts over borders. The conflict in Somaliland over secession is taking place at a low level, in the contested borderlands between Somaliland and Puntland – with the latter representing the claim to territorial integrity of Somalia (Hoehne 2015).

Whereas European colonizers’ arbitrary demarcation of borders is typically considered the root cause of border conflict, Ethiopia’s role in border conflicts deserves mention. Unlike its neighbours, Ethiopia was never colonized (except for the brief Italian occupation). With the support of colonial powers, Ethiopia, however, attempted to expand its frontiers as evidenced by the annexation of Haud and Ogaden, and Eritrea. These expansionist attempts have led to Ethiopia being perceived as a colonial or imperial state, mainly by Somalia and Eritrea (Kornprobst 2002).

SPILL-OVER EFFECTS OF CIVIL WARS AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN REFUGEE AND HOST POPULATIONS

Due to long-running violent conflicts, repression and severe economic hardship, the GHoA has witnessed massive refugee movements within the region for many decades and hosts millions of refugees today (Research and Evidence Facility (REF) 2017). One of the first major refugee crises was caused by the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-78. When the Somali army, which had invaded Ethiopia to capture the “Western Somali lands” of Ethiopia’s Ogaden region was defeated with the help of the USSR, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled Ethiopia for Somalia (Bariagaber 2016; Lewis 2002). A decade later, when the government of Somalia bombed cities in northern Somalia to quell a rebellion, many inhabitants fled to Ethiopia and the collapse of the Somali state in the civil war led to a mass

exodus to Kenya. Today, some 200,000 Somali refugees live in Ethiopia and about 500,000 in Kenya, alongside about two million Ethiopian Somalis and four million Kenyan Somalis. The conflict in Somalia has since developed from a conflict between warlords and their militias to an arena where a western coalition with African allies, including Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, fights a proxy war with international networks financing Islamist insurgencies and terrorism that has spread to Kenya since 2011. Al-Shabaab attacks around Lamu and Garissa triggered an invasion by the Kenyan army, the first large-scale military involvement since the “Shifto War” (1963–1967) against Somali insurgents and Muslim civilians. While brutal terrorist attacks (e.g. in 2013 in Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and 2015 on Garissa University College) increased tensions in Kenya, the Kenyan forces in Somalia have failed to curb Al-Shabaab and, instead, are accused of using strategic positions to profit from trade and smuggling particularly around the important port of Kismayo (Journalists for Justice 2015; Rasmussen 2017).

In parallel to the dynamics of the HoA, many Southern Sudanese suffered first from the civil wars in Sudan and more recently from the collapse of the recently independent South Sudan after 2013. These decades of fighting lead hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese into camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. As of October 2017, there were 416, 886 South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, mainly in camps around border areas, 110,337 in Kenya, 1,034,106 in Uganda, and 447,287 in Sudan (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2017). These refugees compete with host communities over resources and access to social services. Other examples in this regard are Somali refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, and Nuer refugees from South Sudan in Ethiopia. In Gambella, South Sudanese refugees outnumber the host population and exacerbate ethnic tensions (IOM 2017). Although finding refuge from violence remains crucial and can create or strengthen bonds across borders, insufficient provisioning, strain on local resources, differential access to services and jobs and citizenship regimes have often caused frictions between refugee and host communities (UNHCR 2015).

Furthermore, rebel activities in the borderlands have fuelled SALW proliferation and other illegal trade, exacerbated livestock raiding and conflicts between communities on both sides of the border. Still, host regions have received resources and benefitted from cross-border connections. In spite of salient problems similar to those described above, this is also true for refugees in Uganda, where they have become an important economic factor and a market for agricultural produce, and in Kenya, where an enormous influx of Somali refugees turned the once impoverished Nairobi neighbourhood of Eastleigh into a bustling economic hub (Carrier and Lochery 2013).

In addition to refugees, and at times in relation to them, borderlands also serve as a ‘safe haven’ for rebel groups. For instance, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has operated on both sides of the Ethiopia-Kenya border taking advantage of the cross-border settlements of the Boran. Similarly, the Ogaden National Liberation Front’s (ONLF’s) insurgency has been enabled by the cross-border settlements of the Somali on the Ethiopia-Somali border, leading to the securitization of not only the border areas but also the borderland communities. Large parts of South Sudan’s (widely ‘ungoverned’) borderlands with Kenya and Ethiopia are used by rebel factions such as the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) as retreat areas, deployment zones and supply corridors.

STAKEHOLDERS AND POLICIES

BWG'S POTENTIAL ROLE

The Borderlands Working Group is a consortium of agencies working across the borderlands of East Africa on a range of issue including livelihoods, conflict management and development.²¹ According to the Group's Terms of Reference, the BWG "aims to influence discourse on border policy and practical interventions in borderlands in East Africa towards a community-centred approach".²² In the following sections we outline major stakeholders and their respective interests and policies in the borderlands that the BWG should be aware of and aim to influence. We also outline effective ways in which different policy makers can include community-sensitive approaches in future policy and programming.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Governments in the region, like elsewhere, are not monolithic, especially in the context of recent political reforms. Ethiopia's federal political order, devolution in Kenya, and decentralization Uganda and South Sudan have created decentralized forms of government structure with a direct bearing on border governance. Despite some notable differences, the similarity in these new structures is the importance of local governments and the space for local decision-making. This is important for the BWG to consider in its agenda. Although central governments continue to be important players in border areas, local governments are becoming increasingly relevant such as districts (weredas) in Ethiopia, counties in Kenya, and districts/sub-counties in Uganda. Various government stakeholder institutions are involved in border management. In Uganda, responsibilities for border control and management are shared among the following agencies: Directorate for Immigration and Citizenship Control, Uganda Police Force, Internal Security Organisation, External Security Organisation, which are all under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Uganda Peoples' Defence Force and Uganda Revenue Authority. Besides, numerous other Government of Uganda institutions deal with other areas relevant to border management such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Works and Transportation, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture (quarantine) and others. A major policy gap is that Uganda does not have a comprehensive border and migration policy in place that details the country's priorities. There is clearly a need for a comprehensive policy to address the challenges posed by significant irregular and illegal cross-border movements and encourage a coordinated response from all agencies through enhanced inter-agency cooperation (IOM 2016). In Ethiopia Administration for Refugees Affairs, Ethiopian National Defence Force and Special Police Forces in the border areas are key security actors. In addition, the Ministry of Federal and Pastoral Development plays an important role in border management and administration in general and in the four 'developing' border regions in particular: Somali, Afar, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. In Kenya the lead agency for border management and administration is the Department of Immigration. Generally, the capacity of the Department was found to be wanting in terms of personnel, relevant training, and use of modern equipment for surveillance and patrol, as well as for detecting document fraud (Cheruiyot 2014). Border management agencies in Somalia and South Sudan are even more ineffective given weak state capabilities. IOM has commendable border management supports to governments in the region, which needs to be further strengthened.

All national governments have a heightened interest in border areas because of security concerns and economic developments. Cross-border settlement pattern makes border regions susceptible to spill overs from civil wars in the neighbouring countries, as in Somalia and South Sudan. The Al Shabaab militancy and its cross-border reach, particularly in the Somalia border areas, is also a major threat for countries in the region. In response to the security challenge posed by Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government, for instance, had planned to construct a 700-kilometer-long security wall along the northeastern border with Somalia. Eight kilometers of the wall already constructed starting at the border point in Mandera. When

²¹ By February 2018, members included the Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining Group, Norwegian Refugee Council; PACT; Institute for Security Studies; Rift Valley Institute; Small Arms Survey; PAX Christi; Life and Peace Institute; Handicap International; and Conciliation Resources; International Committee of the Red Cross has observer status.

²² Borderlands Working Group, *Terms of Reference Borderlands Working Group*, undated.

completed, the wall will have designated immigration and custom entry points with a 2 feet tall concrete wall fitted with CCTV cameras (Sambu 2018). A border wall would greatly undermine the resilience of borderland communities. At least 10, 000 people are involved in daily cross-border business. Creating such a barrier would have a huge economic impact and affect thousands of families who transact millions into the country daily (Mutisya 2017). Above all, it would deflect attention away from the root cause of borderland insecurity. The Kenyan government needs to root out corruption first, which is the primary reason for the entry of militants into the country. Contrary to Kenya, the reason Ethiopia remains less affected by Al Shabaab activities has nothing to do with an 'effective' wall but rather its focus on border security with greater professionalism.

The Ethiopian government has also adopted a different border management strategy. It has decentralized the security apparatus and established a regional para military force known as the Somali region Liyu (Special) police force. Initially formed as a counter-insurgency strategy against the Ogaden national Liberation Front (ONLF) insurgency that operated along the Ethiopia-Somalia border, the Liyu Police has evolved into a formidable regional military force actively combatting Al Shabaab across the border in Somalia. The Liyu police is entirely constituted by Ethiopian Somalis. One of the reasons why the Kenya security forces do not work is that they do not know the context, culture and have nothing vested in the security of local communities. Both Ethiopia and Kenya have also sought to create a buffer zone inside Somalia to protect their border (Ochieng 2014). For several years Kenya, with international support, has been pushing for Azania, traditionally known as Jubaland, to be set up. The new region, which comprises Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba, was created in 2013 as a third major semi-autonomous region, following Kenya's military intervention in Somalia. Ethiopia has also used Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a forces and the Galmadung State in central Somalia as a buffer zone (Mesfin and Beyene 2018).

Besides security concerns, borderlands have also become associated with a new economic premium in recent years. This is due to the discovery of hydrocarbons and minerals, construction of mega hydropower dams, and large-scale irrigation development projects on Trans-Boundary Rivers. As a result, state presence on border areas has greatly increased. Whether greater presence of state in the border areas will be a liability or an asset to borderland communities remains to be seen. Economic developments could both be new opportunity incentivising governments to invest in border areas, or, conversely, result in increased vulnerability. The Ethiopian government's drive to extract economic resources in the border areas, such as the huge sugar plantation in the South Omo valley, could spell an environmental disaster endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of cross borders communities. A more community-inclusive and sensitive development approach would, on the other hand, enhance the legitimacy of the federal government.

Economic development must account for social justice, community rights, and redressing the historic grievances of minority groups. In Uganda, the extraction of limestone, marble, and gold in the Karamoja borderlands has been mired in controversy. As recently as February 2018, reports of mismanagement of community land and hard-handed approaches to access mineral-rich areas by extractive companies have emerged. This has led to increased tensions between borderland communities and the private sector. Whereas the development of appropriate community structures to obtain surface rights and royalties is underway, further deliberations between communities and various stakeholders is required to ensure safeguarding of community access to land and benefit sharing from royalties. Local governments need further strengthening and bargaining power in order to advocate for communities' rights and access funds directed from private companies to the central government, and most likely stronger downward accountability to the local communities to make sure that local leaders are not corrupted.

Kenya's economic interest in the border areas is primarily linked to the LAPSSSET (Lamu Port South Sudan and Ethiopia Transport Corridor). With a price tag of over 30 billion USD, the LAPSSSET Corridor is conceived as a regional flagship project to provide transport and logistics infrastructure to connect the two landlocked countries of Ethiopia and South Sudan with coastal Kenya. It is also intended to operate

as an Economic Corridor with the objective of providing multiple Eastern African nations access to a large-scale economic trade system thereby promoting socio-economic development in the region. An investment of this magnitude requires much tighter controls over the border region. Advocacies such as freedom of movement across borders need to be informed both by governments' high stakes in the border areas as well as the community's needs. Issues should be framed in a way that shows how governments benefit by adopting a more community inclusive policymaking such as indicating the political, and even economic, cost of an aggrieved and restive borderland communities. This is certainly true in the case of Al Shabaab, for example, which has managed to tap into the historic marginality and grievances of communities along the Somalia-Kenya border.

Responding to the growing humanitarian crisis in the region, particularly the influx of refugees, governments – particularly in Uganda and Ethiopia – have increasingly adopted integrative refugee policies. These include out-of-camp approaches enabling refugees to integrate into the national labour markets and for those who stay for twenty years to acquire citizenship in the host countries. As of December 2017, Uganda was host to 1,400,218 refugees and asylum seekers; an indication of fragility and conflict in the region (UNICEF 2017). Ethiopia has also hosted nearly a million refugees from the neighboring countries. In response to the humanitarian crisis, Uganda and Ethiopia are adopting a more integrative refugee policy. Uganda is a pilot country for the global Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and Ethiopia made nine pledges aligned with the CRRF. It remains to be seen how effective these integrative policies will be and, importantly, how they will affect already strained refugee-host relations. We also need to learn how much of the 'integrative policies' structure is driven by new global incentive structures or reflect pan-Africanist conviction of governments. Tanzania, for instance, has decided to withdraw from the CRRF for reasons of security and lack of funds (AFP 2018).

Local governments are also becoming increasingly relevant in border management and play an active role in inter-state border security meetings. Ethiopia-Sudanese border developments meeting, for instance, include two regional states each on both sides of the border. Similar security arrangement and cross-border security meeting is held between Ethiopia and South Sudan, and Kenya and Ethiopia. Recently, the Turkana County and Karamoja District governments have played an active role in addressing cross-border migration issues and quelling renewed tensions among borderland communities. Local governments are also playing an important role in cross-border development projects. For example, the cross-border "Integrated Programme for Sustainable Peace and Socio-economic Transformation" along the Kenya-Ethiopia border involves Kenya's Marsabit County, and Ethiopia's Borana/Dawa Zones. In Karamoja, sub-county governments (within districts) are actively pursuing the issue of extractives and attempting to bridge borderland communities with the private sector. Local governments are closer to the values and views of their respective constituencies while at the same time operate within national government structures. They are also better and more frequently informed about pressing community issues than national governments. Thus, BWG can advocate for the greater participation of local governments in border security and development interventions. This may involve building capacity at the local government level, as well as providing a platform for negotiations.

THE AFRICAN UNION AND ITS BORDER POLICIES

The African Union (AU) has various peacebuilding frameworks and initiatives, some of which have a special bearing on border areas. Among them, three stand out: The African Union Border Program (AUBP); AU SALW Strategy, and the AU Policy Framework for Pastoralism.

The African Union Border Programme (AUBP)

The AUBP is a response to the challenges posed by the various contested borders in Africa. Among the many border disputes in the continent, some are active; others are latent, while many of them are in the process of being resolved. In 2017 alone, the AU, through the AUBP, facilitated dialogues on 23 disputed borders. Three principles guide AUBP's actions (African Union 2010a). First is the principle of respect of

borders existing at national independence. This is in line with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on Border Disputes between African States. Second, the principle of negotiated settlement of border disputes, which is captured in a resolution adopted by the OAU in 1986. Third, the shared commitment to pursue the work of border delimitation and demarcation as factors for peace, security and economic development. This is contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in 2002. Experts of the Member States validated the AU Border Governance Strategy draft document in November 2017. The draft strategy is built on five pillars: 1) development of capabilities for border governance; 2) conflict prevention, border security and transnational threats; 3) mobility, migration and trade facilitation; 4) cooperative border management; and 5) borderland development and community engagement. The challenge of finding a balance between “free movements” and “securing borders” is captured in some of the pillars of the strategy. The strategy provides recommendations that will, if properly implemented, secure borders and facilitate the free movement of persons and goods, which is already a reality in some parts of the continent. The AUBP has faced major challenges including inadequate technical and financial support for the de-limitation and demarcation of African borders; lack of a holistic view of the needs in terms of delimitation and demarcation, which hinders efforts for resource mobilization; the lack of funds to finance local initiative cross-border cooperation activities; lack of sustained interaction between neighboring States for the implementation of the various aspects of the AUBP; inadequacy of existing human and technical capacities for the effective implementation of the AUBP.

AU Convention on Cross Border Cooperation

The AU endorsed the Convention on Cross Border Cooperation, also called the Niamey Convention, in 2014. It aims to ‘ensure efficient and effective integrated border management’ (Article 2(5)) and defines cross-border cooperation in the following terms: Cross-Border Cooperation means any act or policy aimed at promoting and strengthening good-neighbourly relations between border population, territorial communities and administrations or other stakeholders with the jurisdiction of two or more states, including the conclusion of agreement useful for this purpose (African Union 2014). The Niamey Convention forms the legal framework for cross-border cooperation from the local to the national, regional and continental level. It addresses in a holistic manner the multiple dimensions of cross-border cooperation and security. However very few African countries have so far signed, let alone ratified, the Convention. Certainly, no country in the east Africa region has done so.

There are some initiatives that the BWG should focus on to enhance the space for community participation in policy making. For instance, the EU-funded cross border project called “Engaging CSOs in Pan-African Issues” is a case in point. The project, launched in March 2017, will contribute to policies that prevent border-related conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. People living in border areas will participate in decision-making on border issues through the project which will build the capacities of civil society organisations (CSOs) to engage and support more effective and sustainable policies. One of the expected outcomes will be improved cross-border cooperation between CSOs along parts of the Ethiopia-Kenya, Kenya-Uganda, and Sudan-Eritrea borders. The partners involved in the implementation of the project alongside the Life and Peace Institute are crucial actors in the Horn of Africa Region: Inter-Africa Group (IAG, Ethiopia), Act Change Transform (ACT! Kenya) and Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI) of Uganda. The project seeks to persuade at least Kenya and Uganda to sign the Niamey convention through targeted advocacy campaigns. It will develop continental-level policy engagements and hold large community summits with representatives of final beneficiaries in the border areas. The CSOs will share the continental advocacy plan and seek the support and advice from the local communities on how to further align the communities’ concerns with the continental advocacy plan. The additional input from the communities will be documented and transmitted to the implementing CSOs (European Commission n.d.).

AU SALW Strategy

The AU Assembly adopted the 2013 AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as a corresponding Action Plan. The plan aims to coordinate, harmonize and strengthen the sub-regional arrangements by designating national focal points and establishing a Steering Committee on SALW convened by the AU Commission and composed of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The AU strategy draws on regional initiatives such as the 2002 Nairobi Convention. However, the strategy has not delivered on its promises, as it can be gauged from the continued security challenge SALW has posed in the region. To begin with, the strategy does not have a programme document (African Union 2011). African governments are often unwilling to share sensitive information on the manufacture, import, and export of weapons and ammunition. Recently, however, the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN) broke through this barrier, gathering and sharing information on the manufacture and export of SALW across the continent (AEFJN 2010). While Western institutions have most often conducted research on the trade and manufacture of arms in Africa, the encouragement and support of Africa-based research institutions, such as the AEFJN, could contribute to a culture of greater transparency.

There is also a capacity gap. While it is important to conduct a thorough needs assessment before embarking on a small arms control project, it is equally important to assess the capacity of the state to implement such a project. Numerous small arms control initiatives, including projects to mark and register arms, have been hampered by attempts to begin activities in a setting where the necessary infrastructure and legislative backing is not in place. Implementation tools should therefore be tailored to local capacities, including local technological capacities. Over-funding and duplication of projects should be addressed through increased donor co-ordination and national planning. Risks should be identified and managed early rather than focusing on crisis management, and public information should be provided by donors and beneficiary governments throughout the lifespan of a project (Alusala 2016).

Above all, and directly relevant to BWG, is that existing SALW strategies and initiatives are not sufficiently based on a community-centred approach – where community members, government officials, and security sector actors work together to identify and resolve security and safety (Saferworld 2015). As Saferworld noted, “SALW control happens around local communities and to them, not with them, by them or truly for them. It is therefore important that arms control initiatives engage fully with communities, take into consideration real needs, concerns, knowledge, and understandings of the communities for whose benefit this work is being carried out”. Ongoing work by Saferworld in Kenya around SALW control demonstrates that placing communities at the heart of local-level security initiatives is more effective, especially when all stakeholders are involved. It is against this background that Saferworld, in collaboration with the Kenya National Focal Point on SALW, Security Research and Information Centre, Isiolo Peace Link and SIKOM Peace Network, has been working with police and communities in Isiolo and West Pokot to implement community-driven arms control initiatives (Njunguna, et al. 2015).

AU Policy Framework for Pastoralism

AU’s Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa is the first continent-wide policy initiative, which aims to secure, protect and improve the lives, livelihoods and rights of African pastoralists (African Union 2010b). The framework is a platform for mobilizing and coordinating political commitment to pastoral development and emphasizes the need to fully involve pastoralist women and men in the national and regional development processes from which they are supposed to benefit. The framework also emphasizes the regional nature of pastoralist ecosystems and, therefore, the need to support and harmonize policies across the RECs and Member States. The objectives of the framework are to “secure and protect the lives, livelihoods and rights of pastoral peoples and ensure continent-wide commitment to political, social and economic development of pastoral communities and pastoral areas”, and to “reinforce the contribution of pastoral livestock to national, regional and continent-wide economies”. The framework offers the much-needed antidote to the sedentarisation agenda pushed by many governments in the

region. It also provides an avenue for BWG's engagement with governments on the ecological and economic rationality of mobile pastoralism. Despite political reforms and affirmative actions in border areas, government transformation schemes, notably Ethiopia and Uganda's, continue to have strong sedentarisation biases.

IGAD and its policies

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is another important stakeholder, particularly in the areas of security and cross-border development interventions. Within IGAD, two regional initiatives seek to contribute to resilience and sustainable development in the ASALs of the East Africa region: the Conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response (CEWARN) mechanism and the IGAD Drought, Disaster, Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI). CEWARN is one of the most visible institutional expressions of IGAD in the border areas. Set up in 2002, it remains a principal platform for regional cooperation on conflict prevention and mitigation. Its mandate is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region; undertake and share analyses of that information; develop case scenarios and formulate options for response; share and communicate analyses and response options; carry out studies on specific types and areas of conflict in the region. CEWARN is the longest functioning mechanism on the African continent in comparison to ECOWAS, AU and SADC's similar initiatives.

IGAD's most comprehensive initiative is IDDRSI, a regional response to the 2010/2011 droughts. IDDRSI builds on the Nairobi strategy, which solidly established the regional approach for a sustainable development in the ASAL of the East Africa region. It is operationalized in the form of Country Programming Papers (CCP) and a Regional Programming Paper (RPP). While recognizing the specificity of the issues in each Member State, the CPPs provide regional and cross-border priorities, which are introduced in a common RPP to guide programmes at the regional level. Resilience investments are framed along seven Priority Intervention Areas (PIAs). These are: Natural resources and environment management; Market access, trade and financial services; Livelihoods support and basic social services; Disaster risk management, preparedness and effective response; Research, knowledge management and technology transfer; Conflict prevention, resolution and peace building; and Coordination, institutional strengthening and partnerships. Like the AU, IGAD has adopted a more pastoralist-friendly development approach, one that recognizes pastoralism as an environmentally sound, economically viable and legitimate livelihood.

As such, there is a dissonance between national development policies and continental/regional development policies regarding border areas and borderland communities. Whereas governments advance sedentarisation policies that severely constrain mobility-based production, IGAD recognizes mobility as critical to resilience. The BWG advocacy needs to be aware of this policy dissonance so that it can frame the interests of borderland communities in the development language used by AU and IGAD. The BWG can also contribute to strengthening the evidence base for the rationality of mobile production practices.

Relevant to the BWG is also the IGAD's Informal Cross-border Trade (ICBT) policy framework that seeks to leverage policy shifts on ICBT to improve Cross Border Security Governance (CBSG) in the IGAD region.²³ The policy framework adopted a narrower definition of ICBT: "the small-scale cross-border trade of legitimate subsistence goods and services, which intentionally or unintentionally evade taxation and other procedures set by governments, and often goes unrecorded into official national statistics". CBSG, on the other hand, is defined as "cross-border multilateral or bilateral cooperation, coordination and collaboration among states, civil society and/or borderland communities (in this case through IGAD or bilaterally at sub-national or local level) to address threats and harness opportunities along their borders towards commonly shared peace, integration and prosperity". Many studies have attested to

²³ See Draft IGAD Policy Framework on Leveraging Informal Cross-border Trade to improve Cross-border Security Governance. Collaborative works between IGAD (CEWARN) and two CSOs - the Life and Peace Institute, and Inter-Africa Group and an academic institution, OSSREA, develop the policy framework.

the immense contributions of ICBT to the livelihoods of borderland communities in the Horn of Africa (see also *Ecology, Economy and Livelihoods*). ICBT encourages entrepreneurial activity, is an important source of food security for communities in ASALs, provides employment, and constitutes an important source of capital and savings for communities and individuals with vulnerable livelihoods. ICBT also has critical gender implications and dimensions as it provides an avenue for women's entrepreneurial activity and economic empowerment. A substantial proportion of ICBT traders in the IGAD region are women and ICBT is a critical source of income and savings for women and women-headed households. ICBT also constitutes a critical basis for regional integration in the African context. ICBT can be considered as a form of intra-African trade, which has yet to fulfill its potential. In this context, ICBT emerges as an organic and community-driven process that is facilitating and pushing regional economic integration. ICBT often reflects long-standing relationships and indigenous patterns of socio-economic interdependence, which pre-date colonial and post-colonial state boundaries.

The policy framework is also cognizant of the legitimate security concern of states at their borders. States as territorial and sovereign entities have a vested interest in controlling entry and exit of goods and people across international boundaries. While the livelihood and resilience benefits of ICBT are undeniable, the borderlands where ICBT occurs are also sites of a range of inter and intra-state conflicts and sources of insecurity such as trafficking in SALWs, human smuggling and trafficking, and trafficking in goods (e.g. manufactured goods and pharmaceuticals) that do not meet certain standards. The spectrum of human and state security challenges that characterize the IGAD borderlands necessitates a CBSG approach that allows flexibility and creativity in articulating responses to these challenges. CBSG transcends the conventional views that conceive of borders and borderlands either as 'constraints' or as an 'irrelevance'. CBSG conceptualizes borders and borderlands as sources of opportunities that, if properly instrumentalised, could translate into immense benefits in terms of enhancing the livelihoods and socio-economic development of borderland communities, enhancing the peace and stability of borderlands, facilitating and deepening inter-state cooperation, and, in the long run, advancing regional cohesion and integration in the IGAD region.

The CBSG advocates a holistic approach to developing a border governance system. This approach is inclusive of all stakeholders-states, borderland CSOs, and communities. The CBSG approach envisages policy formulation and implementation in relation to borderlands, as a participatory and consultative process that would foreground the human security needs of borderland communities in the Horn of Africa. CBSG would ensure that borderland communities emerge as key players in enhancing the peace and stability of borderlands in the IGAD region. The policy framework, and the policy objectives and recommendations it puts forward, directly address the ICBT-CBSG nexus by aiming to leverage changes in ICBT policy to enhance CBSG. In doing so, it recognizes the contributions of (subsistence-oriented) ICBT to the livelihoods and resilience of borderland communities, and, by extension, to human security. At a final stage of endorsement by the IGAD Member States, the ICBT policy framework could be leveraged by the BWG to protect and legitimize subsistence-oriented ICBT, distinct from the contraband trade in illicit goods with which governments are concerned. One of the objectives of the policy framework addresses the issue of inclusion of borderland communities in decisions affecting their lives. The strategies emphasize the inclusion of community voices and interests in policy consultations. As such, the BWG can leverage the IGAD ICBT policy framework to enhance the desirability of community approaches to borderland security in the human security sense of the term.

PRIVATE SECTOR

The private sector has become increasingly visible in border areas, particularly in extractives following the discovery of strategic high-value resources. Most of the region's hydrocarbons, minerals, land and water resources are found in the border areas. Backed by international financial organisations such as the World Bank, multi-national oil companies and agribusiness interests have started exploration and exploitation of these resources. Keen to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), governments in the

region are entering unfavourable deals, especially for borderland communities. In fact, the East African region is a latecomer in the extractives sector and most governments in the region lack a regulatory framework with regard to it. There is a strong need to engage the private sector to encourage them to adopt a genuine and robust corporate social responsibility. In so doing, the BWG should frame issues in terms of ‘smart business’, not one that might be construed as a ‘naming and shaming’ approach in its engagement with multinational companies. As shown by the protests in Ethiopia, local sense of ownership of the foreign investment schemes is low. Companies should consider how their investment benefits local communities. Not doing so would have a financial cost, as these companies are often the prime targets of public protest or social unrest. The BWG should, therefore, also advocate for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources. The EITI aims “to promote governance by strengthening transparency in the extractive industries. Revenues from the extractive industries should be an important source of economic growth and social development in developing countries. Paradoxically, however, the lack of transparency in the management of these resources has often led to conflict, corruption and poverty. The EITI seeks to address some of these challenges” (AfDB n.d.). Regional conversations on borderlands should also include China and explore ways to leverage China in improving the human security of borderland communities. Both public and private Chinese companies are active in the border areas particularly in the regional mega infrastructures, from LAPSSSET to the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway.

MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

Multilateral organisations – such as the UNDP (United Nation Development Programme), the World Bank and the European Union (EU) – have increasingly become major players in border areas. UNDP, in partnership with IGAD, the Government of Kenya and the Government of Ethiopia, is implementing a five-year comprehensive and integrated cross-border initiative to foster peace and sustainable development in the northern Marsabit county of Kenya and the southern Borana Zone in Ethiopia (2015-2020). The project seeks to redress regional imbalances, as the cross-border areas are characterized by poor infrastructure and basic service provision, low literacy levels and high poverty levels. The scarcity of resources has triggered conflict among resident communities, especially over water and grazing land. The programme is conceived within the framework of regional integration and is focused on developing the area’s untapped energy and mining resources, and meat and livestock trade, to create jobs particularly for the youth. Other pillars of the programme include improved access to health and education, and efforts to build social cohesion and trust between the communities. The programme is engaging a wide range of stakeholders including civil society, private sector, faith-based organisations, peace committees, development partners and philanthropic organisations. Community engagement is not explicitly articulated, for which the BWG can advocate.

The World Bank has implemented several projects in the borderlands. In 2014 it launched a regional development programme called Development Response to Displacement Impacts (DRDIP) targeting Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti to help mitigate the impact of forced displacement on refugee-hosting communities. The programme seeks to improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management for communities hosting refugees in target areas of the three countries (World Bank 2016). In 2015 the World Bank also launched the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLRP) which is based on the understanding that livelihood systems in the drought-prone arid lands of the Horn of Africa region have been under-resourced, leaving their population more vulnerable to external stressors such as droughts, while on the other hand, the ecosystems from which pastoralists derive their livelihoods often go beyond national borders. The RPLRP seeks to develop regional solutions to challenges faced by pastoralists who reside in the ASALs of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, in order to enhance opportunities for livelihood development. Project components include sustainable management of natural resources; market access to the intra-regional and international markets of livestock and livestock products; livelihood support; pastoralist risk

management, and project management and institutional support. The RPLRP embodies the first attempt in the Horn of Africa to deliver country specific outputs directly linked to regionally driven goal.

Over the past decade the development policy agenda of the EU has increasingly considered issues of fragility and security as crucial to development. For the countries of the Horn of Africa, a strategic framework has been adopted in the areas of governance, democracy and human rights, conflict resolution and prevention, security, and fostering inclusive economic growth and regional cooperation (European Union 2012). Some of the EU's major initiatives in the borderlands include Pastoral Initiatives; the Regional Learning and Advocacy Programme (REGLAP); the Regional Drought Preparedness Programme (RDPP); RISPA (The Regional Initiative for Sustainable Pastoralism) and PLP (Pastoralist Livelihood Programme). EU's Pastoral Initiatives operates on both sides of the border between Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya (part of the Somali Cluster) under the umbrella of humanitarian aid. The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid Coordination provides support for the livelihood of vulnerable populations by supporting diversification of livelihoods, assets protection including vaccination of animals, drought mitigation and preparedness, and the rehabilitation and construction of water systems. REGLAP, on the other hand, aims to reduce the vulnerability of pastoral communities through policy and practice change in the Horn and East Africa. REGLAP also seeks to promote the integration of humanitarian assistance with development interventions through Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) among governments, donors and national and international CSOs. The third cycle of the project has been running since July 2010 with a primary focus on Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Implemented by FAO, the RDDP focuses on technical support to Drought Risk Management (DRM), coordination and information sharing on DRM, facilitation of policy dialogue on DRM, and on support of drought preparedness activities in cross-border areas. Under the Disaster Preparedness Programme, cross-border aspects are recognized and cross-border cooperation of CSOs is supported. RISPA has four modules to support pastoralists to improve their drought preparedness: Community Management Disaster Risk Reduction, pastoralist field schools, village community banks, and early warning. The PLP covers the border areas of South Ethiopia, North Kenya, and northeast Uganda (most of the Karamoja Cluster). The programme aims at strengthening the institutional and policy framework affecting resilience of (agro) pastoral communities and the diversification of their livelihoods.

The International Office of Migration (IOM) is actively supporting several projects throughout East and Horn of Africa in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. IOM supports governments to achieve the balance between addressing security concerns on the one hand and facilitating the cross-border movement of migrants and bone fide travellers on the other. IOM activities are directed at helping governments create policy, legislation, administrative structures, and operational systems. It also provides the human resources necessary to respond effectively to diverse migration challenges and to institute appropriate migration governance. In Somalia, for example, IOM has supported the implementation of various projects designed to enhance the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland State to manage borders through support to infrastructure development and capacity building. Immigration and border management projects are also implemented in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda to improve border security, facilitate the movement of people, prevent organized crime and improve migration management through an Integrated Border Management Approach (IOM n.d.). However, there is a need for greater articulation between initiatives such as IOM's and the AU border strategy. The issue can be framed in terms of freedom of movement in the language of regional integration. The focus should be how cross border movement constitutes a resilience factor for borderland communities.

BILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

Various western governments are key actors in border management and development interventions, of which GIZ (Germany) and USAID (USA) are the major ones. GIZ is actively involved in the border areas as part of its “Support to the African Union Border Programme (AUBP)”. The programme is premised on the assumption that ill-defined borders as potential sources of conflict, especially when natural resources are discovered in the border regions. Furthermore, such borders are considered a threat to peace and security, and they hinder regional integration, economic growth and development. Implemented since 2007, AUBP’s vision is effective and sustainable border management prevents conflicts between African states and fosters integration through peaceful, open and prosperous borders. To date, more than 2,500 km of African borders have been fully delimited and demarcated as part of the GIZ project. The AU set a deadline for all African countries to delineate and demarcate their borders by the end of 2017, but only 30 percent of the entire 80,000 km borders on the continent have been demarcated (GIZ n.d.). There are various ongoing border disputes in the GHoA: the border dispute that led to a devastating war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; the maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia in the Indian Ocean; competing ownership between Kenya and Uganda over the fish-rich Migingo Island on Lake Victoria, and the Elemi Triangle border dispute between Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia in the past 50 years, which is further exacerbated by the potential oil and mineral deposits. AUBP is not as active in the East Africa region as it is elsewhere such as in West Africa. There is a pressing need for the AUBP to engage with border dispute settlement in the GHoA region before they escalate into deadly confrontations.

USAID’s major intervention in the border areas is the Peace III programme. USAID is actively involved in the borderland areas of GHoA with the objective of strengthening conflict management along the Kenya/Somalia, Kenya/Ethiopia, Kenya/South Sudan and Kenya/Uganda borders. Implemented by PACT, the programme seeks to promote stability in the region by strengthening the relationship between communities and local governments in cross-border areas and improving the ability of regional and national institutions to respond rapidly and effectively to conflict (USAID 2017).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MAJOR FINDINGS

This section draws conclusions from the review of borderlands in the study and thematic areas with a view to the way forward in research, policymaking and practice. It also identifies possible contributions of the BWG. It gathers the main points made by the contributors and research participants regarding strategies assumed to have key potential to improve border security, management and the living conditions of borderlanders. These are strategies that integrate the needs and preferences of local communities, security providers, and government institutions, promote equitable development, and harness the economic potential of the borderlands sustainably.

ECOLOGY, ECONOMY AND LIVELIHOODS

Pastoralism and development: In most of the borderlands, mobile pastoralism is the most viable livelihood, given the arid/semi-arid and unpredictable climatic conditions. Pastoralism is critically dependent on mobility and, thus, vulnerable to disruptions caused by political disputes over and restrictive security regimes around borders. The main impediment to pastoralist production is the periodic loss of livestock to drought and diseases. Reducing these losses through access to fodder and water, including across borders; decentralized and mobile low-cost provision of services; economically viable insurance systems; the generation of revenue from compensatory payment in stock, etc. are well suited to boost productivity. However, development planning remains slow in adopting insights from decades of research and experience. Too often, this results in resource alienation and degradation; decreasing productivity; redistribution of benefits to the advantage of regional elites; unsustainable population growth, increasing scarcity, inequality and tensions; disempowerment, mass-destitution and dependence.

Cross-border landscapes: The borderlands and surrounding areas are part of large socio-ecological systems that stretch across administrative and national boundaries. These systems are most productive when used flexibly but managed carefully based on the experience accumulated by the communities. Ecological and anthropological research has revealed that indigenous communities, including those without central or policing institutions, manage and protect vital resources far more successfully and sustainably than those relying on states and formal organisations. They are also far from leaving access rights undefined. Research and practice should, thus, focus on how communities protect their resource base sustainably and efficiently. Community expertise and knowledge can be used in conjunction with scientific knowledge to design appropriate policy and practice directions on resource use. This would be essential since a key avenue to improved border security is to improve the human security of the borderlanders.

Complementary livelihoods: Traditionally, borderland communities have combined pastoralism with rain-fed and flood recession agriculture, fishing, foraging and exchange/trade. Due to a combination of factors, especially demographic growth, many borderlanders are forced to exit pastoralism. In order to cope with the risks in their environment, many individuals are turning to alternative livelihoods such as, among others, mining, wage labour, and contraband. The emergence of urban centres has led not only to new economic opportunities but also to increasing pressure on resources and rising inequality. Poorer pastoralists typically resort to low-income activities (e.g. charcoal trade and casual labour), whereas wealthier households can take advantage of the commercialized livestock trade. In adaptation to a harsh environment, the region's communities have developed attitudes towards problems and adversities that combine pragmatism and soberness with toughness and resilience, flexibility and ingenuity, competitiveness with solidarity and intrepidity with a cooperative spirit. Although there is great stress on the resources they can access, most borderland communities have mechanisms and institutions to ensure equitable use and protection of key resources on which their livelihoods depend.

SOCIAL ORGANISATION, POLITICAL CONTEXT AND GOVERNANCE

With a few exceptions, all borderland communities are organized politically on decentralized principles of social organisation, such as gerontocracy, generation and age-set systems, territorial sections, clans and lineages. Open debates play important roles in community decision-making processes and in regulating access to resources such as rangeland and water. Patrilineal descent systems, patrilocal settlement patterns, and polygynous marriage are key features of gender relations. Although women do not have the same power as men, they make important contributions to internal debates, economy and food security of borderlands. Borderland communities rely extensively on social networks, both within and across ethnic or clan groups that allow for exchange, trade and reciprocal assistance during or after shocks. Centralized rules and regulations of state-based authority are often adverse to traditional participatory governance structures. Borderland communities tend to be peripheral to state interests and to lack influence in decisions made by state and development actors. Some have largely been left to their own devices while others, especially in the Somali-dominated regions, have been subjected to stricter control due to geopolitical reasons.

PEACE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY

Conflict in the borderlands includes competition over natural resources, livestock raiding, disputes over contested boundaries, historical access rights, spill-over effects of civil wars and unrest as well as the peace and security challenge posed by terrorism and violent extremism. Conflict patterns are influenced by environmental factors (resource availability), demographic factors (population growth), government policies and development practices (misguided approaches to development in pastoralist regions). The proliferation and circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) makes it difficult for formal security providers to deter or contain conflict. Moreover, in some borderlands, the problems of SALW is linked to the absence or ineffectiveness of formal security providers. The region's governments have enacted measures to control the use and flow of SALW such as disarmament, destruction of illicit weapons and ammunition, stockpile management and awareness campaigns. Despite these, there remain several obstacles in the eradication of weaponry including lack of coherent national and cross-border strategies, heavy militarization of populations (e.g. Somalia, South Sudan), and recurring human insecurity. SALW are also crucial for protecting and restoring pastoralist livelihoods. The limited resources that national governments can provide make it unlikely that there will be viable alternatives to self-protection. However, experience suggests that better integration of informal/traditional and formal security provision can lead to significant improvement even without large-scale investments.

Security provisioning in borderlands involves the military and other state apparatuses, non-state entities, private security providers, and sociocultural institutions. Some borderlands experience a heavy presence of security apparatuses due to their geopolitical positioning or heavy insecurity. However, formal security actors, where present, are largely ineffective and the relation between them and the communities remains conflictive due to heavy-handed approaches and cultural distance between formal security providers and borderland communities. In some areas, this generates grievances which violent extremist organisations such as Al Shabab exploit. The complementary capacities of borderland communities, states, regional bodies, experts and NGOs are not yet in synergy.

Local capacities for security provision and peacebuilding: Borderland communities have evolved as complex systems of social organisation in adaptation to a tough ecological and political environment. Neighbouring communities sometimes use lethal power in contests over resources that are critical for individual and collective survival, especially in periods of extreme scarcity. As borderlanders have long been at the margins of the nation states they belong to, the attempts of their respective states to provide them with reliable physical security have been weak. In many areas it is also apparent that even where state forces are deployed, they are not effective in providing security. On the one hand, this is partly because borderlanders are often proficient fighters with far superior experience and practice, knowledge of the terrain, its combat opportunities and the techniques to use them. On the other hand, peaceful

relations between rival communities, as well as the successes of their conflict management institutions and the long periods of inter-community peace indicate strong local capacities for peace making. Existing formal security provision regimes do not harness these capacities adequately. Local peacebuilding capacities provide important opportunities for synergy with formal security and conflict management strategies, especially across borders. However, local peace-making capacity is also limited, as local traditional institutions of conflict resolution are more effective in stopping conflicts and solving specific triggers of conflicts than in conflict preventions and laying the foundation for more sustainable peace. A synergy between local institutions of peace making; state security providers, as well as peace building CSOs might deliver a more effective and sustainable peace.

Building peace on economic incentives: A main avenue of achieving sustainability, growth and peace in the borderlands is supporting cross-border economies and resource sharing. Research suggests that this is crucial for policy and practice. For most borderland communities, accessing resources across borders is vital, on a regular basis but especially in times of crisis. Increasing efficiency of resource use translates into economic growth and opportunities for the generation of revenue accruing to the state. There is a frequent mismatch between what borderland communities would like the nation state(s) and development actors to do for them and what the state and development actors actually do. Moreover, the benefits that the governments and their business partners would prefer to generate from these areas and what they ultimately acquire are also discordant. This has much to do with a general lack of a deep understanding of local conditions, needs and opportunities. Borderland communities can utilize the opportunities of their geographical situation, in cooperation with development and business actors. Safeguarding and encouraging cross-border economic activities – particularly livestock/product trade, can achieve this and advocating for and ensuring community participation in negotiations on cross-border resource use.

KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND RESEARCH NEEDS

This study has identified issues of key importance for border security and borderland populations and found significant knowledge gaps that limit the ability to address these issues efficiently. Evidence-based policy making has recently gained greater traction among national governments and international development organisations. The BWG's objective of improving the life of borderland communities through engagement with the various stakeholders, therefore, needs to address gaps in knowledge and further build the evidence base. Below, we outline some of the main areas where the BWG could help generate vital insights to improve policy and practice:

- **Under-researched borderland communities:** Some borderland communities have been extensively studied, whereas there is very scant information on others such as communities along the tri-border junction between Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan (e.g., the Mao-Komo) or the Burun speaking communities along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. Up-to-date knowledge about under-researched communities' economy, demography, livelihoods, etc. would be critical in informing policy and practice.
- **Role and contribution of borderland economies:** There is insufficient information on how borderland and cross-border economies are organized and connected, how they manage resources and relations, how they contribute to national economies and what factors shape current trends in borderland economies. Yet, understanding these dynamics is important for engaging governments, donors and development professionals in constructive dialogue, and enabling them to understand and appropriately incorporate the capacities, perspectives and knowledge of borderland communities in policies, planning and practice.
- **Mobility and resilience:** As the productivity of borderland economies depends on mobility, it is imperative to have a deeper understanding of how pastoralist mobility, including across administrative and state boundaries, can be supported. Knowledge gaps on how infrastructure development, the extractives sector, and growth of settlements affect mobility need to be addressed.

- **Population growth and its implications:** While statistics show strong long-term population growth in the entire region, areas such as Turkana experience exponential demographic growth. This has led increasing portions of the population to find livelihoods or support outside pastoralism. However, our understanding of why populations grow to the extent they do is based on a very slim base of empirical knowledge. Available data is poor because it does not differentiate between social and territorial groups, provides no insight into the reasons behind reproductive choices, and gives meagre insights into the external factors that shape these outcomes. Here, in-depth population studies are needed that focus on long-term dimensions, e.g. longitudinal family and area histories, including strong qualitative components. The effects of population growth on borderland economies, livelihoods, food security and intergroup dynamics are severely under-studied.
- **Role of women in borderlands:** As much of the discourse on borderlands centres on men and male matters, e.g. livestock trade, smuggling, conflict etc., the role and agency of women remains severely under-researched. We need to know more about how women contribute to borderland economies, e.g. through livestock production, trade or other activities; about their role in household economies and in household food security; and how their experiences, understandings and practices around borders differ from those of men.
- **Dynamics of intercommunity peace and conflict:** Key questions here are: How do (a) resource scarcity, (b) population growth, (c) economic changes, (d) governance, (e) international dynamics and (f) available technology (including weaponry) influence conflict and insecurity? What factors cause shifts from conflict to cooperation and how can these be built upon? Why and how does intergroup cooperation break down? Here, the challenge is not a lack of literature. Apart from adequate data on certain issues, the main impediment is lacking clarity in data analysis. This clarity depends crucially on holistic understandings of complex contexts; the integration of quantitative and qualitative studies that harness insights and expertise of local people; as well as the efficient use of participatory approaches, citizen science methods and interdisciplinary and cross-sector cooperation.
- **Relations between formal security providers and borderland communities:** What are the specific local and regional dynamics between communities and security forces? What can formal security providers and development actors learn from communities? How can local communities be supported and how would cooperation with security forces be optimally structured? How do communities and security forces interact in daily life, in security and other matters?
- **Political economy analysis of smuggling and its links with conflict:** The contraband economy is pervasive in border areas, particularly in the Somali borderlands. However, there are serious knowledge gaps regarding the goods smuggled (both licit and illicit) and the major players. As the securitization of cross-border trade, especially on the Ethiopian side of the Somali borders, is reported as damaging livelihoods and fuelling inter-ethnic conflict between Somali and Oromo, the impact on inter-community relations and the situation of borderlands needs to be investigated.
- **Comprehensive study of the process of class formation in pastoralist areas:** Better understanding is needed regarding the internal and external factors that generate inequality and class formation in pastoralist societies. What are the forms and pathways of these new inequalities? How do destitute pastoralists cope with inequality and livestock loss and how they can be best supported?
- **Political economy of the emerging extractives sector:** Most of GHOA's hydrocarbons and minerals are found in border areas. Key questions include: What are the regulatory frameworks (if any) that govern the sector/s? How can the newfound wealth be used to improve the lives of marginalized borderland communities? Which companies are involved in extractive activities in borderlands and what is their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) track record? How can the region avoid the 'resource-curse' path and make use of its latecomer advantage?
- **Community perspectives/relations:** In-depth, qualitative studies are needed on historical and present relations vis-à-vis peace, conflict, and security in regional clusters (e.g. between Karamojong communities, Turkana-Nyangatom-Dasanach, Murle-Nuer, etc.). Cross border cattle raiding, as

well as child abduction practices mistakenly exclusively attributed to the Murle (South Sudan) while also practiced by other groups, need further understanding, especially from the Murle perspective. Studies are also needed on community-government relations, such as between locals and chiefs, Local Councils, administrators, etc.

- **Impacts of development and villagisation schemes:** Governments in the region – particularly in Ethiopia – have embarked on large scale mechanized farming linked to mega hydroelectric dams on Trans-Boundary Rivers. These schemes are mainly driven by national economic growth concerns. However, it has been argued that boosting ecologically sound production systems that build on local and scientific expertise, international capacities and national support would be critical in curtailing conflicts and avoiding the destruction of cross-border livelihood landscapes such as in the Omo-Turkana basin. The focus should be on how national, local, and international public goods can be best harmonized as well as on what regional integration frameworks and cross-sector cooperation can contribute to sustainable and equitable improvement.
- **Refugee-host relations:** The borderlands under study are currently hosting millions of refugees. While this is of utmost importance for those in need of asylum from violence and persecution, it has also generated tensions between refugees and host communities. Governments such as those of Uganda and Ethiopia are moving towards a more integrative policy. The nine pledges the Government of Ethiopia has recently made are aligned with the global CRRF. There is a need to understand the political underpinnings and the incentive structures of such integrative policies and how they will be adapted to local contexts. Specifically, what are the implications of integrative policies on fragile refugee-host relations (e.g. in Gambella) and what are viable alternatives? How can the needs of refugees be met in more conflict-sensitive ways (e.g. by distributing them more widely instead of concentrating them in conflict prone areas) and from which positive examples could lessons be drawn?
- **Aid, development and the role of the state:** How can governments and development actors make use of academic learning for programming on borderlands? How can research and analysis on border issues be effectively bridged with programming and resource allocation within development? How can state capacities be best used without impairing cross-border economies and relations?
- **Cross-sector cooperation and learning:** How can local, developmental, academic and political expertise be brought into synergy to address the key issues affecting borderlands?

RECOMMENDATIONS

EXPAND ON, ORGANISE AND PROMOTE THE USE OF KEY KNOWLEDGE INNOVATIVELY AND EFFECTIVELY

Although the evidence base on ecology, demography, livelihoods, political economies of development and security in the border areas is growing, significant work remains to be done. The BWG brings together organisations with extensive experience and expertise that have ongoing relationships with local communities and CBOs, experts and professionals. Towards this end, recommendations include: to support and/or initiate interdisciplinary studies and research on issues identified above; compile varied insights on key issues/themes affecting borderlands, which enables actors to identify solutions by conceptualising them as interactive parts of complex socio-ecological contexts; promote the use of qualitative and participatory methods to generate knowledge on borders; commission or support in-depth case studies on the reasons and dynamics of both failure and success in peace building, security provision and development; commission or participate in comparative studies of the ideas, discourses and concepts that underlie established approaches to and practices of development, peace building and security provision; compile all studies and evidence base in an easily accessible format and online

platform such as the Borderlands Knowledge Hub (BKH);²⁴ and provide a forum for cross-sector discussion on these.

PROMOTE PASTORALIST FRIENDLY CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS

With the exception of certain areas of the Ethiopia-(South) Sudan borderlands, (agro-) pastoralism is at the core of the economy, culture and social organisation of borderland communities. Yet there is a dissonance between continental and regional policy frameworks on the one hand, and national policy frameworks on the other. IGAD, drawing on AU's Framework for Pastoral Development, has clearly articulated a policy in favour of mobile pastoralism, evident in the basic assumptions of IDDRSI. However, member states, particularly Ethiopia and Uganda, and to a certain degree even Kenya, have pushed the sedentarisation agenda, purportedly to facilitate the provision of services more effectively. International experience has shown that if there is political will, it is possible to deliver mobile services to pastoralist communities. Other than the 'service provision' justification, strong agro-business interests have been identified as drivers of sedentarisation agendas. The GHoA region has become a target for large-scale commercial farming to exploit opportunities opened up by the global food crisis. As African pastoralists are among the most marginalized and vulnerable populations in the world, there is a high risk that reckless efforts of political elites to make exclusive profits from the global land rush will have devastating consequences for the pastoralists' otherwise resilient livelihoods, their participatory social institutions, and their general well-being. It is therefore critical to work on better alignment between national policies and international frameworks. The rush with which national governments and global economic players seek to 'unlock' strategic resources of border areas (e.g. water, land, hydrocarbons and minerals), and associated emerging extractives sectors have put a new economic premium in the border areas. This, in turn, incentivizes governments to use short-term strategies that unnecessarily damage sustainable economies, generates socio-economic crisis and alienation, and diminishes long-term productivity.

HIGHLIGHT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF MARGINALITY, EXCLUSION AND DISPOSSESSION

Poverty has a strong spatial dimension, as it is concentrated in specific areas. If access to modern services, cash income and expenditure are taken as core indicators, many borderlanders rank among the poorest in their respective countries (see also REGLAP 2012). The millions of people –especially those who have lost their economic base – who do in fact live in destitution or poverty, are in need of assistance. A core problem here is a lack of differentiation in the perceptions of outsiders. The needs of active pastoralists are in many respects very different from the needs of non-pastoralists. Their needs are rarely understood, appropriately considered or seriously investigated by development practitioners. Moreover, as (agro-) pastoralists remain the most efficient and sustainable economic producers, alienating resources from their economies to patch together quick short-term solutions exacerbates the problems, including those brought on by previous interventions. It is at this point that marginality has the most serious consequences for borderlanders. Their lack of influence on the decisions on their lives, on the aims and strategies of development interventions, and the approaches to security provision is dangerous. The problem is not that their homelands are geographical peripheries from a nation-centred perspective; rather, it is that their voices are marginal in pertinent political arenas. This makes them vulnerable to more powerful interest groups. Consequently, the increasing interest in economic resources of the borderlands frequently turns out to be detrimental to their own well-being.

This is also a security problem. A growing sense of victimhood, mistreatment and exclusion breeds anger, resentment, and distrust that makes border regions susceptible to extremist ideologies and movements. In Kenya, the most serious security problem – Al Shabaab – has not only affected borderlanders but also people

²⁴ By February 2018, the BKH was not online and there were ongoing discussions on the platform's final name and connection to the BWG. However, the currently named BKH is an online platform where, among other things, it is possible to access existing studies and research on borderlands organized thematically and geographically.

in the major demographic and economic centres. It has also been a constant political embarrassment for the national government. In Ethiopia, militant resistance against authoritarian and coercive governance, forced transformation, and resource grabbing is spreading, including in the border regions from east to west. In Uganda, the authoritarian transformation policies imposed under military rule in Karamoja have foreseeably failed to produce the proclaimed objectives, and, have, instead, ruined a vibrant pastoralist economy that is only slowly recovering with the gradual revoking of these policies. In Somalia and South Sudan, non-inclusive governance has corroded the very foundations of statehood so systematically that both remain largely textbook examples of failed statehood (though with instructive exceptions like Somaliland). Many of the political reforms governments have undertaken, such as Ethiopia's federal project, Kenya's devolution, and Uganda's decentralization are important steps in the right direction. However, much remains to be done to meet their core objective to give the people more influence in decisions and practices affecting and shaping their collective wellbeing.

ADVOCATE FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS AND SECURITY PROVISION

Decades of practical experience and research have led to a growing consensus that development interventions and security policy, especially in border areas, can only be addressed efficiently through the adoption of a regional approach. This approach takes into account the embeddedness of local problems in social, ecological and political cross-border systems. Cross-border livelihoods, ethnicity, mobility and conflicts are interwoven in a complex system of relations that need to be considered thoroughly. Tapping the full potential of any area is only possible if these relations, their foreseeable interplay with changes caused by interventions and the consequences are appropriately analysed. As in other regards, we can and should learn from the regions' communities. In this case, it would involve viewing the borderlands from an integrated, holistic perspective that reveals opportunities beyond imported, ready-made development or security concepts that are uninformed by the conditions of the region and the people whose lives they are supposed to transform. While the regional approach has gained significant traction among governments and development actors and is informing the work of institutions like the AU and IGAD, national and sub-national frameworks continue neglecting it. One of the most important opportunities the BWG can provide is the popularization/use of existing and emerging regional institutions and forums, platforms and policy frameworks. These would facilitate discussions towards better-informed policies, more efficient cooperation and more inclusive practices that cause less social and ecological damage and generate more sustainable and equitable benefits.

HELP CREATE POLICY SPACE FOR BORDERLAND COMMUNITIES IN DECISION-MAKING AND SECURITY PROVISION

Security provision has largely been a community matter in vast parts of the borderlands, although the state has, by no means, been inactive. However, while most of the borderlands have very little of the kind of state presence that contains violent cross-border and intra-borderland conflict efficiently (most pronounced along the common borders of South Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia), there are structures of surveillance and enforcement in most of them. A main obstacle to efficient conflict management in the borderlands is the low degree of integration between the social systems of the borderland communities, the state and other actors. This deficiency is rooted in cultures of exclusion on all sides. As their capacities are complementary, it seems plausible that a key avenue to increasing efficiency is to jointly develop, test, implement and analyze structures of cooperation and task sharing (see also Danish Demining Group 2016). Such an enterprise should build on a thorough analysis of past and present experiences with cooperative security provision and development in the region and beyond. It should tap into the vast local expertise, make thorough use of the sound scientific expertise accumulated over the decades, involve practitioners in a systematic dialogue, and include a focus on the design of formal structures that regulate this cooperation. Experience shows that there are many risks involved in such endeavours.

Among them are the collusion of locals and security personnel in illicit activities, the use of the power of office, the use of force in pursuit of selfish and anti-social interests, and uses of local recruitment and other forms of cooption of members of local communities with primarily negative effects on their credibility. The deficiency of the present border (land) management systems is, in large part, owed to the narrowness of the established governance and decision-making mechanisms. This calls for a cross-sector brainstorming exercise collecting suggestions and innovative concepts from a wide range of qualified contributors, including locals. This can start from individual research and publications projects, cross-sector workshops and learning spaces, but should ideally form a permanent cross-sector forum in which practical and axiomatic issues of key importance can be addressed.

A key field of questions is in which precise ways members of pastoralist and other borderland communities could be recruited or cooperatively integrated into state-run security provision structures. This would include discussions on how local communities could best ensure border(land) security themselves autonomously, and how this can productively include the cooperation of the state and other actors. In our view, such an endeavour is massively impeded by counterproductive attitudes towards local practices. Informal practices and institutions among local communities are still considered inferior to “standard” practices, even where the former have shown better success. It must be analyzed and explained why locals are often more efficient than formal security forces, how their capacities could be brought to maximum synergy with formal and cross-sector cooperative arrangements, and what and how security providers, peace building efforts and conflict-sensitive development planning can learn from them. Current practice is based on views that define illiterate and local people as generally in need of “education” and “increased awareness”, i.e. in need of ‘literate’ knowledge. The failures of established formal models of security provision and development suggest that community capacities should be seen as key complements. As part of this process, the value of socio-cultural education systems that transmit crucial skills, knowledge and capacities to young borderlanders that enable them to make use of sophisticated herding, resource management, and social regulation techniques needs to be recognised and embraced. Rather than being sidelined, local knowledge needs to be integrated with useful scientific, legal, and practical knowledge.

A promising emerging field where this knowledge exchange process is being explored is the combined use of qualitative, participatory and citizen science methods. This can contribute to the viability of projected solutions by building the capacity of their designers and implementers. In-depth case studies on the reasons and dynamics of both failure and success in peace building, security provision, and development are also indispensable. These can be accompanied by comparative studies of the ideas, discourses, and concepts that underlie established approaches to and practice of development, peace building, and security provision. The BWG has a unique potential to provide a forum for cross-sector discussion, learning, and innovation regarding these issues. Regular workshops, a systematic publication programme building an accessible state-of-the-art knowledge base on the borderlands of GHoA and issues central to their situation, and cross-sector cooperation on knowledge production and dissemination can result in useful contributions.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING LIVELIHOODS, SECURITY AND COOPERATION

- Move away from quick fixes to isolated problems towards holistic long-term approaches.
- Institutionalise cross-sector cooperation, including CBOs, NGOs, communities, academic and research institutions, local and national governments, cross-border initiatives, regional and international organisations.
- Integrate elements of cross-sector research and learning (What is working? Where are the problems? What do people believe to be appropriate responses to specific problems?).
- Incorporate practical and academic work by making learning an integral part of all programming, providing time and spaces for programme staff, local beneficiaries and partners across sectors to come together in regular intervals, discuss and jointly analyse experiences, insights and relevant information to generate

better understanding of issues.

- Develop relationships between organisations working in the borderlands and academic and research institutions. This would allow for the integration of insights from practical, on-the-ground work and academic learning.
- Support the creation of cross-sector, cross-border conflict management and peace building systems integrating communities with formal security and government actors, CSOs, NGOs and other stakeholders.
- Develop programmes where community members can engage positively with security and peace building actors.
- Advocate for the protection of subsistence-oriented Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT) as distinct from the conflictual rent-seeking smuggling economy; advocate for IGAD's draft policy framework of ICBT.
- Pay attention to growing inequality in pastoral societies and support poor and stockless pastoralists. Greater attention to upcoming and growing peri-urban settlements is also required. Investigate employment and labour trends among poor and stockless pastoralists in order to devise appropriate ways to support new, alternative livelihoods.
- Bring in international best practices towards a more locally inclusive extractive sector.
- Explore combinations of traditional and scientifically informed rangeland management practices with an aim to sustainably improve pastoralist production.
- Promote mobile pastoralism-friendly continental and regional policy frameworks (e.g. AU's policy on pastoralism); increase understanding of benefits of pastoralism among national policy makers and even local governments; advocate for the inclusion of pro-pastoralist policies in national development policies
- Advocate for development approaches that go beyond resource extraction and mono-cropping.
- Analyse possible pathways for the reduction of armed conflict, SALW proliferation and counter-productive security operations. Promote the role of communities and customary authorities in managing conflict. Advocate for active engagement with local government and customary authorities that avoids co-option and is based on a spirit of partnership.
- Advocate for conflict- and side-effect sensitive humanitarian approaches.
- Explore refugee policies that avoid conflicts with host communities, e.g. through more decentralised residence allocations and incentives to locals.
- Explore and promote mobility-friendly border management approaches, efficient cross-border use of pastoral resources and un-bureaucratic visa policies supporting cross-border value chains.



ANNEX I: TABLES

TABLE 1: ITEMS CONTROLLED AND CONFISCATED WHILE INFORMALLY EXPORTED FROM ETHIOPIA

Items Exported	Values of Livestock and Commodities in Birr from 2011 to June 2015					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Cattle	12,561,997	12,502,653	18,780,336.75	9,173,723.15	14,083.911	67,102,620.90
Sheep	643,258	479,335	1,059,283.50	1,512,019.15	1,728,865.50	5,422,761.15
Goat	763,300	361,392	507,298	1,182,274.26	1,684,161.80	4,499,426.06
Camel	289,100	761,750	1,084,307.50	580,050	344,272	3,059,479.50
Donkey		20,000	41,230	8,000	32,400	101,630
Sub-Total	13,614,397	14,125,130	21,472,456	12,456,067	3,803,783	77,126,438
Total (livestock + other commodities)	29,505,467.60	26,613,664.24	40,475,997.94	29,162,297.95	27,840,139.21	153,597,566.94
% of livestock from total	46.14	53.07	53.05	42.71	13.66	50.21
% of cattle from total	42.58	46.98	46.40	31.46	0.05	43.69

Source: Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authorities cited in Life and Peace Institute (2015)

TABLE 2: NUMBER OF LIVE ANIMALS EXPORTED THROUGH BERBERA PORT (2008-2016)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Camel	18,517	19,047	98,188	106,167	101,686	73,789	63,385	54,039	55,723
Cattle	59,519	88,810	134,934	150,905	190,606	202,548	245,950	150,880	151,288
Sheep and goat	940,976	1,550,554	2,352,217	3,116,978	3,191,434	2,852,875	3,054,416	3,159,883	2,806,612
Total	1,019,012	1,658,411	2,585,339	3,374,050	3,483,726	3,129,212	3,363,751	3,364,802	3,013,623
Likely origin from Ethiopia (40 % of total exported through Berbera)									
Camel	7,407	7,619	39,275	42,467	40,674	29,516	25,354	21,616	22,289
Cattle	23,808	35,524	53,974	60,362	76,242	81,019	98,380	60,352	60,515
Sheep and goat	376,390	620,222	940,887	1,246,791	1,276,574	1,141,150	1,221,766	1,263,953	1,122,645
Total	407,605	663,364	1,034,136	1,349,620	1,393,490	1,251,685	1,345,500	1,345,921	1,205,449

Source: Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (http://www.somalilandchamber.com/?page_id=16) Data available after April 2018

TABLE 3: EXPORT EARNINGS (USD) FROM KHAT, LIVESTOCK AND VEGETABLES

Fiscal Year	Total formal exports	<i>Khat</i> sub-total	Livestock and livestock products sub-total	Vegetable sub-total
2008/09	88,976,933.41	84,376,315 (94.83 %)	4,600,618.41 (5.17 %)	
2009/10	160,056,711.21	142,579,745 (89.08 %)	16,805,229.12 (10.50 %)	604,018.84 (0.38 %)
2010/11	206,916,644.14	162,696,105 (78.28 %)	35,764,061.29 (17.28 %)	8,217,480.79 (3.97 %)
2011/12	234,305,509	168,779,560 (72.03 %)	49,146,988 (20.98 %)	15,761,495 (6.73 %)
2012/13	262,954,162.39	196,474,975 (74.72 %)	46,197,127.40 (17.57 %)	19,100,822.26 (7.26 %)
2013/14	325,088,715.61	215,725,885 (66.36 %)	85,169,715.65 (26.20 %)	21,931,256.31 (6.75 %)
2014/15	260,730,029	205,176,950 (78.69 %)	28,243,001 (10.83 %)	24,476,492 (9.39 %)
2015/16	277,435,561.53	195,539,725 (70.48 %)	50,891,612.33 (18.34 %)	28,739,975.82 (10.36 %)
2016/17	266,672,347.84	204,210,145 (76.58 %)	17,622,484.96 (6.61 %)	41,659,430.18 (15.62 %)

Source: Annual reports from Jijiga Branch of the Ethiopian Customs Authority

ANNEX II: AUTHOR PROFILES

LEAD RESEARCHERS

Immo Eulenberger is a social anthropologist working in the Ateker region of Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda since 2008. He is presently completing his PhD thesis on cooperation, conflict and boundaries in Ateker societies, the role of their changing structures and dynamics in history and human evolution at the Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. He is also engaged with research on the conflict-resource use nexus with SIPRI, the Omo-Turkana and Lands of the Future research networks.

Dereje Feyissa, PhD is Senior Research Advisor to the Life and Peace Institute, Horn of Africa Research Program and adjunct Associate Professor at Addis Ababa University. He specializes in borderlands, conflicts, inter-community and state-community relations in Northeastern Africa. He is the author and co-editor of several books on ethnic identity and borderland issues, notably “Resourcing state borders and borderlands in the Horn of Africa” (2008). He is a Fellow of the Humboldt Foundation and Max Planck Institute.

Padmini Iyer, PhD is an anthropologist specializing in pastoralism, social risk management strategies, and, more broadly, evolutionary and cross-cultural theories of cooperation. Her PhD dissertation investigated risk buffering friendship networks in Karamoja. She has led fieldwork in Karamoja and in its borderlands since 2012. Besides working as an independent consultant, she is Technical Advisor to the Karamoja Development Forum, and a Visiting Research Associate at Rutgers University’s Department of Anthropology.

REGIONAL EXPERTS

Fana Gebresenbet, PhD is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, and a Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa. His PhD dissertation investigated the political economy of land investments in Gambella region of Ethiopia. He has also researched the political economy and conflict implications of sugar industrialization in South Omo Zone (Ethiopia), and on the effects of trade in the Somali region of Ethiopia.

Fekadu Adugna Tufa, PhD is an Assistant Professor at Addis Ababa University, Department of Social Anthropology. His research areas of interest are borderland studies, migration, identity studies, conflict and conflict management, land deals, and pastoralism. He is also Addis Ababa University’s coordinator of “Borderland Dynamics in East Africa Project”, a network of the Universities of Khartoum (Sudan), Makerere (Uganda) and Bergen (Norway). He was a 2016 fellow of Social Science Research Council (SSRC), based in New York.

Samuel Tefera, PhD is an Assistant Professor and Associate Dean for Research and Technology Transfer at the College of Social Sciences in Addis Ababa University. He has been working with pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in Ethiopia. He has been a consultant for OXFAM GB and has led the South Omo-Turkana cluster of the European Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa.

Markus Virgil Hoehne, PhD is Lecturer at the Institute of Social Anthropology at the University of Leipzig. He works on conflict, identity, state formation, borderlands, transitional justice and forensic anthropology in Somalia. He is the author of *Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions* (RVI 2015), the editor of a special issue on *The effects of ‘statelessness’ Dynamics of Somali politics, economy and society since 1991* (Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2013), and co-editor of *Borders and borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa*.

Augustine Lokwang Ekitela is a retired military officer, currently the County Security Advisor and a member of the Strategy Delivery Unit in the Office of the Governor of Turkana County, Kenya. He is finalizing a Master of Science in Governance, Peace and Security at the Africa Nazarene University, Kenya. He has over 15 years of experience in government, private and humanitarian sectors involving coordination of projects on asset protection, conflict and public security risks. He is the Director and

Founder of the Ateker Research Centre in Turkana.

Dave Eaton, PhD is an Associate Professor of African and world history at Grand Valley State University in Allendale, Michigan. He is also affiliated with the Global Studies Program and the Department of African and African-American Studies at Grand Valley State. He has published on cattle raiding along the Kenya-Uganda border, and worked as a consultant on the impact of food aid in Karamoja.

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